【摘要】：我國的資本市場(chǎng)自發(fā)展以來,直接投票制在各項(xiàng)涉及上市公司的重要決議上得到了廣泛的應(yīng)用,但是直接投票制不利于中小股東對(duì)自身訴求的表達(dá),為大股東侵害中小股東利益提供了可能。在這樣的背景下,為了保護(hù)我國上市公司的中小股東的權(quán)益,我國證監(jiān)會(huì)于2002年出臺(tái)規(guī)定并引入了累積投票制,規(guī)定控股股東持股比例在30%以上的公司應(yīng)當(dāng)采用累積投票制度,而控股股東持股比例低于30%的公司則擁有自主決定投票制度的權(quán)利。 目前國內(nèi)外對(duì)于累積投票制度的研究大多集中在法律設(shè)立和制度制定的層面,廣泛探討的話題包括累積投票制度的起源史,累積投票制發(fā)展和轉(zhuǎn)變進(jìn)程、對(duì)累積投票制應(yīng)當(dāng)采用強(qiáng)制主義還是許可主義、累積投票制度的正面影響和負(fù)面效應(yīng)以及累積投票制度的改進(jìn)建議等。對(duì)于累積投票制度實(shí)施的動(dòng)機(jī)和效果方面的實(shí)證研究較少,那么對(duì)于證監(jiān)會(huì)沒有強(qiáng)制規(guī)定的上市公司,也就是控股股東比例在30%以下的公司,是否也有自愿采用累積投票制的?是什么樣的動(dòng)機(jī)促使這些公司采用累積投票制?對(duì)于被強(qiáng)制采用累積投票制、自愿采用累積投票制以及未采用累積投票制的三類公司,采用了累積投票制度的公司是否有明顯的董事變動(dòng)?其中代表大股東意志的董事席位占比是否有變化?采用累積投票制對(duì)于大股東占款是否有影響?這些問題的答案,不僅有助于理解累積投票制度的實(shí)施動(dòng)機(jī)和實(shí)施效果,而且對(duì)于市場(chǎng)中未采用累積投票制度的公司、市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管者以及其他市場(chǎng)參與者提供一定的參考和借鑒。 結(jié)合我國累積投票制度實(shí)施的實(shí)際情況,本文采用實(shí)證研究的方法,梳理了2001年至2011年期間的A股主板上市公司,將研究對(duì)象公司劃分為三類：強(qiáng)制采用累積投票制度、自愿采用累積投票制度以及未采用累積投票制度。首先對(duì)2001年至2011年間自愿采用累積投票制度和未采用累積投票制度的公司進(jìn)行研究,選取相應(yīng)的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)和公司治理指標(biāo),構(gòu)建邏輯回歸模型,考察公司自愿采用累積投票制度的影響因素,研究自愿采用累積投票制度的動(dòng)機(jī)。然后本文選取2003年至2011年作為研究區(qū)間,分別從董事變更、大股東董事席位占比、大股東占款三個(gè)維度研究累積投票制度的實(shí)施效果,以采用累積投票制度作為解釋變量,構(gòu)建線性回歸模型,并進(jìn)一步考察自愿采用累積投票制度和強(qiáng)制采用累積投票制度的公司在采用累積投票制度后的實(shí)際影響。 本文的研究結(jié)果表明,增長率較高、控股股東持股比例較高的公司更有動(dòng)機(jī)采用累積投票制度。采用累積投票制度在提高董事會(huì)成員變動(dòng)幅度、降低大股東侵占方面沒有顯著作用,采用累積投票制度對(duì)降低大股東董事席位比例能夠起到一定作用。
[Abstract]:Since the development of China's capital market, direct voting system has been widely used in various important resolutions involving listed companies, but direct voting system is not conducive to the expression of minority shareholders' demands. It provides the possibility for the large shareholders to infringe on the interests of the minority shareholders. In this context, in order to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders of listed companies in China, the CSRC introduced a cumulative voting system in 2002, which stipulates that companies with controlling shareholders holding more than 30% should adopt the cumulative voting system. Companies with controlling shareholders holding less than 30% have the right to vote on their own. At present, most of the researches on the cumulative voting system at home and abroad focus on the establishment of laws and the establishment of the system. The topics widely discussed include the history of the origin of the cumulative voting system, the development and transformation process of the cumulative voting system. Whether the cumulative voting system should be compulsory or permissive, the positive and negative effects of the cumulative voting system and the suggestions for improvement of the cumulative voting system should be adopted. There are few empirical studies on the motivation and effect of the implementation of the cumulative voting system, so is there any voluntary use of the cumulative voting system for listed companies, that is, the proportion of controlling shareholders below 30%, which are not mandatory by the CSRC? What motivates these companies to adopt a cumulative voting system? For the three categories of companies which are forced to adopt the cumulative voting system, which voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and which do not adopt the cumulative voting system, are there any significant changes in the directors of the companies which have adopted the cumulative voting system? Is there a change in the percentage of directors representing the will of major shareholders? Does the cumulative voting system have an impact on large shareholders? The answers to these questions not only help to understand the motivation and effectiveness of the cumulative voting system, but also for companies in the market that do not use the cumulative voting system. Market regulators and other market participants to provide a certain reference and reference. Combined with the actual situation of the implementation of the cumulative voting system in China, this paper uses the method of empirical research to comb the A-share main Board listed companies from 2001 to 2011, and divides the research object companies into three categories: mandatory adoption of the cumulative voting system. The cumulative voting system is adopted voluntarily and the cumulative voting system is not adopted. First of all, the paper studies the companies that voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and those companies that do not adopt the cumulative voting system from 2001 to 2011, select the corresponding financial indicators and corporate governance indicators, and construct a logical regression model. The influence factors of voluntary adoption of cumulative voting system were investigated and the motivation of voluntary adoption of cumulative voting system was studied. Then this paper selects 2003 to 2011 as the research interval, respectively from the three dimensions of directors change, the proportion of the directors of the majority shareholders, the majority shareholders to study the implementation of the cumulative voting system, using the cumulative voting system as an explanatory variable. The linear regression model is constructed, and the actual influence of the cumulative voting system on the companies that voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and compulsorily adopt the cumulative voting system is investigated. The results show that the companies with higher growth rate and higher shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders have more incentive to adopt the cumulative voting system. The adoption of cumulative voting system does not play a significant role in increasing the change rate of board members and reducing the encroachment of large shareholders. The adoption of cumulative voting system can play a certain role in reducing the proportion of directors' seats of large shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.5

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