本文選題：物流金融　切入點(diǎn)：演化博弈　出處：《鄭州大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來,有鑒于物流行業(yè)中小企業(yè)信用度不高、審批貸款程序復(fù)雜、融資渠道狹窄、融資成本高等特征決定了其融資難。物流金融作為一項(xiàng)新興的復(fù)合型業(yè)務(wù),可以解決中小企業(yè)的融資難問題,拓寬金融機(jī)構(gòu)的業(yè)務(wù)范圍,為物流企業(yè)開拓新的業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域。但是,由于物流金融在我國(guó)起步較晚,發(fā)展時(shí)間較短,相關(guān)理論研究和法律法規(guī)及其政策尚不完善,其本身還存在許多亟待解決的現(xiàn)實(shí)問題。 本文闡述了物流金融的主要業(yè)務(wù)模式,討論了金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)合作關(guān)系的必要性及存在的問題；通過運(yùn)用演化博弈理論,分別對(duì)物流金融業(yè)務(wù)中金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)的契約簽訂、監(jiān)督欺詐等問題進(jìn)行了分析；構(gòu)建了相關(guān)演化博弈模型,并通過數(shù)值仿真分析驗(yàn)證了演化模型的適用性。本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容包括： (1)在物流金融業(yè)務(wù)模式的分析基礎(chǔ)上,討論了金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)合作的必要性,并剖析了金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)合作可能存在的問題,為后續(xù)構(gòu)建金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)間的演化博弈模型奠定理論基礎(chǔ)； (2)運(yùn)用演化博弈理論對(duì)物流金融業(yè)務(wù)中金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)的合作關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析。在確定參與者在不同策略下的收益矩陣的基礎(chǔ)上,將參與者選擇不同策略的概率作為參數(shù),考慮了諸多可能影響策略的變量,構(gòu)建了各參與者策略的基因復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程,進(jìn)行了局部穩(wěn)定性分析,并運(yùn)用Matlab軟件對(duì)其進(jìn)行了數(shù)值仿真分析； (3)運(yùn)用演化博弈理論對(duì)物流金融業(yè)務(wù)中金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)的監(jiān)督欺詐問題進(jìn)行了分析。同樣在確定金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)在不同策略下的收益矩陣的基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建了各參與者策略的基因復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程,并分別對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)間監(jiān)督或欺詐策略問題進(jìn)行了分析；然后構(gòu)建了二者間監(jiān)督欺詐問題的群體演化博弈模型,分析了群體策略的演化過程及結(jié)果；最后討論了引入外力影響后系統(tǒng)的演化過程,并對(duì)其進(jìn)行了數(shù)值仿真分析。 本文從物流金融中金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)間的契約簽訂問題入手,運(yùn)用演化博弈理論進(jìn)行復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)分析,并延伸至合作成功后的監(jiān)督欺詐問題分析,研究成果有利于豐富物流金融理論,為金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)在開展物流業(yè)務(wù)的過程中提供決策參考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, in view of the low credit degree of small and medium-sized enterprises in logistics industry, the complexity of loan approval procedures, narrow financing channels and high financing costs, it is difficult to finance. Logistics finance is a new and complex business. It can solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises, widen the scope of business of financial institutions, and open up new business fields for logistics enterprises. However, because logistics finance started relatively late in our country, the development time is relatively short. The relevant theoretical research, laws and regulations and their policies are not perfect, and there are still many practical problems to be solved. This paper expounds the main business models of logistics finance, discusses the necessity and problems of the cooperative relationship between financial institutions and logistics enterprises, and applies evolutionary game theory. This paper analyzes the problems of contract signing and supervision fraud between financial institutions and logistics enterprises in logistics financial business, and constructs a relevant evolutionary game model. The applicability of the evolutionary model is verified by numerical simulation. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. 1) based on the analysis of logistics financial business model, this paper discusses the necessity of cooperation between financial institutions and logistics enterprises, and analyzes the possible problems existing in the cooperation between financial institutions and logistics enterprises. It lays a theoretical foundation for the subsequent construction of evolutionary game model between financial institutions and logistics enterprises. 2) using evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperative relationship between financial institutions and logistics enterprises in logistics finance business. Based on determining the return matrix of participants under different strategies, the probability of participants choosing different strategies is taken as parameters. Considering many variables that may affect the strategy, the dynamic equation of gene replication of each participant strategy is constructed, the local stability is analyzed, and the numerical simulation analysis is carried out by using Matlab software. 3) using evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the problem of supervision fraud of financial institutions and logistics enterprises in logistics finance business. On the same basis, it determines the return matrix of financial institutions and logistics enterprises under different strategies. The dynamic equation of gene replication of participants' strategies is constructed, and the problems of supervision or fraud strategy between financial institutions and logistics enterprises are analyzed, and then a group evolution game model of supervision fraud between financial institutions and logistics enterprises is constructed. The evolution process and results of the population strategy are analyzed, and the evolution process of the system after the introduction of external force is discussed, and the numerical simulation is carried out. This paper begins with the problem of contract signing between financial institutions and logistics enterprises in logistics finance, and applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the duplication and dynamics, and extends to the analysis of supervision fraud after successful cooperation. The research results are helpful to enrich the theory of logistics finance and provide decision reference for financial institutions and logistics enterprises in the process of carrying out logistics business.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F259.23;F224.32;F832

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