本文關(guān)鍵詞： 金融類上市公司 公允價(jià)值計(jì)量 高管薪酬 相關(guān)性　出處：《陜西科技大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：理論界對(duì)于公允價(jià)值計(jì)量與公司高管薪酬相關(guān)性的研究日趨深入,由于金融行業(yè)的特殊性,在研究樣本選擇時(shí)通常將其剔除。金融行業(yè)高管薪酬遠(yuǎn)高于其他行業(yè),且高薪酬缺乏高業(yè)績(jī)支撐的現(xiàn)象時(shí)有發(fā)生,社會(huì)關(guān)注強(qiáng)烈。金融行業(yè)在公允價(jià)值計(jì)量及其與高管薪酬相互關(guān)系等方面與其他行業(yè)有較大差異,迫切需要在理論上對(duì)此差異進(jìn)行揭示與詮釋。基于此,本文專門針對(duì)我國(guó)金融類上市公司,立足于公允價(jià)值計(jì)量的發(fā)展歷程,全面調(diào)查金融類上市公司高管薪酬的狀況,結(jié)合相關(guān)理論分析,提出研究假設(shè),基于2009-2014年公司公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)損益等財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),進(jìn)行深入的實(shí)證研究,探討金融類上市公司公允價(jià)值計(jì)量對(duì)高管薪酬的影響。本文通過(guò)實(shí)證分析,得出以下主要結(jié)論：(1)金融類上市公司公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)收益與高管薪酬之間并不存在顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,而公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)損失與高管薪酬之間存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,所謂“薪酬粘性”在金融類上市公司并無(wú)體現(xiàn)。說(shuō)明金融類上市公司薪酬制定機(jī)制相對(duì)理性,公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)損失有薪酬約束作用。(2)金融類上市公司高管薪酬對(duì)于公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)損益的敏感性系數(shù)小于經(jīng)常性損益(其他盈余)的敏感性系數(shù)。說(shuō)明金融類上市公司高管薪酬制定更看重能體現(xiàn)管理者努力程度的利潤(rùn)項(xiàng)目。(3)金融類上市公司高管薪酬受到較為嚴(yán)格的約束,并沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)管理者為提高自身薪酬而通過(guò)公允價(jià)值計(jì)量調(diào)節(jié)利潤(rùn)的行為異化現(xiàn)象。為進(jìn)一步完善金融類上市公司公允價(jià)值計(jì)量的應(yīng)用,優(yōu)化高管薪酬制定機(jī)制,本文認(rèn)為當(dāng)前應(yīng)著重從三方面著手：(1)構(gòu)建公允價(jià)值計(jì)量引導(dǎo)性框架；(2)優(yōu)化高管薪酬制定機(jī)制；(3)平衡不同行業(yè)之間的高管薪酬。
[Abstract]:The research on the correlation between fair value measurement and executive compensation is getting deeper and deeper, because of the particularity of financial industry. Financial industry executives pay far higher than other industries, and the phenomenon of high pay lack of high performance support occurs from time to time. The financial industry has great differences with other industries in the measurement of fair value and its relationship with executive compensation. It is urgent to reveal and interpret the differences in theory. This paper focuses on the financial listed companies, based on the fair value measurement of the development process, a comprehensive investigation of financial listed companies executive compensation situation, combined with relevant theoretical analysis, put forward research assumptions. Based on the financial data of the change of fair value of the company in 2009-2014, an in-depth empirical study is carried out. This paper discusses the impact of fair value measurement on executive compensation in financial listed companies. The main conclusions are as follows: 1) there is no significant positive correlation between fair value change income and executive compensation of financial listed companies. However, there is a significant negative correlation between the loss of fair value change and executive compensation, and the so-called "salary stickiness" is not reflected in the financial listed companies. The sensitivity coefficient of executive compensation of financial listed companies to fair value change profit or loss is less than that of recurrent profit and loss (other surplus). Shows that the financial listed companies pay more attention to reflect the level of management efforts of profit items. 3) Financial listed companies are more strictly constrained by executive compensation. In order to further improve the application of fair value measurement of financial listed companies, the development mechanism of executive compensation is optimized. This paper holds that we should focus on three aspects to construct the guiding framework of fair value measurement. 2) optimizing the mechanism of executive compensation; Balance executive pay between industries.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.3;F830.42

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