【摘要】：以2007～2009年被大股東減持的滬深A(yù)股上市公司作為樣本,運(yùn)用OLS與Logistic回歸方法,實(shí)證分析了大股東通過(guò)操縱重大信息披露在股份減持過(guò)程中的隧道行為。得出了在減持前30個(gè)交易日被大股東減持的上市公司有顯著的正累計(jì)超常收益,但減持后30個(gè)交易日則出現(xiàn)顯著的負(fù)累計(jì)超常收益;被大股東減持的上市公司在減持前披露"利好"消息、減持后披露"利空"消息的概率高;民營(yíng)控股上市公司大股東操縱上市公司信息披露的概率較高;公司估值(托賓值)越高,大股東信息操縱行為的概率也越大;被減持公司的凈資產(chǎn)收益率(ROE)與總資產(chǎn)收益率(ROA)對(duì)大股東信息操縱行為的概率不存在顯著影響等結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:Taking the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies which were reduced by the major shareholders from 2007 to 2009 as a sample, this paper empirically analyzes the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders in the process of stock reduction by manipulating the major information disclosure by using the OLS and Logistic regression methods. It is concluded that the listed companies that have been reduced by the major shareholders in the 30 trading days before the reduction have significant positive cumulative extraordinary returns, but there are significant negative cumulative extraordinary returns in the 30 trading days after the reduction. The listed companies that have been reduced by large shareholders have high probability of disclosing "good news" before and after the reduction, while the large shareholders of private holding listed companies have a higher probability of manipulating the information disclosure of listed companies, and there is a high probability of disclosing "positive news" before and after the reduction of the holdings of listed companies. The higher the corporate valuation (Tobin value), the greater the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the large shareholders, and the conclusion that the reduced return on assets (ROE) and the total return on assets (ROA) have no significant influence on the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the major shareholders.
【作者單位】： 天津大學(xué)管理與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)部;
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

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本文編號(hào)：2440569