本文關(guān)鍵詞： 非效率投資 投資過度 投資不足 公司治理機(jī)制　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：中國經(jīng)濟(jì)在改革開放以后經(jīng)歷了飛速的發(fā)展,不論從宏觀層面還是微觀層面來看,作為拉動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的三駕馬車之一的投資都對國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展起了不可替代的作用。房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)蒸蒸日上,股市經(jīng)歷了過山車式的發(fā)展,各行業(yè)做大做強(qiáng)的口號不絕于耳,行業(yè)內(nèi)大魚吃小魚的并購重組現(xiàn)象叢生,上市公司的投資呈現(xiàn)了高速、大量、過度的趨勢。近幾年由于金融危機(jī)的影響和國家政策導(dǎo)向的改變,使得經(jīng)濟(jì)增速放緩,消費(fèi)需求的不足又令企業(yè)的投資增速放緩,投資意愿下降。不論是從宏觀上為了促進(jìn)國家宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,還是在微觀層面上實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價值的最大化,研究公司投資行為都顯得尤為重要。 本文在綜述了國內(nèi)外企業(yè)投資理論的基礎(chǔ)上,從公司治理的角度提出合理假設(shè),并在Richardson殘差度量模型的基礎(chǔ)上結(jié)合我國實(shí)際情況對其進(jìn)行合理的修改,使其更適合本文的研究背景和研究方向。 本文利用2008-2011年非金融類上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)對企業(yè)的投資行為進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,結(jié)果表明中國上市公司存在非效率的投資行為,且投資不足的企業(yè)更多,現(xiàn)象更嚴(yán)重。隨后將投資過度和投資不足公司分別作為兩個樣本組,試圖從公司內(nèi)部治理的角度解釋企業(yè)的非效率投資。研究結(jié)果表明：獨(dú)立董事機(jī)制對企業(yè)非效率投資行為缺乏有效的制約,在公司治理中的作用并未發(fā)揮出來；第一大股東持股比例的增加會加劇企業(yè)過度投資問題,但對投資不足企業(yè)的抑制影響則不顯著；國有企業(yè)是否比非國有企業(yè)能更好地抑制非效率投資問題還有待進(jìn)一步研究；股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制能有效抑制投資不足的非效率投資行為,但對于投資過度企業(yè)來說卻會加重過度投資水平：高管持股并沒能發(fā)揮實(shí)質(zhì)性的公司治理作用,難以約束和抑制企業(yè)非效率投資行為。 綜上所述,中國上市公司普遍存在非效率的投資行為,且投資不足現(xiàn)象更嚴(yán)重,而公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制在抑制企業(yè)的非效率投資行為方面收效甚微。
[Abstract]:China's economy has experienced rapid development since the reform and opening up, both from the macro level and the micro level. As one of the troika to stimulate economic growth, investment has played an irreplaceable role in the development of the national economy. The real estate industry is booming, the stock market has experienced a roller coaster development. The slogan of making big and strong in various industries is endless, the phenomenon of M & A and reorganization of big fish eating small fish in the industry is numerous, and the investment of listed companies presents a high speed and a large amount. In recent years due to the impact of the financial crisis and the change of national policy orientation, the economic growth rate has slowed down, and the lack of consumer demand has slowed the growth rate of enterprise investment. Whether in order to promote the stable development of national macroeconomic or to maximize the value of the company on the micro level, it is particularly important to study the investment behavior of the company. On the basis of summarizing the investment theory of enterprises at home and abroad, this paper puts forward reasonable assumptions from the angle of corporate governance. On the basis of Richardson residuals measurement model, a reasonable modification is made on the basis of the actual situation in China, which makes it more suitable for the research background and research direction of this paper. Using the data of non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2011, this paper makes an empirical study on the investment behavior of enterprises. The results show that there are inefficient investment behaviors of listed companies in China. And there are more underinvested enterprises and the phenomenon is more serious. Then the overinvestment and underinvestment companies are taken as two sample groups respectively. This paper attempts to explain the inefficient investment of enterprises from the angle of internal corporate governance. The research results show that the independent director mechanism has no effective restriction on the non-efficient investment behavior of enterprises and has not played a role in corporate governance. The increase of the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder will aggravate the problem of overinvestment, but the restraining effect on the underinvested enterprises is not significant. Whether the state-owned enterprises can restrain the non-efficiency investment better than the non-state-owned enterprises still needs to be further studied; The equity balance mechanism can effectively restrain the inefficient investment behavior of underinvestment, but it will aggravate the excessive investment level for the over-invested enterprises: the executive ownership does not play a substantive role in corporate governance. It is difficult to restrain and restrain the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises. To sum up, China's listed companies generally have inefficient investment behavior, and the phenomenon of insufficient investment is more serious, and the internal governance mechanism of the company has little effect on restraining the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.48

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