發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-08 08:06

  本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在國家弘揚(yáng)科學(xué)發(fā)展觀,推進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型的大背景下,深圳創(chuàng)業(yè)板正在成為創(chuàng)新經(jīng)濟(jì)新的推動(dòng)力,代表了未來一段時(shí)間國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型升級(jí)的方向,是國家政策扶持發(fā)展的重點(diǎn)所在。但是,國內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)界的研究絕大多數(shù)聚焦于主板市場的研究,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市企業(yè)的研究少之又少。2013年以來,創(chuàng)業(yè)板股價(jià)持續(xù)走高,高管紛紛減持套現(xiàn),創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管持股偏高、董事長一股獨(dú)大等特點(diǎn)開始緩解,高管內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)的變更在所難免。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司大多是高科技中小企業(yè),具有高成長性、高創(chuàng)新性、高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性等特點(diǎn),因此迫切需要吸引和激勵(lì)優(yōu)秀的管理人才并發(fā)揮他們的管理才能。但由于企業(yè)上市時(shí)間短、規(guī)模較小等原因,公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和薪酬激勵(lì)制度尚不完善,由此產(chǎn)生的一系列不合理現(xiàn)象層出不窮。 本文針對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的特點(diǎn)和現(xiàn)實(shí)情況,以委托代理理論、人力資本理論和激勵(lì)理論為理論基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究,從公司特征、公司治理、高管特征、外部環(huán)境等四個(gè)方面對(duì)影響高管薪酬的因素進(jìn)行了文獻(xiàn)綜述。在此基礎(chǔ)上,綜合比較了創(chuàng)業(yè)板和深圳主要板塊各項(xiàng)指標(biāo)的差異,著重從創(chuàng)業(yè)板的差異點(diǎn)出發(fā),以創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的高管薪酬為因變量,公司規(guī)模、公司績效、研發(fā)投入、董事長持股、董事會(huì)規(guī)模等指標(biāo)為自變量,從創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2009年到2012年的年度報(bào)告中獲取數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)分析和多元回歸分析對(duì)影響創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管薪酬的公司內(nèi)外部因素進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司中,公司規(guī)模、公司績效、研發(fā)投入、公司位于發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)等指標(biāo)對(duì)高管薪酬有顯著的正向影響,董事長持股比例對(duì)高管薪酬水平有顯著的負(fù)向影響。而董事會(huì)規(guī)模和結(jié)構(gòu)、薪酬委員會(huì)、高管個(gè)人特征等因素對(duì)高管薪酬的影響不顯著,董事會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事的存在、以及企業(yè)中機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的存在、薪酬委員會(huì)的設(shè)立并沒有對(duì)高管薪酬起到應(yīng)有的監(jiān)控作用,高管自身人力資本的價(jià)值沒有得到充分體現(xiàn)。由此發(fā)現(xiàn),我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在高管薪酬契約制定和董事會(huì)構(gòu)成等公司治理方面還存在諸多欠缺和不合理的現(xiàn)象。針對(duì)這些現(xiàn)象,本文在實(shí)證研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上提出了有針對(duì)性的改進(jìn)建議,以期為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司薪酬政策的制定和公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善提供參考。
[Abstract]:Against the background of promoting the concept of scientific development and promoting the transformation of industrial structure, the Shenzhen gem is becoming a new driving force for the innovation economy and represents the direction of the domestic economic transformation and upgrading for some time to come. However, most of the domestic academic research focuses on the main market, and the research on gem listed enterprises is rare. Since 2013, the share price of gem has continued to rise. Executives have reduced their holdings to cash, the gem executives hold shares are on the high side, and the characteristics of the chairman of the board, such as a dominant share, begin to ease, and changes in the internal structure of executives are inevitable. Most listed companies on the gem are high-tech small and medium-sized enterprises with high growth. Because of the characteristics of high innovation and high risk, there is an urgent need to attract and motivate excellent management talents and bring their management skills into full play. However, due to the short time to market, the small scale of enterprises, and so on, The internal corporate governance structure and salary incentive system are not perfect, resulting in a series of unreasonable phenomena. Based on the theory of principal-agent theory, human capital theory and incentive theory, this paper aims at the characteristics and reality of listed companies in the gem, combining the relevant research at home and abroad, from the company characteristics, corporate governance, executive characteristics, On the basis of the literature review of the factors influencing executive compensation, the paper compares the differences between gem and Shenzhen's main sectors, and focuses on the differences between gem and Shenzhen's main plates. Taking the executive compensation of listed companies on the gem as dependent variables, the company size, company performance, R & D investment, chairman's stock holding, board size and so on are independent variables. The data obtained from the annual report of gem listed companies from 2009 to 2012 are taken as research samples, and descriptive statistical analysis is used. Correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis have made an empirical study on the internal and external factors that affect the executive compensation of the gem. The study found that: in the gem listed companies, the company size, corporate performance, R & D investment, Indicators such as the company's location in developed regions have a significant positive impact on executive compensation, while the chairman's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on executive compensation levels, while the size and structure of the board, compensation committees, The influence of personal characteristics of executives on executive compensation is not significant, the existence of independent directors in the board of directors, and the existence of institutional investors in enterprises, the establishment of compensation committees do not play a role in monitoring executive compensation. The value of executives' own human capital is not fully reflected. There are still many deficiencies and unreasonable phenomena in the corporate governance of listed companies in the gem, such as the formulation of executive compensation contracts and the composition of the board of directors. Based on the conclusions of empirical research, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the salary policy of listed companies in gem and the improvement of corporate governance structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F276.6;F272.92

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