本文選題：公司治理結(jié)構(gòu) + 控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：上市公司是證券市場(chǎng)的基石,而上市公司的信息披露是證券市場(chǎng)的主要信息來源。良好的信息披露是解決資本市場(chǎng)上信息不對(duì)稱的重要機(jī)制,也是緩解代理沖突的重要手段,對(duì)于保護(hù)投資者利益、優(yōu)化資源配置、維護(hù)證券市場(chǎng)高效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)至關(guān)重要。 然而在證券市場(chǎng)中,我國(guó)上市公司大量存在著信息披露失真、不主動(dòng)、不及時(shí)、不完整、不規(guī)范等主要問題,并連續(xù)爆發(fā)各種財(cái)務(wù)丑聞事件。繼銀廣廈事件之后,盡管相關(guān)部門通過陸續(xù)推出多項(xiàng)政策法規(guī)并修訂相關(guān)法律等制度措施來規(guī)范上市公司的信息披露,但隨后又發(fā)生了杭蕭鋼構(gòu)等多起違規(guī)事件,這些事件表明信息披露問題產(chǎn)生的根源并不在于信息披露制度本身,而在于不完善不健全的公司治理機(jī)制。按照現(xiàn)代公司治理理論,公司內(nèi)、外部機(jī)制的有機(jī)結(jié)合是實(shí)現(xiàn)公司良好治理的基礎(chǔ),其中控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是衡量公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)是否完善的重要標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是一種重要的外部治理機(jī)制。 因此,該文從內(nèi)、外兩個(gè)層面著手,研究?jī)?nèi)部治理和產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響。文中選取2010年深圳證券交易所主板A股上市公司為研究樣本,并運(yùn)用logistic回歸模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,從股東制衡和董事會(huì)制衡兩個(gè)方面研究控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)上市公司信息披露的影響,然后根據(jù)證監(jiān)會(huì)行業(yè)分類標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將樣本公司分為低產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)度行業(yè)和高產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)度行業(yè)兩組樣本,分別研究處于低、高行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)度內(nèi)的上市公司控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明,上市公司的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與信息披露質(zhì)量之間具有顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,合理的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有利于信息披露質(zhì)量的提高,而產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)主要通過與公司控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)相互協(xié)作產(chǎn)生效應(yīng)：產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與董事會(huì)治理(獨(dú)立董事的比例)形成了替代關(guān)系,而與股權(quán)制衡(股權(quán)屬性、控股股東控制、高管持股)形成了互補(bǔ)效應(yīng)。
[Abstract]:The listed company is the cornerstone of the securities market, and the information disclosure of the listed company is the main information source of the securities market. Good information disclosure is an important mechanism to solve the information asymmetry in capital market and also an important means to alleviate agency conflicts. It is very important to protect the interests of investors optimize the allocation of resources and maintain the efficient operation of the securities market. However, in the stock market, a large number of listed companies in our country have many main problems, such as information disclosure distortion, inactivity, untimely, incomplete, non-standard and so on, and a variety of financial scandals have been broken out in succession. After the Yinguangxia incident, although the relevant departments regulated the information disclosure of listed companies by introducing a number of policies and regulations one after another and revising relevant laws and regulations, there were also a number of irregularities such as Hangxiao Steel structure. These events show that the root of the information disclosure problem lies not in the information disclosure system itself, but in the imperfect corporate governance mechanism. According to modern corporate governance theory, the organic combination of internal and external mechanisms is the basis of good corporate governance, in which the control structure is an important standard to measure whether the internal corporate governance structure is perfect or not. The product market competition is an important external governance mechanism. Therefore, this paper studies the influence of internal governance and product market competition on the quality of enterprise information disclosure. This paper selects the 2010 Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share listed companies as the research sample, and uses the logistic regression model to analyze the impact of the control structure on the information disclosure of listed companies from the aspects of shareholder balance and board of directors checks and balances. Then according to the CSRC industry classification standard, the sample companies are divided into two groups: low product market competition industry and high product market competition industry. The relationship between the control structure of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure. The results show that there is a significant correlation between the control structure of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure, and a reasonable control structure is conducive to the improvement of the quality of information disclosure. The product market competition produces the effect mainly through the cooperation with the company control structure: the product market competition and the board of directors governance (the proportion of the independent director) form the substitution relation, and with the equity balance (the ownership attribute, the controlling shareholder control), Executive ownership) forms a complementary effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F274;F832.51

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