本文選題：中小企業(yè)融資 + 交易成本�。� 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,中小企業(yè)在我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的地位越發(fā)重要,其生存現(xiàn)狀得到了空前的關(guān)注。國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)的風(fēng)云變幻和國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型改革的不斷推進(jìn)使得中小企業(yè)面臨前所未有的機(jī)遇與挑戰(zhàn),為促進(jìn)中小企業(yè)發(fā)展,國(guó)家出臺(tái)多項(xiàng)措施,從財(cái)政傾斜、稅收優(yōu)惠到政策法規(guī)的保障,管理機(jī)構(gòu)的完善等,但是一直困擾中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的融資難題卻依然存在,且有愈演愈烈之勢(shì)。 相對(duì)于大企業(yè)而言,中小企業(yè)的融資方式單一,以間接融資為主且大量依賴銀行貸款。但商業(yè)銀行對(duì)待中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)的態(tài)度卻十分謹(jǐn)慎,“惜貸”現(xiàn)象十分普遍。本文選擇以商業(yè)銀行的視角考察中小企業(yè)的信貸融資問題,也正是看中商業(yè)銀行在中小企業(yè)信貸融資中的重要地位。目前針對(duì)中小企業(yè)信貸融資的研究涉及商業(yè)銀行層面的不多,而將商業(yè)銀行和中小企業(yè)的信貸行為作為互動(dòng)過程的研究又大多停留在理論分析的層面,量化分析較少。本文利用模擬仿真的手段對(duì)銀企信貸互動(dòng)過程進(jìn)行了量化實(shí)驗(yàn),試圖找到制約商業(yè)銀行中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素,為破解中小企業(yè)的融資難題提供有益思路。 本文通過對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行中小企業(yè)信貸現(xiàn)狀的分析和國(guó)外開展中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)有益經(jīng)驗(yàn)的借鑒,認(rèn)為業(yè)務(wù)的交易成本過高和潛在的損失風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大是商業(yè)銀行不愿進(jìn)行中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)的主要原因。在一定的假設(shè)條件下抽象出商業(yè)銀行中小企業(yè)信貸的靜態(tài)博弈基本模型,并將交易成本和擔(dān)保收益作為變量引入模型,分別得到交易成本模型和擔(dān)保收益模型,利用MatLab對(duì)模型進(jìn)行模擬仿真實(shí)驗(yàn),得到結(jié)論：(1)隨著銀行貸款業(yè)務(wù)的交易成本降低,其對(duì)中小企業(yè)要求的貸款抵押率下降,銀行更易做出貸款決策的同時(shí)中小企業(yè)更易得到貸款,銀企良性互動(dòng)增加。(2)增加企業(yè)違約后的銀行擔(dān)保收益,可以使銀行對(duì)中小企業(yè)的貸款抵押率以及抵押物回收系數(shù)的要求降低,銀行和中小企業(yè)更易形成合作,有利于中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展。根據(jù)得到的結(jié)論,本文提出了促進(jìn)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行中小企業(yè)信貸發(fā)展的若干對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the status of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has become more and more important in China's economic development. The changing international economic situation and the continuous promotion of domestic economic transformation and reform make small and medium-sized enterprises face unprecedented opportunities and challenges. In order to promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the state has issued a number of measures, which are in favor of finance. Tax benefits to the protection of policies and regulations, the improvement of management institutions, but has been puzzling the development of small and medium-sized enterprises financing problems still exist, and has a growing trend. Compared with large enterprises, SMEs have a single financing mode, mainly indirect financing and rely heavily on bank loans. However, commercial banks are very cautious about the credit business of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the phenomenon of "sparing loans" is very common. This paper chooses to study the credit financing of small and medium-sized enterprises from the perspective of commercial banks, which is also the important position of commercial banks in the credit financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. At present, there are few researches on the credit financing of SMEs at the commercial bank level. However, the research on the credit behavior of commercial banks and SMEs as an interactive process mostly stays at the level of theoretical analysis, and the quantitative analysis is less. This paper makes a quantitative experiment on the interactive process of bank and enterprise credit by means of simulation and tries to find out the key factors restricting the development of the credit business of small and medium-sized enterprises in commercial banks and to provide useful ideas for solving the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises. Based on the analysis of the credit situation of SMEs in commercial banks in China and the beneficial experience of developing SME credit business in foreign countries, It is considered that the high transaction cost and high potential loss risk are the main reasons why commercial banks are unwilling to carry out SME credit business. The static game model of SME credit in commercial banks is abstracted under certain assumptions, and the transaction cost model and guaranteed income model are introduced as variables to obtain transaction cost model and guaranteed income model, respectively. By using MATLAB to simulate and simulate the model, we can draw a conclusion: 1) with the decrease of transaction cost of bank loan business, the loan mortgage rate required for small and medium-sized enterprises will decrease. It is easier for banks to make loan decisions and for small and medium-sized enterprises to get loans. The number of benign interactions between banks and enterprises increases. It can reduce the demand of loan mortgage rate and mortgage recovery coefficient for small and medium-sized enterprises, and make it easier for banks and small and medium-sized enterprises to form cooperation, which is conducive to the development of credit business of small and medium-sized enterprises. According to the conclusions, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to promote the credit development of small and medium-sized enterprises in Chinese commercial banks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F224.32

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 聶爾德;;基于演化博弈視角的中小企業(yè)融資分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究;2011年06期

2 張文春;;銀企博弈視角下中小企業(yè)融資對(duì)策研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2011年11期

3 謝八妹;;論貨幣政策對(duì)中小企業(yè)信貸融資的影響——基于2004—2008年月度數(shù)據(jù)的實(shí)證分析[J];重慶工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(西部論壇);2009年02期

4 陳f^;;“小銀行優(yōu)勢(shì)”的理論突破與實(shí)踐新進(jìn)展[J];南方金融;2010年09期

5 陳曉紅,劉劍;基于銀行貸款下的中小企業(yè)信用行為的博弈分析[J];管理學(xué)報(bào);2004年02期

6 羅正英;周中勝;;國(guó)外中小企業(yè)信貸融資研究的進(jìn)展與啟示[J];國(guó)外社會(huì)科學(xué);2010年05期

7 單嬌;郭帥;;中小企業(yè)融資能力影響因素分析——基于金融危機(jī)前后對(duì)比的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2012年21期

8 王雅炯;;資本監(jiān)管下中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)困境和市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)演進(jìn)——基于銀行生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的進(jìn)化博弈分析[J];南方金融;2012年08期

9 高正平;趙建強(qiáng);;競(jìng)爭(zhēng)深化、信息成本與小企業(yè)信貸技術(shù)創(chuàng)新——民生銀行“商貸通”的啟示[J];金融論壇;2012年07期

10 孔劉柳;商業(yè)銀行的信貸合約設(shè)計(jì)與中小企業(yè)信貸問題[J];上海理工大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2000年03期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 高輝;商業(yè)銀行中小企業(yè)信貸業(yè)務(wù)之國(guó)際借鑒與研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2007年

2 姚傳偉;政府在中小企業(yè)信貸融資中的作用研究[D];天津大學(xué);2009年

，

本文編號(hào)：2028621