本文關(guān)鍵詞：長(zhǎng)沙市商業(yè)銀行高管人員激勵(lì)方案改進(jìn)研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì)，隨著知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代的到來(lái)，高管人員在現(xiàn)代商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)管理中的地位和作用越來(lái)越重要，已經(jīng)成為決定市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)勝敗的關(guān)鍵因素。同時(shí)，高管人員激勵(lì)機(jī)制是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的重要組成部分。然而，由于高管人員與其所有者具有不可分割性，，我們難以對(duì)其人力資本貢獻(xiàn)度進(jìn)行測(cè)算，進(jìn)而無(wú)法開(kāi)展有效的監(jiān)督與約束。 本文在對(duì)理論與實(shí)際相結(jié)合、國(guó)外與國(guó)內(nèi)相結(jié)合、現(xiàn)實(shí)與前瞻相結(jié)合和當(dāng)前與創(chuàng)新相結(jié)合進(jìn)行研究的基礎(chǔ)上，通過(guò)對(duì)長(zhǎng)沙市商業(yè)銀行現(xiàn)行激勵(lì)機(jī)制的實(shí)例分析，提出了該行在高管人員實(shí)際激勵(lì)操作中存在的問(wèn)題：部分高管人員薪酬收入未與業(yè)績(jī)緊密掛鉤、高管人員個(gè)性化需求未能得到有效滿(mǎn)足、高管人員職業(yè)生涯不通暢、高管人員中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度較弱等。針對(duì)上述問(wèn)題，本文嘗試構(gòu)建了一套科學(xué)、合理、創(chuàng)新、可行的現(xiàn)代商業(yè)銀行激勵(lì)方案，如實(shí)施高管人員工作考核、修訂高管年薪制度、推行高管培訓(xùn)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)、退職補(bǔ)償、選任和繼任者制等。針對(duì)方案實(shí)施中可能出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題，本文還從建立全方位溝通機(jī)制、建立高管末位淘汰制度、建立強(qiáng)有力的組織保障、多管齊下整體推進(jìn)等方面，提出了方案實(shí)施的保障措施。 本文的研究不僅為長(zhǎng)沙市商業(yè)銀行調(diào)動(dòng)高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的工作積極性，實(shí)現(xiàn)銀行持續(xù)穩(wěn)健快速發(fā)展提供了思路與方法的借鑒，也為推動(dòng)全國(guó)城商行高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制的建設(shè)和創(chuàng)新提供有益的參考。
[Abstract]:In 21th century, with the arrival of the era of knowledge economy, the position and role of executives in the management of modern commercial banks has become more and more important, which has become the key factor to determine the success or failure of market competition. The incentive mechanism of senior managers is an important part of corporate governance structure. However, due to the indivisibility of executives and their owners, it is difficult to calculate the contribution of human capital. Furthermore, it is impossible to carry out effective supervision and restriction. In this paper, the combination of theory and practice, the combination of foreign and domestic, the combination of reality and prospect and the combination of current and innovation on the basis of research. Through the analysis of the current incentive mechanism of Changsha City Commercial Bank, the paper points out the problems in the actual incentive operation of Changsha City Commercial Bank: some executives' salary and income are not closely linked to their performance. The individualized needs of senior executives have not been effectively met, the career of senior executives is not smooth, and the long-term incentive intensity of senior executives is weak. In view of the above problems, this paper tries to build a set of scientific, reasonable and innovative. Feasible incentives for modern commercial banks, such as the implementation of executive assessment, the revision of the annual executive pay system, the implementation of executive training, equity incentives, retirement compensation. In view of the possible problems in the implementation of the program, this paper also from the establishment of a comprehensive communication mechanism, the establishment of the system of final elimination of senior executives, the establishment of a strong organizational guarantee. This paper puts forward the safeguard measures for the implementation of the scheme in the aspects of multi-pronged and integrated propulsion. The research in this paper not only provides a reference for Changsha Commercial Bank to mobilize the enthusiasm of the senior management team, but also to realize the steady and rapid development of the bank. It also provides a useful reference for promoting the construction and innovation of the incentive mechanism of city commercial bank.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.33;F272.92

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