【摘要】：自1997年亞洲金融危機(jī)，特別是時(shí)隔十年，美國(guó)再次爆發(fā)大規(guī)模的金融危機(jī)以來(lái)，越來(lái)越多的國(guó)家或地區(qū)開(kāi)始重新審視銀行的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而建立顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度被奉為防止銀行擠兌的法寶。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，我國(guó)一直采用的是政府的隱性保護(hù)，這種隱性存款保險(xiǎn)制度不僅給政府造成沉重的財(cái)務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)，而且不利于銀行業(yè)的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與良性發(fā)展。對(duì)于建立我國(guó)的顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度一直是學(xué)術(shù)理論界十分關(guān)注的課題，而我國(guó)政府相繼出臺(tái)的有關(guān)法律法規(guī)，將我國(guó)的存款保險(xiǎn)制度從學(xué)術(shù)理論研究逐步引入實(shí)際的操作層面，相關(guān)部門(mén)正加緊制定我國(guó)顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度的相關(guān)政策和法律法規(guī)。但顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度是一把“雙刃劍”，，必須對(duì)其進(jìn)行合理的設(shè)計(jì)和運(yùn)作，最大限度發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的用途。所以，設(shè)計(jì)我國(guó)的顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度，既要借鑒國(guó)際的最新發(fā)展趨勢(shì)和成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)，又要審時(shí)度勢(shì)，深刻分析我國(guó)的國(guó)情和金融環(huán)境。隨著市場(chǎng)約束作為《新巴塞爾協(xié)議》中銀行監(jiān)管的“三大支柱”之一，逐漸登上歷史舞臺(tái)，因此如何將市場(chǎng)約束這一關(guān)鍵要素加入我國(guó)顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度的建立之中，從有效發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)約束和存款保險(xiǎn)的雙重作用這一新視角，研究我國(guó)存款保險(xiǎn)制度的構(gòu)建和如何運(yùn)行問(wèn)題，具有非常強(qiáng)的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文綜合運(yùn)用信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論，在對(duì)相關(guān)概念和現(xiàn)有研究進(jìn)行總結(jié)后，首先分析了隱性存款保險(xiǎn)制度對(duì)我國(guó)金融業(yè)所產(chǎn)生的不利影響，然后通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)15家銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了模型分析，驗(yàn)證了我國(guó)隱性存款保險(xiǎn)制度確實(shí)在很大程度上減弱我國(guó)市場(chǎng)約束的力量；隨后對(duì)我國(guó)建立顯性存款保險(xiǎn)制度內(nèi)部環(huán)境和基礎(chǔ)條件進(jìn)行了闡述；接著對(duì)基于市場(chǎng)約束視角下，國(guó)際存款保險(xiǎn)制度的變革和發(fā)展趨勢(shì)進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析；最后結(jié)合我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)國(guó)情和國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)，基于市場(chǎng)約束這一視角，從存款保險(xiǎn)制度的目標(biāo)定位、組織形式和基金來(lái)源、參保資格、最高理賠限額和參保費(fèi)率等方面進(jìn)行了設(shè)計(jì)，以期為我國(guó)建立市場(chǎng)約束和存款保險(xiǎn)激勵(lì)相容的存款保險(xiǎn)制度提供理論支持，促進(jìn)我國(guó)金融業(yè)的健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, especially in the past ten years, the United States has once again broken out a large-scale financial crisis, more and more countries or regions began to re-examine the systemic risks of banks. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system is regarded as a magic weapon to prevent bank runs. For a long time, our country has been adopting the implicit protection of the government. This hidden deposit insurance system not only causes a heavy financial burden to the government, but also is not conducive to the fair competition and healthy development of the banking industry. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in our country has always been a topic of great concern to academic theorists. However, the relevant laws and regulations issued by our government one after another have gradually introduced the deposit insurance system from academic theoretical research into the practical operational level. Relevant departments are stepping up the formulation of China's explicit deposit insurance system related policies and laws and regulations. But the explicit deposit insurance system is a "double-edged sword", it must be reasonably designed and operated to maximize its use. Therefore, in designing our country's explicit deposit insurance system, we should not only draw lessons from the latest international development trends and successful experiences, but also review the current situation and analyze our country's national conditions and financial environment. As one of the "three pillars" of banking supervision in the New Basel Accord, market constraint has gradually stepped onto the historical stage, so how to add the key element of market restraint to the establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in China. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the construction and operation of deposit insurance system in China from the new perspective of exerting the dual functions of market restriction and deposit insurance effectively. Based on the relevant theories of information economics and institutional economics, this paper summarizes the relevant concepts and existing studies, and analyzes the adverse effects of the recessive deposit insurance system on the financial industry in China. Then, through the analysis of the panel data of 15 banks in China, the author verifies that the implicit deposit insurance system in our country really weakens the power of market restraint to a great extent. Then it expounds the internal environment and basic conditions of establishing explicit deposit insurance system in China, and then makes a comparative analysis of the reform and development trend of international deposit insurance system from the perspective of market constraints. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country and international experience, based on the perspective of market restriction, this paper designs the target orientation, organization form and fund source, insurance qualification, maximum claim limit and premium rate of deposit insurance system. The purpose is to provide theoretical support for the establishment of a deposit insurance system which is compatible with market constraints and deposit insurance incentives, and to promote the healthy and stable development of our financial industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.2;F842.6

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