本文選題：信用評級　切入點：利益沖突　出處：《安徽大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：自2007年次貸危機以來,信用評級機構(gòu)備受公眾關(guān)注。各界聲音中,不僅有對信用評級機構(gòu)發(fā)布的信用評級質(zhì)量的質(zhì)疑,也有對三大評級機構(gòu)的“霸權(quán)主義”的斥責,更有對三大評級機構(gòu)對危機的推波助瀾的批判。盡管評級機構(gòu)一再強調(diào)聲譽激勵機制對行業(yè)的自律作用以及信用評級機構(gòu)的內(nèi)部控制制度對利益沖突的規(guī)制作用。但是在“發(fā)行人付費”下,利益沖突從未停止過。1975年美國證券交易委員會對NRSRO的授權(quán),不僅加深了監(jiān)管者對信用評級的依賴,助長了信用評級機構(gòu)對市場的影響力,更是對“發(fā)行人付費”模式下利益沖突的雪上加霜。危機后,盡管美國監(jiān)管者頻頻發(fā)布對信用評級行業(yè)的監(jiān)管規(guī)制文件及法規(guī),但是這并沒有改變信用評級行業(yè)的“發(fā)行人付費”模式,在未來很長一段時間內(nèi),這一模式仍將繼續(xù),本文是在這種模式下,將聲譽機制與市場結(jié)構(gòu)相結(jié)合,研究不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)下聲譽機制發(fā)揮的作用,并對信用評級行業(yè)的改革提出了一些建議。 第一部分首先介紹了本文的研究背景、研究意義及目的、研究內(nèi)容及方法、創(chuàng)新與不足。并結(jié)合本文的研究主題對國內(nèi)外信用評級相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的文獻作了簡要歸納。主要分為以下三類：第一,聲譽激勵機制與利益沖突的文獻；第二,市場結(jié)構(gòu)與利益沖突的文獻；第三：利益沖突與評級報告質(zhì)量的文獻。 第二部分,信用評級行業(yè)現(xiàn)狀分析。首先對信用評級行業(yè)的起源及發(fā)展做了簡要介紹,然后從付費模式看信用評級行業(yè)的利益沖突來源,在“投資者付費”模式下,聲譽激勵機制對信用評級行業(yè)起到很好的行業(yè)自律,在“發(fā)行人付費”模式下,評級機構(gòu)傾向于提高發(fā)行人的信用等級；接著闡述了美國的NRSRO制度與市場結(jié)構(gòu)。在NRSRO制度下,監(jiān)管者對評級機構(gòu)的依賴加重了利益沖突,更使得聲譽對信用評級機構(gòu)的自律作用大大降低；再接著研究了“發(fā)行人付費”模式與NRSRO制度帶來的利益沖突使得聲譽激勵機制對評級行業(yè)自律作用的失效,駁斥了信用評級機構(gòu)一直引用聲譽機制應對公眾質(zhì)疑的做法。最后總結(jié)了美國監(jiān)管者對信用評級行業(yè)的監(jiān)管的文件及法規(guī)。 第三部分,壟斷性市場結(jié)構(gòu)下利益沖突研究。首先提出了模型的假設,在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,對評級機構(gòu)的利潤函數(shù)進行了分析,指出評級機構(gòu)的利潤一方面由評級費用構(gòu)成另一方面由聲譽帶來的未來現(xiàn)金流的收益。然后分別研究在有無評級機構(gòu)情況下,發(fā)行人與投資者的利潤函數(shù)；在研究了評級機構(gòu)、發(fā)行人、投資者的利潤函數(shù)的基礎(chǔ)上,就開始對市場結(jié)構(gòu)及聲譽機制對評級報告質(zhì)量進行研究。首先假設不存在評級購買時,即假設沒有利益沖突評級機構(gòu)在可以控制其評級精度時,研究“發(fā)行人付費”模式下,評級機構(gòu)對壞企業(yè)與好企業(yè)的最優(yōu)選擇問題。然后放松利益沖突讓模型更接近實際,研究評級機構(gòu)在存在利益沖突下的利潤最大化選擇。 第四部分,競爭性市場結(jié)構(gòu)下利益沖突研究。首先指出競爭性市場結(jié)構(gòu)與壟斷性市場結(jié)構(gòu)的不同之處在于評級機構(gòu)可以自由選擇信用評級機構(gòu)使得自己的利潤最大化。然后對發(fā)行人的利潤函數(shù)做了分析,分別對存在評級購買以及不存在評級購買時,評級機構(gòu)的利潤最大化選擇研究,并得出相關(guān)結(jié)論。接著以社會福利最大化為研究對象,對社會的福利函數(shù)做了定義。得出在以社會福利最大化的視角下,信用評級的評級費用應當為0,即信息的交易成本為0,市場能夠?qū)Πl(fā)行人的好于壞做出區(qū)別,此時市場效率達到最大化,這是一種理想的狀態(tài)。然后結(jié)合第三章和第四章,對評級報告的質(zhì)量進行比較,得出不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)下市場效率的大小。 第五部分,首先研究了聲譽機制發(fā)揮不同作用時,監(jiān)管者對市場結(jié)構(gòu)選擇。然后著重分析了中國當前市場結(jié)構(gòu)及現(xiàn)狀,并針對性的提出了我國信用評級行業(yè)應選擇壟斷性市場結(jié)構(gòu)。 第六部分,總結(jié)本文得出的結(jié)論并對監(jiān)管者提出幾點關(guān)于信用評級行業(yè)的改革建議。
[Abstract]:Since the 2007 subprime crisis, the credit rating agencies of public concern. The voice of all walks of life, not only questioned the release of the credit rating agencies credit rating quality, but also on the three major rating agencies "hegemonism" rebuke, more of the three major rating agencies to the crisis fueled criticism. Despite repeatedly stressed that the internal rating agencies the control system of rating agencies self-discipline reputation incentive mechanism of the industry and credit for conflict of interest rules made. But in the "issuer pays", the conflict of interest has never stopped in the United States Securities and Exchange Commission authorized the.1975 to NRSRO, not only deepened the regulators' reliance on credit ratings, credit rating agencies contributed to influence on the market, it is the one disaster after another issuer pays "conflict of interest mode. After the crisis, although the United States regulators frequently issued letter of The regulatory documents and regulations of the rating industry, but this does not change the credit rating industry "issuer pays", in the future for a long period of time, this pattern will continue, this article is in this mode, combining the reputation mechanism and market structure, the research of reputation mechanism in different market structures under the role, and puts forward some suggestions on the reform of the credit rating industry.
The first part introduces the research background, research purpose and significance, research contents and methods, innovation and shortcomings. Combined with the research topics of domestic and international credit rating related literature was briefly summarized. Mainly divided into the following three categories: first, the conflict with the interests of the reputation incentive mechanism of literature; second the market structure, and conflicts of interest in literature; third: the conflict of interests and the quality rating report literature.
