本文關(guān)鍵詞：委托—代理理論視角下我國商業(yè)銀行反洗錢激勵機制研究　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 反洗錢 激勵機制 委托—代理模型 商業(yè)銀行

【摘要】：上世紀50年代以來,洗錢犯罪日益膨脹,其對國際社會的影響的日益增大。在犯罪形式上,洗錢犯罪日益與上游的犯罪相互剝離,逐漸成為一個獨立的犯罪形式。特別是美國9.11事件以來,恐怖活動更加猖獗,國際社會已經(jīng)意識到打擊洗錢犯罪是遏制恐怖活動的重要手段之一。近年來,洗錢對我國金融體系危害日益嚴重,反洗錢工作受到越來越多的重視,反洗錢體系日益完善。2007年1月1日正式實施的《反洗錢法》標志著我國反洗錢工作進入了一個新的階段。本法規(guī)定反洗錢工作的最重要的主體之一就是金融機構(gòu),而大部分洗錢行為是通過商業(yè)銀行各種復(fù)雜的金融工具將“黑錢”轉(zhuǎn)化為表面合法的資金。所以,商業(yè)銀行仍然承擔(dān)著反洗錢一線排頭兵的重任。但是由于商業(yè)銀行與反洗錢工作在短期內(nèi)存在著商業(yè)利益上的沖突,反洗錢工作受到了一些限制。研究商業(yè)銀行的反洗錢行為,探討如何更好的發(fā)揮商業(yè)銀行的主觀能動性,完善其反洗錢工作的內(nèi)部機制和外部環(huán)境成為了學(xué)術(shù)界不可忽視的重要課題。 基于上述背景,本文旨在分析我國當前的反洗錢及激勵體系的現(xiàn)狀,運用依據(jù)委托—代理理論分析商業(yè)銀行反洗錢激勵問題,豐富了相關(guān)理論和提出針對性政策建議。具體而言,本文做了以下幾方面的工作：首先,本文對于反洗錢基礎(chǔ)理論進行了歸納,并梳理了激勵理論和委托—代理理論,為解決下文商業(yè)銀行反洗錢激勵問題打下了理論基礎(chǔ)。然后,對我國的商業(yè)銀行的反洗錢及反洗錢激勵機制的現(xiàn)狀和存在的問題進行了分析,并介紹了歐美國家的反洗錢激勵機制特點和對我國建立反洗錢激勵機制的啟示。再次,建立了基于委托—代理理論的模型,分析監(jiān)管機構(gòu)與商業(yè)銀行二者之間的關(guān)系,圍繞最優(yōu)激勵水平、監(jiān)管水平等和影響監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的幾個主要因素展開分析。最后結(jié)合我國的實際,分析了建立反洗錢激勵機制的必要性,以及如何按照委托—代理機制建立具有中國特色的反洗錢激勵機制,并給出具體的政策建議。本文認為反洗錢激勵機制建設(shè)應(yīng)該采用“適度激勵,先內(nèi)后外,制度在前,逐步推進”的工作原則作為其機制設(shè)計的基本思路。
[Abstract]:Since -50s, the crime of money laundering is expanding day by day, and its influence on the international community is increasing. In the form of crime, the crime of money laundering is increasingly peeling off from the upstream crime. Gradually becoming an independent form of crime. Especially since the September 11 attacks in the United States, terrorist activities have become more rampant. The international community has realized that combating the crime of money laundering is one of the important means to curb terrorist activities. In recent years, money laundering has become more and more serious to the financial system of our country, and anti-money laundering work has been paid more and more attention. The anti-money laundering system is becoming more and more perfect. In January 1st 2007, the Anti-Money-Laundering Law formally implemented marked a new stage in the anti-money laundering work in China. One of the most important subjects of anti-money laundering work stipulated in this Law is that of the anti-money laundering work. Financial institutions. And most of the money laundering is through various complex financial instruments of commercial banks to transform "black money" into apparently legitimate funds. Commercial banks still bear the responsibility of leading the anti-money laundering front line. However, there is a conflict of commercial interests between commercial banks and anti-money laundering work in the short term. Anti-Money-Laundering work has been limited by some. This paper studies the anti-money laundering behavior of commercial banks and discusses how to better play the subjective initiative of commercial banks. Perfecting the internal mechanism and external environment of anti-money-laundering has become an important subject which can not be ignored by academic circles. Based on the above background, this paper aims to analyze the current situation of anti-money laundering and incentive system in China, and use principal-agent theory to analyze the incentive problem of anti-money laundering in commercial banks. Enrich the relevant theory and put forward targeted policy recommendations. Specifically, this paper has done the following work: first, this paper summarizes the basic theory of anti-money-laundering. And combing the incentive theory and principal-agent theory to solve the following commercial banks anti-money laundering incentive problem laid a theoretical foundation. Then. This paper analyzes the current situation and existing problems of anti-money laundering and anti-money laundering incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China. It also introduces the characteristics of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism in Europe and the United States and the inspiration to the establishment of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism in China. Thirdly, the model based on principal-agent theory is established. This paper analyzes the relationship between the regulatory agencies and commercial banks, focusing on the optimal incentive level, regulatory level and several main factors affecting the regulatory body. Finally, combined with the reality of our country. This paper analyzes the necessity of setting up anti-money laundering incentive mechanism and how to establish the anti-money laundering incentive mechanism with Chinese characteristics according to the principal-agent mechanism. This paper holds that the working principle of "moderate incentive, first inside and then outside, system in the front, advance gradually" should be adopted as the basic thinking of the mechanism design of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.33

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