本文選題：上市商業(yè)銀行 + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《青島理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行對國家金融安全與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展而言意義非凡，在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離的時代背景下，高管薪酬激勵的有效性直接影響高管行為，進而影響銀行經(jīng)營績效，因此，銀行高管薪酬機制的設(shè)計長期以來備受關(guān)注。怎樣對商業(yè)銀行高層實施有效的薪酬激勵向來是研究的熱點，美國次貸危機的爆發(fā)再次將銀行業(yè)飆升的高管薪酬推向輿論的風(fēng)口浪尖，銀行高管天價高薪頻引公眾熱議。我國四大國有商業(yè)銀行的股份制改革已于2010年圓滿收官，伴隨著國有控股銀行的紛紛上市，各商業(yè)銀行也逐步加快了薪酬改革的步伐。如何完善銀行治理結(jié)構(gòu)，建立一套科學(xué)合理的薪酬激勵機制，真正實現(xiàn)激勵效果，這是銀行業(yè)進一步改革的重點，更是銀行業(yè)公司治理亟待解決的問題。 本文對中、美、德三國商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵機制現(xiàn)狀進行了對比分析，以2001-2012年間16家國內(nèi)上市商業(yè)銀行作為研究樣本，對銀行高管薪酬、銀行業(yè)績與公司治理要素進行了實證研究，探究銀行業(yè)高管薪酬的影響因素，求證高管激勵與約束機制的有效性。通過實證檢驗，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)目前國內(nèi)上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬與績效整體存在正相關(guān)的關(guān)系，銀行規(guī)模也對高管薪酬存在正向影響，相反的，銀行股權(quán)集中度越高，高管獲得高薪的可能性越低，，而銀行風(fēng)險與安全指標(biāo)與高管薪酬的敏感度則比較低。將銀行按照國有性質(zhì)分組后的實證結(jié)果顯示，各影響因素在國有控股銀行組中的顯著性低于非國有控股銀行組�；诶碚撗芯颗c實證檢驗，本文總結(jié)出我國商業(yè)銀行在薪酬激勵設(shè)計方面的特點及其不盡合理之處。我們認為商業(yè)銀行要真正實現(xiàn)對高管的薪酬激勵與約束效應(yīng)，首先需完善銀行內(nèi)部與外部治理機制，其次應(yīng)優(yōu)化薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)、構(gòu)建綜合績效指標(biāo)體系，再次，銀行業(yè)應(yīng)重視制度改革與法制建設(shè)對合理高效的薪酬機制運行的保障。此外，國有控股銀行可以通過優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、改善薪酬組合、精簡管理層等方式逐步完成更合理的改革。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are of great significance to national financial security and economic development. Under the background of the separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprises, the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive directly affects the executive behavior, and then affects the bank operating performance. The design of bank executive compensation mechanism has been concerned for a long time. How to implement effective compensation incentive to the senior level of commercial banks has always been a hot topic. The outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States once again pushed the banking industry soaring executive pay to the forefront of public opinion. The joint-stock system reform of the four major state-owned commercial banks in our country has been successfully completed in 2010. Along with the listing of state-owned holding banks one after another, the commercial banks have gradually accelerated the pace of salary reform. How to perfect the bank governance structure, establish a set of scientific and reasonable salary incentive mechanism, and realize the real incentive effect, this is the focus of the further reform of the banking industry, but also the banking corporate governance problem to be solved urgently. This paper makes a comparative analysis of the current situation of compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks in Germany, taking 16 domestic listed commercial banks as the research samples from 2001 to 2012, and makes an empirical study on executive compensation, bank performance and corporate governance elements. To explore the impact of banking executives pay factors, to verify the effectiveness of executive incentive and restraint mechanism. Through empirical test, we find that there is a positive correlation between executive compensation and performance in domestic listed commercial banks, and the scale of banks also has a positive impact on executive compensation. On the contrary, the higher the concentration of bank equity is, Executives are less likely to receive higher salaries, while bank risk and security measures are less sensitive to executive pay. The empirical results of grouping the banks according to the state-owned nature show that the significance of the influencing factors in the group of state-owned holding banks is lower than that in the group of non-state-owned holding banks. Based on theoretical research and empirical test, this paper summarizes the characteristics and unreasonable features of compensation incentive design in Chinese commercial banks. We think that in order to realize the compensation incentive and restraint effect of commercial banks, first of all, we should perfect the internal and external governance mechanism of banks, secondly, we should optimize the compensation structure, build a comprehensive performance index system, again, The banking industry should pay attention to the guarantee of reasonable and efficient salary system operation by system reform and legal system construction. In addition, the state-owned holding banks can gradually accomplish more reasonable reform by optimizing the ownership structure, improving the salary mix and streamlining the management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.33

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本文編號：2002772