本文關鍵詞： 供應鏈融資 應收賬款模式 多任務委托代理 激勵約束機制　出處：《貴州財經大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國經濟社會的發(fā)展，中小企融資難的問題得到了社會與國家的廣泛關注，由此產生的供應鏈融資也得到了迅速的發(fā)展。近幾年，供應鏈融資作為一項創(chuàng)新的業(yè)務領域，引起了企業(yè)界與學術界的廣泛關注，它不僅在一定程度上緩解了中小企業(yè)融資難的問題，還為商業(yè)銀行提供了廣闊的市場和全新的盈利模式，更是降低了整體供應鏈的管理成本，提高了供應鏈整體的競爭力。而隨著2007年《物權法》的出臺，明確規(guī)定了應收賬款可以作為有效抵押物，為供應鏈融資中的應收賬款模式的發(fā)展提供了更為有利的條件，也為缺乏不動產抵押的中小企業(yè)提供了新的融資方式。 本文以供應鏈融資為背景，首先闡述了供應鏈融資的概念，發(fā)展以及基本的運作模式，著重介紹了供應鏈融資中應收賬款模式的運行機制、現(xiàn)有的基于應收賬款模式的融資業(yè)務以及存在的主要風險。在分析了供應鏈融資中應收賬款模式的運作機制的基礎上，提出依托核心企業(yè)信用的供應鏈融資業(yè)務，成功運行的決定性因素在于中小企業(yè)的努力程度，銀行與核心企業(yè)都存在對中小企業(yè)進行激勵的必要性。隨后分別對銀行與中小企業(yè)，核心企業(yè)與中小企業(yè)之間的委托代理關系進行分析，得出銀行與中小企業(yè)、核心企業(yè)與中小企業(yè)之間的委托代理關系并不是單一任務的委托代理關系，因此引入Holmstrom和Milgrom（1991）[1]提出的多任務委托代理理論，分別構建了銀行激勵中小企業(yè)提高銷售利潤和合理使用資金的多任務委托代理模型；核心企業(yè)激勵中小企業(yè)降低生產成本，提高產品質量的多任務委托代理模型，再對努力成本相互獨立和相互依存兩種情況下的中小企業(yè)激勵問題進行分析，希望在此基礎上設計出最優(yōu)激勵合約，為供應鏈融資應收賬款模式的有效運作與發(fā)展提供有效依據(jù)。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于系統(tǒng)的分析了供應融資中應收賬款模式下各主體之間的委托代理關系，并針對中小企業(yè)的激勵約束問題，首次在供應鏈融資中引入多任務委托代理理論，，并建立了有關委托代理的數(shù)學模型，通過分析兩項任務下的委托代理問題，構建了合適的激勵約束機制。
[Abstract]:With the development of our country's economy and society, the problem of financing difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises has been paid more and more attention by the society and the country, and the supply chain financing has also been developed rapidly. In recent years, supply chain financing has become an innovative business field. It not only alleviates the difficulty of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises to some extent, but also provides a broad market and a new profit model for commercial banks. It also reduces the management cost of the whole supply chain and improves the overall competitiveness of the supply chain. With the introduction of the property Law in 2007, it is clearly stipulated that the accounts receivable can be used as effective collateral. It provides more favorable conditions for the development of accounts receivable model in supply chain financing, and also provides a new financing method for small and medium-sized enterprises lacking real estate mortgage. Based on the background of supply chain financing, this paper first expounds the concept, development and basic operating mode of supply chain financing, and emphatically introduces the operating mechanism of account receivable model in supply chain financing. On the basis of analyzing the operation mechanism of the account receivable model in supply chain financing, the paper puts forward the supply chain financing business which relies on the credit of the core enterprise. The decisive factor of successful operation is the degree of effort of small and medium-sized enterprises. Banks and core enterprises both have the need to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises. By analyzing the principal-agent relationship between the core enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises, it is concluded that the principal-agent relationship between the banks and the small and medium-sized enterprises and the core enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises is not a single-task principal-agent relationship. Therefore, by introducing the multi-task principal-agent theory proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 (1), the multi-task principal-agent model of encouraging SMEs to increase their sales profits and reasonably use funds is constructed, and the core enterprises encourage SMEs to reduce production costs. The multi-task principal-agent model to improve the quality of products is used to analyze the incentive problem of small and medium-sized enterprises under the condition of independent and interdependent effort cost, and the optimal incentive contract is designed on this basis. It provides an effective basis for the effective operation and development of the supply chain financing accounts receivable model. The innovation of this paper lies in the systematic analysis of the principal-agent relationship between the agents under the account receivable model in supply financing, and the introduction of multi-task principal-agent theory into supply chain financing for the first time, aiming at the incentive and constraint problems of small and medium-sized enterprises. The mathematical model of principal-agent is established, and the appropriate incentive and constraint mechanism is constructed by analyzing the principal-agent problem under two tasks.
【學位授予單位】：貴州財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F274;F832.4

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