The second part, analysis of the current situation of credit rating industry. Firstly, the origin and development of the credit rating industry is briefly introduced, and then look at the source of conflict of interest of credit rating industry from the payment mode, in the "investor pays" mode, the reputation incentive mechanism of the credit rating industry played a very good self-discipline, in the "issuer pays" mode, the rating agencies tend to improve the credit rating of the issuer; then elaborated the NRSRO system and the market structure of the United States. In the NRSRO system, regulators' reliance on rating agencies aggravated the conflict of interests, the more reputation the role of self-discipline of the credit rating agencies is greatly reduced; the conflict of interest and then study "the issuer pays model and NRSRO system makes the reputation incentive mechanism of industry self-discipline failure rating, credit rating agencies have refuted the reputation mechanism to deal with The public questioned the practice. Finally, it summed up the documents and regulations of US regulators on the supervision of the credit rating industry.
The third part, study on the conflict of interest under the monopoly market structure. Firstly put forward the assumptions of the model, on the basis of previous studies, the profit function of the rating agencies were analyzed, pointed out that the rating agencies on the one hand by the rating cost profit on the other hand by the reputation for bringing the future cash flow of income. Then we study in there is no rating agencies under the condition of issuing profit function of person and investors; on the basis of the rating agencies, the issuer, investor's profit function, started on the market structure and mechanism of reputation rating report research quality. Firstly, the assumption that there is no rating to buy, assuming that there is no conflict of interest in the rating agencies you can control the accuracy of rating, the issuer pay model, rating agencies optimal choice for bad enterprises and good corporate problems. Then relax the conflict of interests make the model more Close to the reality, study the rating agency's profit maximization choice under the existence of conflicts of interest.
The fourth part, study on the conflict of interest under competitive market structure. Firstly, points out the difference of monopolistic competition market structure and market structure that the rating agencies can choose credit rating agencies to maximize their profits. Then the profit function of the issuer to do the analysis of the existing rating respectively to buy and buy rating does not exist study on profit maximization, choice of rating agencies, and draw relevant conclusions. Then to maximize the social welfare as the research object, the social welfare function are defined. That in order to maximize the welfare of society from the perspective of credit rating, the rating cost should be 0, namely the transaction cost information is 0, the market can the issuer is good or bad to make a difference, the market efficiency is maximized, which is a kind of ideal state. Then combined with the third chapter and the fourth chapter, the quality of the credit rating report Compare the market efficiency under the different market structure.
The fifth part first studies the choice of the market structure when the reputation mechanism plays different roles. Then it focuses on the analysis of the current market structure and current situation in China, and points out that China's credit rating industry should choose the monopoly market structure.
The sixth part summarizes the conclusions of this article and puts forward some suggestions on the reform of the credit rating industry.

【學位授予單位】：安徽大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F830.4

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相關(guān)博士學位論文 前1條

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相關(guān)碩士學位論文 前1條

1 侯晨陽;美國信用評級機構(gòu)利益沖突分析[D];中國政法大學;2010年

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本文編號：1565434