【摘要】：隨著全球經(jīng)濟網(wǎng)絡(luò)的迅速發(fā)展,商家與消費者均對電子商務(wù)表現(xiàn)出高漲的熱情,電子商務(wù)的發(fā)展促進經(jīng)濟和金融業(yè)的發(fā)展,但同時也對現(xiàn)代銀行業(yè)、信用產(chǎn)業(yè)提出了更大的挑戰(zhàn)。2004年,深圳爆發(fā)了“銀商之爭”導(dǎo)致電子支付系統(tǒng)接近癱瘓；2013年2月,中國人民銀行又正式通知各商業(yè)銀行和金融機構(gòu)下調(diào)了23%-24%刷卡支付手續(xù)費,這讓商業(yè)銀行的創(chuàng)收又增加了難度,但此項政策的出臺給商家減少了不少負擔(dān)。 在整個刷卡支付系統(tǒng)中,商業(yè)銀行和商家之間存在利益間的矛盾,這種矛盾會直接影響外部的交易市場的正常進行,本文就是試圖尋找緩解雙方矛盾的方法。就研究方法而言,本文主要把市場類型和動態(tài)博弈相結(jié)合,并引入消費者和商家對銀行卡的需求函數(shù),求解POS系統(tǒng)中交易費的精煉納什均衡解,并分析在均衡條件下各參與方的收益和最佳策略。本文研究得出的結(jié)論是： (一)在不同市場類型行下,商家在POS刷卡系統(tǒng)中的地位是不同的,那么商家的策略對銀行間交易費的影響就會不同,總的來說,商家的策略對銀行間交易費的影響是很有限的。 (二)消費者和商家對卡的需求才是影響交易費的關(guān)鍵因素,因為消費者和商家對卡的需求量變化會直接反映到銀行的市場占有率上,這樣銀行就會做出相應(yīng)的對策以爭取得到更大的市場份額,尤其是當(dāng)有多個銀行卡組織時,這種影響尤為明顯。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the global economic network, both businesses and consumers have shown high enthusiasm for e-commerce. The development of e-commerce promotes the development of economy and financial industry, but also for the modern banking industry. The credit industry has put forward a bigger challenge. In 2004, Shenzhen broke out of "the competition between banks and merchants", which caused the electronic payment system to be nearly paralyzed; In February 2013, the people's Bank of China formally informed commercial banks and financial institutions that they had lowered their fees by 23 to 24 percent, which made it more difficult for commercial banks to generate income, but the introduction of the policy reduced the burden on businesses. In the whole credit card payment system, there is a contradiction between commercial banks and merchants, which will directly affect the normal conduct of the external trading market. This paper is trying to find ways to alleviate the conflicts between the two sides. As far as the research method is concerned, this paper mainly combines the market type with the dynamic game, and introduces the demand function of consumers and merchants to solve the refined Nash equilibrium solution of transaction cost in POS system. At the same time, the paper analyzes the benefit and the best strategy of each participant under the equilibrium condition. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) under the different market types, the position of the merchant in the POS credit card system is different, then the impact of the merchant's strategy on the interbank transaction costs will be different. The impact of merchants' strategies on interbank transaction costs is limited. (2) the demand for cards by consumers and businesses is the key factor affecting transaction fees, because the changes in demand for cards by consumers and businesses will directly reflect the market share of banks. In this way, the banks will make corresponding countermeasures to gain a larger market share, especially when there are more than one bank card organization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：O225;F832.3

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