本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市銀行 薪酬 績效 激勵(lì) EVA　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來，隨著改革開放政策的進(jìn)一步落實(shí)，我國的所有制形式和市場經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)也在不斷的改革和完善之中其中受到人們普遍人們關(guān)注的問題之一，就是在不斷發(fā)展的現(xiàn)代公司制度下，由于權(quán)責(zé)相互分離而導(dǎo)致在公司經(jīng)營過程中掌握絕對(duì)信息優(yōu)勢和資源優(yōu)勢的高層管理者的薪酬問題在這種經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下，對(duì)于在運(yùn)營過程中以貨幣為其主要商品的銀行來說，情況比較特殊，其高層管理者的薪酬政策的實(shí)施和完善也更受容易到公司內(nèi)外眾多環(huán)境因素的制約，尤其是最近幾年以來，在政府的指導(dǎo)下，我國銀行業(yè)市場化的步伐逐漸加快，高管們的薪酬大多都與市場掛鉤與不斷飆升的銀行經(jīng)營業(yè)績相比，高層管理者的薪酬也隨著水漲船高，創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)又一個(gè)的歷史新高因此，，如何合理的制定銀行高層管理者的薪酬，以及他們的薪酬是否真實(shí)的反應(yīng)了其經(jīng)營成果等問題，再次吸引了公眾的眼球，成為時(shí)下的熱點(diǎn)話題之一那么，對(duì)于銀行業(yè)來說，其高層管理者的薪酬應(yīng)該處在一個(gè)什么樣的高度上，如何使他們的薪酬水平客觀的反應(yīng)經(jīng)營水平，對(duì)他們薪酬產(chǎn)生明顯影響的敏感因子有哪些，國內(nèi)外的學(xué)者都做了大量的研究，但是由于對(duì)研究對(duì)象和樣本的選擇以及在研究過程中使用的方法等都存在較大的差異，因此對(duì)于銀行高管薪酬和績效問題的研究結(jié)論也相去甚遠(yuǎn) 本文中，在衡量我國銀行高管薪酬與績效的關(guān)系時(shí)，把關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)放在經(jīng)濟(jì)附加值（EVA）上，使其取代以凈資產(chǎn)收益率（ROE）為代表的傳統(tǒng)業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)現(xiàn)有研究成果和文獻(xiàn)絕大部分都是使用凈利潤收益率指標(biāo)作為衡量銀行績效的指標(biāo)，在查閱了大量的資料和相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)并對(duì)這些文獻(xiàn)資料進(jìn)行歸納分析后作者看到，計(jì)算EVA值時(shí)，在進(jìn)行會(huì)計(jì)計(jì)算時(shí)會(huì)對(duì)涉及到的會(huì)計(jì)科目會(huì)進(jìn)行一系列的調(diào)整，并且加入了大量反映企業(yè)經(jīng)營成果的會(huì)計(jì)科目因此，以EVA為衡量指標(biāo)，更加完整和精準(zhǔn)，這也是本文選取EVA為衡量指標(biāo)的原因 因此，本文在闡述EVA理論以及薪酬激勵(lì)理論和方法的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合我國銀行業(yè)的特點(diǎn)，將EVA理論具體運(yùn)用到銀行薪酬激勵(lì)體系評(píng)估當(dāng)中，并通過實(shí)證分析，以國內(nèi)上市的16家商業(yè)銀行中的11家銀行2007—2011年度公布年報(bào)的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本，通過分類歸納和分析我國上市銀高管薪酬和績效之間存在的關(guān)系
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the further implementation of the policy of reform and opening up, the form of ownership and the structure of market economy in our country are also in the process of continuous reform and improvement. Is in the continuous development of the modern company system, due to the separation of power and responsibility from each other, leading to the management process of the company to grasp the absolute information advantage and resource advantages of the top managers pay in this economic context. For the banks with currency as their main commodity in the course of operation, the situation is quite special, and the implementation and improvement of the salary policy of their senior managers are more easily restricted by many environmental factors inside and outside the company. Especially in recent years, under the guidance of the government, the pace of banking marketization in China has been gradually accelerated, executive compensation is mostly linked to the market and the soaring performance of the bank compared. The salary of the top management also rises with the tide, has created one record high one after another, therefore, how to reasonably formulate the compensation of the senior managers of the bank. And whether their pay reflects the real results of their business and other issues, once again attracted the public's attention, become one of the current hot topics, so, for the banking industry. How to make their salary level reflect the management level objectively, and what sensitive factors have obvious influence on their salary. Scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research, but due to the choice of research objects and samples, as well as the methods used in the research process, there are great differences. Therefore, the conclusions of the research on the pay and performance of bank executives are far from the same. In this paper, when we measure the relationship between executive compensation and performance, we put the key point on the economic added value (EVA). Make it replace the traditional performance evaluation indicators represented by the return on net assets (ROE) the existing research results and literature are mostly using the net profit return index as a measure of bank performance. After consulting a large number of data and related literature and summarizing and analyzing these documents, the author sees that the EVA value is calculated. In the accounting calculation will be involved in a series of adjustments to the accounting subjects, and a large number of reflect the business results of the accounting accounts, therefore, EVA as a measure, more complete and accurate. This is the reason why EVA is chosen as a measure in this paper. Therefore, on the basis of EVA theory and compensation incentive theory and methods, combined with the characteristics of China's banking industry, this paper applies the EVA theory to the evaluation of bank compensation incentive system. And through the empirical analysis, 11 of the 16 domestic listed commercial banks published annual report data from 2007-2011 as a sample. On the relationship between executive compensation and performance of listed banks in China
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F272.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳學(xué)彬,李翰,朱曄;完善我國商業(yè)銀行激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制的SWARM模擬分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2003年09期

2 邵平;劉林;孔愛國;;高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績的敏感性因素分析——金融業(yè)的證據(jù)(2000～2005年)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2008年01期

3 魏明海,盧銳;管理層風(fēng)險(xiǎn)報(bào)酬的有效性分析[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2004年03期

4 劉海英;;上市公司高管層薪酬激勵(lì)與資本結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系實(shí)證研究[J];福建論壇(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2009年08期

5 茍開紅;我國股份制商業(yè)銀行薪酬構(gòu)成及長期激勵(lì)研究[J];國際金融研究;2004年11期

6 宋獻(xiàn)中,羅宏;高級(jí)管理層持股與公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績:理論、經(jīng)驗(yàn)與實(shí)踐[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2004年03期

7 許珊珊;;國內(nèi)外商業(yè)銀行薪酬制度比較研究[J];甘肅金融;2010年06期

8 魏剛;高級(jí)管理層激勵(lì)與上市公司經(jīng)營績效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2000年03期

9 闕澄宇,王一江;銀行高層激勵(lì):美國20家銀行調(diào)查[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2005年03期

10 潘秀麗;業(yè)績衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與管理人員報(bào)酬契約[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2002年07期

本文編號(hào)：1491022