本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國國有企業(yè)投資效率研究　出處：《北京外國語大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 投資效率 國有企業(yè) 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 政治關(guān)聯(lián)

【摘要】：在全面深化改革的大背景下,在國民經(jīng)濟中居于關(guān)鍵地位的國有企業(yè)正在中國經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型過程中發(fā)揮著舉足輕重作用。眾所周知,國有企業(yè)體量龐大,根基深厚,在資源配置方面把握這國民經(jīng)濟的命脈。正是因為這樣的原因,研究國有企業(yè)對于把握經(jīng)濟發(fā)展全局有著不容忽視的意義,值得深入探索和發(fā)掘。隨著改革的步步深入,國有企業(yè)的投資效率正逐步成為各方關(guān)注的焦點。作為拉動經(jīng)濟增長的三駕馬車之一,投資對于國民經(jīng)濟的增長及其結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整發(fā)揮著不容忽視的作用。當(dāng)前,我國國有企業(yè)呈現(xiàn)出的過度投資、投資不足等問題,投資效率仍有較大的提高空間。另一方面,學(xué)術(shù)界對于國企投資效率的研究起步較晚,當(dāng)前的研究并不透徹。因此,針對我國全面深化改革的特殊背景,研究國企投資效率及其影響因素具有十分重要的意義。當(dāng)今中國正處于改革攻堅期,一系列全面深化改革的政策正在有序推進。論文擬以制造業(yè)為例,通過相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析,結(jié)合實踐經(jīng)驗,就國有企業(yè)所有權(quán)制度、公司治理、政治關(guān)聯(lián)等因素與國企投資效率的關(guān)系進行研究,以期為新時期的國有企業(yè)改革提供一定的參考。投資效率即為投資收益與投資成本之比。近年來,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對企業(yè)的投資效率進行了大量研究,但基于不同的目的和視角,對其定義卻沒有一個公認的概念。一般說來,投資效率有效率投資和非效率投資兩個表現(xiàn)方式,非效率投資又分為投資不足和投資過度。在樣本選擇方面,利用萬德數(shù)據(jù)庫,選取在上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所上市的制造業(yè)國有企業(yè)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進行分析,利用2000年至2015年在滬深兩市制造類國有企業(yè)作為樣本。本文借鑒Bertrand和Mullainathan提出的雙重差分法構(gòu)建模型,并通過實證回歸的殘差來衡量過度投資和投資不足程度,以此分析國有股權(quán)控制和高管政治關(guān)聯(lián)對國有企業(yè)的投資效率的影響。在模型中,還引入了企業(yè)投資規(guī)模、銷售增長率、經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金流、總資產(chǎn)收益率、資產(chǎn)負債率、大股東控制度、公司規(guī)模和總資產(chǎn)周轉(zhuǎn)率等解釋變量。通過實證分析,筆者得出了以下結(jié)論。第一,國有股東控制權(quán)與高管政治關(guān)聯(lián)二者中的單一因素對企業(yè)投資效率具有負面影響。第二,國有控制權(quán)和高管政治關(guān)聯(lián)的復(fù)合作用對企業(yè)投資效率有積極影響。第三,在國企中,政府可以通過留存對企業(yè)的控制權(quán)同時任命具有較強政治關(guān)聯(lián)的高管人員,借此提升企業(yè)的整體的投資效率。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)對新時期中國國有企業(yè)的改革實踐具有一定的參考意義。各級政府可以通過牢固把握國有股權(quán)以及對高管的認識刁培來實現(xiàn)對企業(yè)的控制,在此基礎(chǔ)上提升企業(yè)投資效率。
[Abstract]:Under the background of deepening the reform in an all-round way, the state-owned enterprises, which occupy a key position in the national economy, are playing an important role in the process of China's economic transformation. As we all know, the state-owned enterprises have a large volume and deep foundation. It is precisely because of this reason that the study of state-owned enterprises is of great significance to grasp the overall situation of economic development. With the deepening of the reform, the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is gradually becoming the focus of attention. Investment plays an important role in the growth of the national economy and its structural adjustment. At present, the problems of excessive investment and insufficient investment in state-owned enterprises in China appear. On the other hand, the academic research on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises started relatively late, the current research is not thorough. Therefore, in view of the special background of China's comprehensive deepening reform. It is of great significance to study the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and its influencing factors. Nowadays, China is in the period of reform and a series of policies to deepen the reform are advancing in an orderly manner. This paper intends to take the manufacturing industry as an example. Through the empirical analysis of relevant data, combined with practical experience, this paper studies the relationship between state-owned enterprise ownership system, corporate governance, political association and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In order to provide a certain reference for the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period, investment efficiency is the ratio of investment income and investment cost. In recent years, domestic and foreign scholars have carried out a large number of research on the investment efficiency of enterprises. However, based on different purposes and perspectives, there is no accepted concept to define it. Generally speaking, efficient investment and inefficient investment are two ways of expression. Inefficient investment is divided into underinvestment and overinvestment. In the aspect of sample selection, we use Wande database. The relevant data of state-owned manufacturing enterprises listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are analyzed. From 2000 to 2015, manufacturing state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are used as samples. This paper uses the dual difference method proposed by Bertrand and Mullainathan to construct the model. And through empirical regression residual to measure the degree of overinvestment and insufficient investment, so as to analyze the impact of state-owned equity control and senior executives political connections on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In the model. The paper also introduces some explanatory variables, such as investment scale, sales growth rate, operating cash flow, total return on assets, asset-liability ratio, controlling degree of large shareholders, company size and total asset turnover. The author draws the following conclusions. Firstly, the single factor of state-owned shareholder control and executive political connection has a negative impact on enterprise investment efficiency. Second. The combination of state-owned control and the political connection of senior executives has a positive impact on the efficiency of enterprise investment. Third, in the state-owned enterprises. The government can appoint executives with strong political connections by retaining control of the business. In order to improve the overall investment efficiency of enterprises, this discovery has certain reference significance for the reform practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the new period. Governments at all levels can firmly grasp the state-owned equity rights and the understanding of senior executives. To realize the control of the enterprise. On this basis, improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國語大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F425;F406.7

【參考文獻】

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1 張丹;李永，

本文編號：1378193