本文選題：金融監(jiān)管 + 國際合作　； 參考：《國際金融研究》2011年08期

【摘要】：金融監(jiān)管的制度差異、監(jiān)管競爭、金融創(chuàng)新導(dǎo)致金融監(jiān)管國際合作協(xié)調(diào)機制失衡,進而產(chǎn)生金融監(jiān)管套利行為。金融監(jiān)管套利容易引發(fā)金融系統(tǒng)的負外部性,導(dǎo)致金融風(fēng)險不斷累加直至爆發(fā)金融危機。金融監(jiān)管套利的盛行暴露了金融監(jiān)管體系的漏洞,推動了金融監(jiān)管國內(nèi)協(xié)調(diào)統(tǒng)一和國際合作的發(fā)展。本文從金融監(jiān)管國際合作失衡的角度,以監(jiān)管制度的成本收益和供需均衡分析為框架,運用凈制度負擔(dān)的一價定律模型和金融監(jiān)管國際合作博弈模型,探討了金融監(jiān)管國際合作不同狀態(tài)下的監(jiān)管套利問題。文章還提出了構(gòu)建具有層次性、區(qū)域性的金融監(jiān)管合作機制,加強各國協(xié)作并保持政策的一致性,拓寬金融監(jiān)管國際合作的參與主體范圍和市場領(lǐng)域,通過國際合作監(jiān)管來緩解監(jiān)管競爭,減少和消除監(jiān)管套利的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The institutional differences of financial supervision, regulatory competition and financial innovation lead to the imbalance of the coordination mechanism of international cooperation in financial supervision, which leads to the arbitrage of financial supervision. Financial regulatory arbitrage can easily lead to negative externalities of financial system and lead to financial risk accumulation until financial crisis breaks out. The prevalence of financial regulation arbitrage exposes the loopholes of financial supervision system and promotes the development of domestic coordination and international cooperation. In this paper, from the perspective of the imbalance of international cooperation in financial supervision, we use the one-price law model of net institutional burden and the game model of international cooperation in financial supervision, taking the cost-benefit and supply-demand equilibrium analysis of regulatory system as the framework. This paper probes into the problem of regulatory arbitrage under different states of international cooperation in financial supervision. The paper also proposes to construct a regional cooperation mechanism of financial supervision, strengthen the cooperation between countries and maintain the consistency of policies, and broaden the scope of the main body and the market area of international cooperation in financial supervision. Through international cooperation regulation to ease regulatory competition, reduce and eliminate regulatory arbitrage policy recommendations.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與金融學(xué)院;哈爾濱金融學(xué)院金融研究所;西安交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與金融學(xué)院金融系;
【基金】：國家社科基金重點項目(09AZD020):“我國金融監(jiān)管的制度框架、制衡機制與績效評價研究” 哈爾濱金融學(xué)院院級重點科研項目“基于金融穩(wěn)定的逆周期宏觀審慎監(jiān)管制度框架構(gòu)建研究”
【分類號】：F832.1

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本文編號：1868505