本文選題：過度投資 + 自由現(xiàn)金流　； 參考：《沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，，投資已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)獲取未來現(xiàn)金流增長的方式，而一些地方也存在著“投資過熱”的現(xiàn)象，非效率投資會造成資源的浪費。在發(fā)展初期，家族企業(yè)的代理鏈短，代理成本低，一般沒有過度投資。隨著家族企業(yè)的發(fā)展，治理結(jié)構(gòu)的改變、經(jīng)理人的引入，家族企業(yè)開始有代理成本，出現(xiàn)過度投資行為,因此，探究家族企業(yè)過度投資的影響因素尤為重要。 本文查閱大量文獻和有關(guān)的理論，對上市家族企業(yè)的過度投資影響因素進行了初步的探究。首先，介紹了相關(guān)的理論基礎(chǔ)。其次，分析了企業(yè)的過度投資成因，包括委托代理成本、信息不對稱和融資約束引起的過度投資以及家族企業(yè)的概念和治理結(jié)構(gòu)的變化。最后，本文進行了實證研究。在實證部分，以2009-2011年的家族上市公司為樣本，利用Richardson（2006）模型分析了了家族企業(yè)的過度投資行為，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)存在37%的家族企業(yè)發(fā)生過度投資，這說明上市家族企業(yè)的投資效率較低。再以發(fā)生過度投資的企業(yè)為樣本，采用線性回歸、邏輯回歸方法實證研究了對家族企業(yè)過度投資產(chǎn)生顯著影響的因素。實證發(fā)現(xiàn)，上市家族企業(yè)確實有過度投資的情況。進一步地分析表明，自由現(xiàn)金流與企業(yè)的過度投資顯著正相關(guān)；控股股東的存在與過度投資產(chǎn)正相關(guān)，但作用不顯著；第一大股東的持股比例與過度投資顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。短期負(fù)債與過度投資顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，而長期負(fù)債與家族企業(yè)過度投資顯著正相關(guān)。政治聯(lián)系與家族企業(yè)過度投資顯著正相關(guān)，并且地方政治聯(lián)系的作用更為顯著。 綜合上述的實證研究結(jié)果，基于我國國情，提出減少家族企業(yè)過度投資的政策及建議。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy, investment has become the way for enterprises to obtain future cash flow growth, and some places also have the phenomenon of "investment overheating", inefficient investment will cause waste of resources. In the early stage of development, the agency chain of the family firm is short, the agency cost is low, and there is generally no overinvestment. With the development of family business, the change of governance structure and the introduction of managers, the family business begins to have agency cost and overinvestment behavior. Therefore, it is very important to explore the influencing factors of family business overinvestment. By consulting a lot of literature and relevant theories, this paper makes a preliminary study on the influencing factors of overinvestment in listed family firms. First of all, the relevant theoretical basis is introduced. Secondly, it analyzes the causes of overinvestment, including principal-agent costs, information asymmetry and financing constraints, and changes in the concept and governance structure of family firms. Finally, this paper carries on the empirical research. In the empirical part, taking the family listed companies from 2009-2011 as the sample, the author analyzes the over-investment behavior of the family firms by using Richardson's 2006) model. The results show that 37% of the family firms overinvest, which indicates that the investment efficiency of the listed family firms is low. Then, taking the overinvested enterprises as the sample, using linear regression and logical regression method, this paper empirically studies the factors that have a significant impact on the overinvestment of family firms. Empirical results show that the listed family firms do have overinvestment situation. Further analysis shows that the free cash flow is significantly positively correlated with overinvestment, the existence of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with overinvested assets, but the role is not significant, and the proportion of the first largest shareholder is negatively correlated with overinvestment. Short-term liabilities are negatively correlated with over-investment, while long-term liabilities are positively correlated with over-investment of family firms. There is a significant positive correlation between political ties and overinvestment of family firms, and the role of local political connections is more significant. Based on the above empirical results, this paper puts forward some policies and suggestions to reduce the overinvestment of family firms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F276.5;F832.51;F275

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