本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：公司業(yè)績　出處：《天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2006年我國股權(quán)分置改革之后,上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)相繼出臺,為我國上市公司實(shí)施管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供了法律依據(jù)。經(jīng)過最初幾年的整頓與規(guī)范,越來越多的上市公司公布管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制,旨在降低代理成本,提高經(jīng)營效率,以實(shí)現(xiàn)股東權(quán)益最大化,源于西方發(fā)達(dá)國家,上市公司通過這種制度提高了公司業(yè)績,促進(jìn)了公司發(fā)展,鑒于我國經(jīng)濟(jì)制度與西方國家存在較大差異,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國的實(shí)施能否能夠提高公司業(yè)績是值得關(guān)注的。 本文從基本激勵(lì)理論出發(fā),在充分研究國內(nèi)外大量文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合公司業(yè)績評價(jià)相關(guān)理論提出了兩點(diǎn)假設(shè),本文假設(shè)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)能夠提高公司業(yè)績,且國有性質(zhì)公司與非國有性質(zhì)公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對公司業(yè)績的影響不同。本文選取2006-2011年公布股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的全體上市公司為樣本,在剔除數(shù)據(jù)不全的公司后進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國總體上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)能夠提高公司業(yè)績,與我國大多數(shù)學(xué)者研究結(jié)果相同；另一方面,本文將總體樣本劃分為國有性質(zhì)與非國有性質(zhì)上市公司兩個(gè)樣本,分別進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)非國有性質(zhì)上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對公司業(yè)績產(chǎn)生促進(jìn)作用,而國有性質(zhì)上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平與公司業(yè)績并不存在顯著的線性關(guān)系。然而分析我國上市公司的業(yè)績,國有性質(zhì)上市公司平均業(yè)績明顯高于非國有性質(zhì)上市公司,且各家經(jīng)營業(yè)績保持在相對穩(wěn)定的水平上,非國有性質(zhì)上市公司不乏虧損之流,也存在高凈資產(chǎn)收益率的優(yōu)秀個(gè)體,業(yè)績水平參差不齊,總體差于國有性質(zhì)上市公司。綜合上述兩方面,本文認(rèn)為,非國有性質(zhì)上市公司適合發(fā)展股權(quán)層股權(quán)激勵(lì),目前國有企業(yè)上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系不明顯,建議高管尋求適合自身發(fā)展的激勵(lì)模式幫助企業(yè)提高業(yè)績。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure in 2006, the relevant laws and regulations of equity incentive of listed companies were issued one after another, which provided the legal basis for the implementation of equity incentive of management of listed companies in China. After the first few years of rectification and regulation, More and more listed companies publish management equity incentive plans. As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive aims to reduce agency cost, improve management efficiency, and realize the maximization of shareholders' rights and interests, which originates from western developed countries. Through this system, listed companies improve their corporate performance and promote their development. In view of the great differences between China's economic system and western countries, it is worth paying attention to whether the implementation of equity incentives in China can improve the performance of companies. Starting from the basic incentive theory, based on the full study of a large number of literature at home and abroad, combined with the relevant theories of corporate performance evaluation, this paper puts forward two hypotheses, this paper assumes that management equity incentive can improve the performance of the company. And the impact of management equity incentive on corporate performance is different between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. This paper selects all listed companies published equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2011 as a sample and carries out empirical research after excluding companies with incomplete data. It is found that management equity incentive can improve corporate performance, which is the same as that of most scholars in China. On the other hand, this paper divides the total sample into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. The empirical test shows that the equity incentive of non-state-owned listed companies has a positive effect on the performance of the company. However, the average performance of state-owned listed companies is significantly higher than that of non-state-owned listed companies. Moreover, the operating performance of each company is kept at a relatively stable level, and the non-state-owned listed companies are not lack of losses, and there are excellent individuals with high net asset returns, and the performance level is uneven. On the basis of the above two aspects, this paper holds that the non-state-owned listed companies are suitable for the development of equity incentive. At present, the relationship between the management equity incentive and the performance of the listed companies is not obvious. It is suggested that executives seek incentive models suitable for their own development to help enterprises improve their performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 廖士光;;中國股票市場定價(jià)效率研究——基于個(gè)股特有信息含量的視角[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2010年08期

2 王娟;;EVA業(yè)績評價(jià)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式設(shè)計(jì)[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2007年03期

3 申尊煥,牛振喜;關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司業(yè)績相關(guān)性的實(shí)證分析——兼論實(shí)證研究結(jié)果的多樣性[J];西北工業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2003年02期

4 吳淑琨;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的U型關(guān)系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2002年01期

5 南開大學(xué)公司治理研究中心公司治理評價(jià)課題組;李維安;;中國上市公司治理指數(shù)與公司績效的實(shí)證分析——基于中國1149家上市公司的研究[J];管理世界;2006年03期

6 鞏娜;;上市公司管理者股權(quán)激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)導(dǎo)刊;2010年04期

7 黃慧馨,代冰彬;高科技企業(yè)經(jīng)理人持股與公司長期業(yè)績的相關(guān)性研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2005年03期

8 黃建山;李春米;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、技術(shù)效率與公司績效:基于中國上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)評論;2009年03期

9 魏剛;高級管理層激勵(lì)與上市公司經(jīng)營績效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2000年03期

10 周建波,孫菊生;經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵(lì)的治理效應(yīng)研究——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年05期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 何煒;上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究[D];中南大學(xué);2011年

2 鞏娜;上市公司管理者股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2009年

3 周紹妮;管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對股東利益影響研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2010年

4 鄭曉玲;上市公司股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性研究[D];蘇州大學(xué);2009年

，

本文編號：1615607