本文關(guān)鍵詞： 風(fēng)險投資 聲譽 IPO 退出時間 退出收益　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：目前IPO依然是風(fēng)險投資的主要退出渠道，而且也是可以獲得公開數(shù)據(jù)的唯一渠道，因此以往學(xué)者開展了很多以IPO為窗口的風(fēng)險投資退出研究。以往的研究過程往往將風(fēng)險企業(yè)IPO等同于風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)實現(xiàn)了退出，但是實際情況是風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)在風(fēng)險企業(yè)IPO后鎖定期結(jié)束后擇機退出，因此本文主要研究這一時間段，風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)的聲譽對風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)退出時間以及退出收益方面的退出決策的影響。 本文主要分為三個部分，第一部分緒論，主要闡述本文的研究背景與意義、整理現(xiàn)有的文獻綜述并從中總結(jié)不足找出本文的研究立足點，之后總體介紹本文的研究目標(biāo)、內(nèi)容、結(jié)構(gòu)和方法以及創(chuàng)新點；第二部分是博弈理論模型研究，這部分將風(fēng)險投資的聲譽簡單理解為外部投資者對風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)的信任程度，將風(fēng)險投資的退出理解為風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)與外部投資者之間的博弈，從而建立起獨立重復(fù)事件和非獨立重復(fù)事件下的風(fēng)險投資IPO退出決策的聲譽均衡；第三部分實證分析，在第二章博弈結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上，提出風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)聲譽對風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)在風(fēng)險企業(yè)IPO后的退出時間和退出收益的研究假設(shè)，并選取中小板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析。 經(jīng)過本文的研究，主要得到以下結(jié)論：（1）風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)的聲譽越高，在風(fēng)險企業(yè)IPO后，風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)的退出時間越長、退出收益越高；（2）IPO市場中優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)的數(shù)量越多、對風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)造假的懲罰越嚴(yán)重，越有利于形成良好的風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)退出環(huán)境。本章的最后，，根據(jù)研究結(jié)論，提出了完善風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)退出的建議。
[Abstract]:At present, IPO is still the main exit channel for venture capital, and it is also the only way to obtain public data. Therefore, previous scholars have carried out a lot of venture capital exit research with IPO as the window. The previous research process often equates venture enterprise IPO with venture capital institution to realize exit. However, the actual situation is that venture capital institutions choose to exit after the IPO lock period ends, so this paper mainly studies this time period. The influence of the reputation of the venture capital institution on the exit time and the exit decision of the venture capital institution. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is introduction, which mainly describes the research background and significance of this paper, collates the existing literature review and finds out the research foothold of this paper, and then introduces the research objectives of this paper. The second part is the study of game theory model, in which the reputation of venture capital is understood as the degree of external investors' trust in venture capital institutions. The exit of venture capital is understood as the game between venture capital institution and external investor, and the reputation equilibrium of venture capital IPO exit decision under independent repeated event and non-independent repeated event is established. The third part is empirical analysis. On the basis of the conclusion of the second chapter, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis of venture capital institution reputation to the exit time and return of venture capital institution after IPO, and selects the data of small and medium-sized board and gem listed company to carry on the empirical analysis. Through the research of this paper, we get the following conclusion: 1) the higher the reputation of venture capital institutions, the longer the exit time of venture capital institutions, the higher the return of exit, the more the number of high quality enterprises in the market of venture capital firms. The more serious the punishment of fraud of venture capital institutions, the more conducive to the formation of a good exit environment of venture capital institutions. Finally, according to the conclusion of the study, the author puts forward some suggestions to improve the exit of venture capital institutions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.48

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本文編號：1498145