發(fā)布時間：2018-06-10 10:26

  本文選題：管理者自利 + 費用粘性�。� 參考：《鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學院》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：費用粘性概念的提出推翻了傳統(tǒng)費用習性假設(shè)所認為的企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)量與費用呈線性變動關(guān)系,撼動了傳統(tǒng)費用習性假設(shè)在傳統(tǒng)管理會計理論中的基礎(chǔ)地位,促使我們必須重新思考傳統(tǒng)費用習性假設(shè)在新經(jīng)濟形勢下的普適性,變革傳統(tǒng)的費用控制和管理理念,改善企業(yè)績效。已有研究成果多以其存在性、成因及影響因素等為切入點,鮮有學者就費用粘性的經(jīng)濟后果進行研究,這使得新形勢下企業(yè)控制自身費用粘性水平、改善業(yè)績無據(jù)可依。企業(yè)管理層作為企業(yè)費用行為選擇的直接決策者,其行為必然會影響到費用粘性與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關(guān)系;因此,通過約束管理者行為來改善企業(yè)業(yè)績不失為一個新的視角。為考察費用粘性、管理者自利與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關(guān)系,選取我國A股制造業(yè)上市公司2011-2015年的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)進行實證研究,結(jié)論如下:(1)我國A股制造業(yè)上市公司中,費用粘性與企業(yè)短期業(yè)績呈顯著的負相關(guān)關(guān)系,費用粘性程度越大,企業(yè)的短期業(yè)績表現(xiàn)越差;(2)相反地,費用粘性與企業(yè)長期業(yè)績呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,企業(yè)維持一定的費用粘性水平有利于其長期業(yè)績表現(xiàn);(3)管理者自利行為進一步增強了費用粘性與企業(yè)短期業(yè)績的負相關(guān)關(guān)系,不利于企業(yè)的短期業(yè)績表現(xiàn);(4)管理者自利行為削弱了費用粘性與企業(yè)長期業(yè)績的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,有損于企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績表現(xiàn)。結(jié)合實證研究結(jié)論,提出充分發(fā)揮董事會監(jiān)督職能、合理設(shè)計制約和激勵合同等相關(guān)管理啟示。將費用粘性、費用粘性成因(管理者自利)及其經(jīng)濟后果(企業(yè)業(yè)績)納入同一研究框架下,不僅進一步擴大了費用粘性的研究范圍,而且為控制企業(yè)費用、改善企業(yè)業(yè)績提供了嶄新的視角,是本文的亮點之一。此外,本文的另一特色為實證部分借鑒了國內(nèi)學者鮮用的WEISS模型來計算各個年度單個企業(yè)的費用粘性水平,克服了ABJ模型的重大缺陷。
[Abstract]:The concept of cost stickiness overturns the traditional assumption that the business volume and the cost change linearly, which shake the basic position of the traditional expense habit hypothesis in the traditional management accounting theory. Therefore, we must rethink the universality of the traditional cost habit hypothesis under the new economic situation, change the traditional cost control and management concept, and improve the enterprise performance. Most of the existing research results are based on their existence, causes and influencing factors. Few scholars have studied the economic consequences of fee stickiness, which makes enterprises control their cost stickiness level and improve their performance under the new situation. As the direct decision makers in the choice of enterprise expense behavior, the behavior of enterprise management will inevitably affect the relationship between cost stickiness and enterprise performance; therefore, it is a new perspective to improve enterprise performance by constraining managers' behavior. In order to investigate the relationship between cost stickiness, self-interest of managers and enterprise performance, the financial data of A share manufacturing listed companies in China from 2011 to 2015 are selected for empirical study. The conclusions are as follows: 1) A share manufacturing listed companies in China. The higher the cost stickiness is, the worse the short-term performance is. On the contrary, the cost stickiness has a significant positive correlation with the firm's long-term performance. Maintaining a certain level of cost stickiness is beneficial to the long-term performance of enterprises. (3) the self-interest behavior of managers further strengthens the negative correlation between cost stickiness and short-term performance. (4) the self-interest behavior of managers weakens the positive correlation between the cost stickiness and the long-term performance of the enterprise, and damages the long-term performance of the enterprise. Combined with empirical research conclusions, this paper puts forward some relevant management implications, such as giving full play to the supervisory function of the board of directors, reasonably designing restriction and incentive contracts, and so on. The cost stickiness, the cause of cost stickiness (managers' self-interest) and its economic consequences (enterprise performance) are included in the same research framework, which not only expands the scope of the study of cost stickiness, but also controls the cost of the enterprise. Improving the performance of enterprises provides a new perspective, is one of the highlights of this paper. In addition, another characteristic of this paper is that the empirical part uses the WEISS model, which is rarely used by domestic scholars, to calculate the cost viscosity level of individual enterprises in each year, which overcomes the major defects of ABJ model.
【學位授予單位】：鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學院
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F425;F406.7

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本文編號：2002891