本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + IPO��； 參考：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：2009年10月30日,我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板在深圳證券交易所正式上市。創(chuàng)業(yè)板的創(chuàng)立,為新興高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)及成長(zhǎng)性較高的企業(yè)提供了廣闊的融資平臺(tái),也很大程度上改善了這些新興高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)及高成長(zhǎng)性公司的融資結(jié)構(gòu),豐富了這些企業(yè)的融資方式,這是我國(guó)建立多層次股票市場(chǎng)體系邁出的第一步。與主板及中小板相比,創(chuàng)業(yè)板調(diào)整了上市條件,降低了“盈利性”要求,強(qiáng)調(diào)了“創(chuàng)新性”與“成長(zhǎng)性”,最低盈利指標(biāo)和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的成長(zhǎng)性要求的提出,使得創(chuàng)業(yè)板擬上市企業(yè)仍然存在著進(jìn)行盈余管理的強(qiáng)烈動(dòng)機(jī)。目前針對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板盈余管理的研究較少,本文選取了2011年和2012年在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的201家公司為樣本,首先從IPO盈余管理及IPO盈余管理與第三方中介相關(guān)關(guān)系兩個(gè)角度出發(fā),對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外的相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行梳理；其次,從創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市條件、市場(chǎng)特征分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)及其手段幾方面闡述了創(chuàng)業(yè)板盈余管理相關(guān)理論；接著,運(yùn)用修正的Jones模型實(shí)在檢驗(yàn)了創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)盈余管理行為存在的程度；然后,通過(guò)差異性比較、相關(guān)性分析以及回歸模型分析,檢驗(yàn)第三方因素對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)盈余管理程度的影響；最后,就實(shí)證分析結(jié)果提出了相應(yīng)建議�；贘ones模型,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司在上市前一年、上市當(dāng)年以及上市后一年的盈余管理程度在0.05的顯著水平下顯著,這就說(shuō)明創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在IPO過(guò)程中存在盈余管理行為,在上市前一年的盈余管理程度最低,上市當(dāng)年程度最高。而關(guān)于IPO盈余管理與第三方影響因素關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明：首先,從第三方中介的分布來(lái)看,高聲譽(yù)承銷(xiāo)商保薦的上市公司IPO盈余管理程度低于低聲譽(yù)組；高聲譽(yù)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)的上市公司IPO盈余管理程度低于低聲譽(yù)組；有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景的上市公司IPO盈余管理程度低于沒(méi)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景的上市公司。其次,從差異性統(tǒng)計(jì)量上來(lái)看,只有在上市當(dāng)年,十大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所與非十大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的差異顯著,這說(shuō)明會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所還是有效抑制了盈余管理程度,但其他樣本年份均不顯著,并且承銷(xiāo)商聲譽(yù)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景在上市前后也都不顯著。這就說(shuō)明,第三方并沒(méi)能在抑制盈余管理行為、降低盈余管理程度上發(fā)揮作用；從回歸模型結(jié)果來(lái)看,只有在上市當(dāng)年,較高聲譽(yù)的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所有效抑制了創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的盈余管理程度,其他年份的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所以及所有樣本年份的承銷(xiāo)商和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)盈余管理程度的影響都不顯著。這個(gè)結(jié)果與差異性檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果相符。最后文章根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果,從會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)以及投資者幾個(gè)角度提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:On October 30, 2009, China's gem was officially listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The establishment of the gem has provided a broad financing platform for emerging high-tech industries and companies with high growth, and also greatly improved the financing structure of these emerging high-tech industries and high growth companies. It enriches the financing methods of these enterprises, which is the first step to establish a multi-level stock market system in China. Compared with the main board and the small and medium-sized board, the gem adjusts the listing conditions, reduces the requirement of "profitability", and emphasizes the requirements of "innovation" and "growth", the minimum profit index and the growth of operating performance. So that gem listed enterprises still have a strong motivation for earnings management. At present, there are few researches on earnings management in the gem. This paper selects 201 companies listed on the gem in 2011 and 2012 as samples, starting from the perspective of IPO earnings management and the relationship between IPO earnings management and third-party intermediaries. Secondly, from the gem listing conditions, market characteristics analysis of the gem listed companies earnings management motivation and means several aspects of the gem earnings management theory; then, Using the modified Jones model to test the extent of earnings management behavior in gem market, and then, through the comparison of differences, correlation analysis and regression model analysis, This paper examines the influence of third-party factors on the earnings management of gem market, and finally, puts forward corresponding suggestions on the empirical analysis results. Based on the Jones model, this paper finds that the earnings management degree of gem companies is significant in the year before listing, the year before listing and the year after listing, which indicates that the listed companies of gem have earnings management behavior in the process of IPO. The level of earnings management is the lowest in the year before listing, and the highest in the year of listing. The empirical study on the relationship between IPO earnings management and third-party factors shows that: first, from the distribution of third-party intermediaries, the degree of IPO earnings management of listed companies recommended by high-reputation underwriters is lower than that of low-reputation companies; The degree of IPO earnings management of listed companies audited by high reputation accounting firms is lower than that of low reputation companies, and the degree of IPO earnings management of listed companies with venture capital background is lower than that of listed companies with no background of venture capital. Secondly, from the difference statistics, only in the year of listing, the difference between the ten accounting firms and the non-top ten accounting firms is significant, which shows that accounting firms effectively restrain the degree of earnings management. But the other sample years are not significant, and the underwriter reputation and venture capital background are not significant before and after listing. This shows that the third party does not play a role in restraining earnings management and reducing earnings management. From the regression model results, only in the year of listing, The accounting firms with high reputation effectively restrain the earnings management degree of the gem companies, while the accounting firms in other years and the underwriters and venture capital in all the sample years have no significant influence on the earnings management degree. This result is consistent with the difference test. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations from the perspective of accounting standards, securities regulatory bodies and investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

中國(guó)期刊全文數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù) 前10條

1 汪攀攀;羅殿英;;保薦機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)與創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO公司盈余管理實(shí)證研究[J];山東科技大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2014年06期

2 李音;林艷;;IPO前盈余管理與IPO抑價(jià)的相關(guān)性研究——基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板制造業(yè)上市公司的視角[J];中國(guó)商貿(mào);2014年08期

3 顧鳴潤(rùn);田存志;;IPO后業(yè)績(jī)變臉與真實(shí)盈余管理分析[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2012年01期

4 蔡春;朱榮;謝柳芳;;真實(shí)盈余管理研究述評(píng)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài);2011年12期

5 蔡春;孫婷;葉建明;;中國(guó)內(nèi)資會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所合并效果研究——基于國(guó)際“四大”審計(jì)收費(fèi)溢價(jià)的分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2011年01期

6 陳祥有;;A股發(fā)行公司IPO前盈余管理與IPO后經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2010年01期

7 陳祥有;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與IPO公司盈余管理行為的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問(wèn)題研究;2010年01期

8 黃梅;夏新平;;操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)模型檢測(cè)盈余管理能力的實(shí)證分析[J];南開(kāi)管理評(píng)論;2009年05期

9 劉富國(guó);孫娜;;IPO審計(jì)是否也存在低價(jià)攬客——來(lái)自中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];會(huì)計(jì)之友(中旬刊);2008年07期

10 劉衛(wèi)東;;淺談企業(yè)利用投資可以合理避稅[J];物流科技;2007年10期

，

本文編號(hào)：1921606