發(fā)布時間：2018-03-15 21:19

  本文選題：非正規(guī)金融　切入點：正規(guī)金融　出處：《華東理工大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2011年溫州、鄂爾多斯等地爆發(fā)的民間借貸債務危機再一次將中小企業(yè)融資問題推到風口浪尖。論文介紹了我國中小企業(yè)融資與正規(guī)金融、非正規(guī)金融的現(xiàn)狀,分析了目前政府在中小企業(yè)融資規(guī)制中所存在的缺陷。目前基本一致的觀點是,中小企業(yè)、銀行與政府規(guī)制之間尚未形成良性互動機制,且尚未形成完善的法律體系和行政體系；而政府對非正規(guī)金融的規(guī)制也缺乏行之有效的體系,但正逐步促使非正規(guī)金融的正規(guī)化。另一方面,非正規(guī)金融市場已經(jīng)成為我國金融體系中不可忽視的一個重要組成部分,特別是非正規(guī)金融對中小企業(yè)融資產(chǎn)生的巨大影響。本文的觀點是希望政府能夠創(chuàng)造多層次企業(yè)社會網(wǎng)絡環(huán)境,引導企業(yè)積累“社會聲譽資產(chǎn)”,創(chuàng)新并完善中小企業(yè)信用體系,從而增強中小企業(yè)軟實力,改善中小企業(yè)制度環(huán)境；并希望政府引導非正規(guī)金融流向中小企業(yè)等實體經(jīng)濟,引導實現(xiàn)非正規(guī)金融與地方中小金融機構共生成長,從而使非正規(guī)金融向規(guī)范化發(fā)展；并希望各個監(jiān)管部門之間能夠加強合作,提高政府規(guī)制有效性。 本文在此次金融試點改革的大背景下,基于博弈理論、規(guī)制經(jīng)濟學的相關知識,運用四個雙方博弈模型全面地從本質(zhì)上分析中小企業(yè)向正規(guī)金融機構尋求貸款過程中存在的障礙,并比較分析非正規(guī)金融在破除這些障礙幫助中小企業(yè)融資的優(yōu)勢與不足。在此基礎上,本文將政府角色加入模型中,構建了一個基于市場準入的政府與非正規(guī)金融、中小企業(yè)之間的三方博弈模型,用以研究政府在對非正規(guī)金融進行規(guī)制所應采取的選擇方式；構建了一個基于風險補償?shù)恼c規(guī)范化后的非正規(guī)金融機構、中小企業(yè)之間的三方博弈模型,用以研究政府在通過影響規(guī)范化后的非正規(guī)金融機構,從而解決中小企業(yè)融資難問題。結合兩個三方博弈模型的結論,本文從中小企業(yè)角度、非正規(guī)金融角度、監(jiān)管部門角度提供了對政府對策的建議。
[Abstract]:In 2011, the private loan debt crisis broke out in Wenzhou, Ordos and other places once again pushed the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises to the top of the wave. The paper introduced the current situation of SMEs financing, formal finance and informal finance in China. This paper analyzes the defects of the government in the regulation of SME financing. The basic view is that there is no positive interaction mechanism between the SME, the bank and the government regulation. Moreover, there is no perfect legal system and administrative system, and the government's regulation of informal finance is lack of effective system, but it is gradually promoting the formalization of informal finance. The informal financial market has become an important part of our financial system. The point of view of this paper is that the government can create a multi-level enterprise social network environment, guide enterprises to accumulate "social reputation assets", innovate and perfect the credit system of small and medium-sized enterprises. In order to enhance the soft power of small and medium-sized enterprises, improve the institutional environment of small and medium-sized enterprises; and hope that the government will guide informal finance to flow to the real economy, such as small and medium-sized enterprises, and guide the development of informal finance and local small and medium-sized financial institutions. In order to make the informal finance develop to standardization, and hope that each regulatory department can strengthen cooperation, improve the effectiveness of government regulation. Under the background of the financial pilot reform, this paper, based on the game theory, regulates the relevant knowledge of economics. By using the four game models, the paper analyzes the obstacles in the process of SMEs seeking loans from formal financial institutions. On the basis of analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of informal finance in overcoming these barriers to help SMEs finance, this paper adds the role of government to the model and constructs a government and informal finance based on market access. The three-way game model between small and medium-sized enterprises is used to study the choice of government to regulate informal finance, and to construct a government based on risk compensation and a standardized informal financial institution. The three-way game model between small and medium-sized enterprises is used to study the government's difficulty in financing small and medium-sized enterprises by influencing the standardized informal financial institutions. Combined with the conclusion of the two three-way game models, this paper studies the problem of small and medium-sized enterprises from the point of view of small and medium-sized enterprises. The informal finance angle, the supervisory department angle has provided the suggestion to the government countermeasure.
【學位授予單位】：華東理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F276.3;F832.4

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 費騰;李智;劉力臻;;基于不完全信息博弈模型的中小企業(yè)融資分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2012年02期

2 鄭芳芳;黎東升;;基于博弈理論的中小企業(yè)融資難的破解對策[J];長江大學學報(自然科學版);2011年01期

3 盧慧;;經(jīng)濟增長與民間金融發(fā)展:市場化制度的轉軌[J];財經(jīng)論叢;2008年02期

4 吳亮;鄧明;;金融生態(tài)視角的正規(guī)與非正規(guī)金融共生成長研究[J];財經(jīng)論叢;2010年05期

5 俞伯陽;沈慶R，

本文編號：1616846