本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于EVA的我國(guó)上市銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的實(shí)證研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 高管薪酬 激勵(lì)效應(yīng) EVA 上市商業(yè)銀行

【摘要】：近年來(lái),每逢上市公司年報(bào)發(fā)布時(shí),被驚為“天價(jià)”的上市銀行高管薪酬總是引起各界的關(guān)注。特別是金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)期間,在整個(gè)銀行業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)不景氣的情況下,國(guó)內(nèi)上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬仍然居高不下,且在各行業(yè)高管薪酬的排名中也是位列前茅。對(duì)此,學(xué)術(shù)界、媒體界等各界人士紛紛質(zhì)疑,銀行高管到底應(yīng)該拿多少工資?高管薪酬是否與銀行的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)掛鉤?高管薪酬是否對(duì)銀行的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理起到了應(yīng)有的激勵(lì)作用?在此背景下,研究銀行高管薪酬對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的激勵(lì)作用就有了現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 高管薪酬激勵(lì)是基于委托代理關(guān)系的背景下提出來(lái)的。為適應(yīng)社會(huì)化大生產(chǎn)的發(fā)展,企業(yè)制度的發(fā)展主要經(jīng)歷了三種制度模式即業(yè)主制、合伙制和公司制。公司制企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理過(guò)程中所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離,在公司內(nèi)部存在股東和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者之間的委托代理關(guān)系。在委托代理關(guān)系下,經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者作為代理人代理股東經(jīng)營(yíng)管理企業(yè),股東作為企業(yè)的所有者對(duì)企業(yè)享有所有權(quán)和參與公司重大決策的權(quán)利。因此在日常的經(jīng)營(yíng)中,經(jīng)營(yíng)管理人員特別是高級(jí)管理人員更容易掌握整個(gè)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況,更容易獲得第一手資料信息,而股東則在企業(yè)有關(guān)信息的掌握上滯后于高管人員,甚至是只能看到企業(yè)披露的信息。企業(yè)真實(shí)的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理過(guò)程對(duì)股東來(lái)說(shuō)就像半透明的黑匣子。股東與高管人員之間存在嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱,這種信息不對(duì)稱容易導(dǎo)致高管人員的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),即掌控企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)大權(quán)的高管人員可能會(huì)為自己的利益而犧牲企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益。上述就是所謂的委托代理問(wèn)題。由于委托代理問(wèn)題會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生不利影響,損害股東的財(cái)富,企業(yè)界、學(xué)術(shù)界在探尋解決委托代理問(wèn)題方法的過(guò)程中提出了高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度。高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度作為解決委托代理問(wèn)題的方法之一,其目的是使經(jīng)營(yíng)者的利益與公司利益相一致,在通過(guò)薪酬激勵(lì)高管人員在經(jīng)營(yíng)中做出有利于股東財(cái)富的管理。十四屆三中全會(huì)對(duì)現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的特征作了概括,十五屆四中全會(huì)強(qiáng)調(diào)了要建立和完善現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度,隨之現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度在國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)中逐步建立起來(lái)。相應(yīng)地為了解決現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度中存在的委托代理問(wèn)題,國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)也引入高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度。在我國(guó)高管薪酬主要由基本工資和績(jī)效工資構(gòu)成,高管薪酬激勵(lì)除了績(jī)效工資外還有較長(zhǎng)期的股權(quán)激勵(lì),但在目前來(lái)看股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)的企業(yè)公司治理中還不普遍。高管薪酬激勵(lì)中貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)主要表現(xiàn)在績(jī)效工資方面,企業(yè)實(shí)行績(jī)效工資制度將高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)掛鉤,以便激勵(lì)管理人員在經(jīng)營(yíng)管理工作中以增加股東財(cái)富為目標(biāo),提高工作的積極性和效率,為股東創(chuàng)造更多的財(cái)富。貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)主要是屬于激勵(lì)高管的短期性手段,為使高管利益與股東利益更好的趨向一致還要采取中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)手段如股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃等,在整個(gè)高管薪酬激勵(lì)中應(yīng)該將短期激勵(lì)手段與中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)手段相結(jié)合才能更好的對(duì)高管起到持續(xù)的激勵(lì)作用,使高管利益與企業(yè)利益最大程度的聯(lián)系在一起,更好的解決委托代理關(guān)系中存在的問(wèn)題。隨著我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理的改革,高管薪酬激勵(lì)也被引入上市銀行治理。上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬一般包括基本薪酬、績(jī)效工資和中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)。隨著我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的逐步上市和證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)高管薪酬披露的要求,我國(guó)上市銀行在其年報(bào)中都會(huì)披露有關(guān)高級(jí)管理人員、董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)的薪酬情況。這對(duì)于國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者研究高管薪酬與銀行績(jī)效的相關(guān)性提供了可參考的數(shù)據(jù)。學(xué)者們對(duì)高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)系的討論特別是在08年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來(lái)顯得尤為激烈。從目前總體研究情況來(lái)看國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者研究關(guān)注的是如此高的高管薪酬能否對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)起到有效地激勵(lì)作用或者是高管薪酬的制定是否取決于企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)相關(guān)研究已有20年左右,前期主要是在參考國(guó)外經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上從理論角度探討高管薪酬激勵(lì)的問(wèn)題,主要包括績(jī)效工資、期股計(jì)劃等的研究。隨著國(guó)內(nèi)公司治理的不斷完善和信息披露制度的完善,國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者的研究重點(diǎn)逐漸從理論研究向?qū)嵶C研究轉(zhuǎn)移,希望通過(guò)對(duì)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的實(shí)證分析檢驗(yàn)國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)高管薪酬與績(jī)效的關(guān)系,并取得了一系列的研究成果。雖然有眾多的學(xué)者們研究,也取得了成果,但這些成果并沒(méi)有形成統(tǒng)一的定論。在高管薪酬和企業(yè)績(jī)效的關(guān)系研究中主要的研究結(jié)論有負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系、不相關(guān)關(guān)系和正相關(guān)關(guān)系。從研究的視角來(lái)看主要有基于內(nèi)生性視角的研究和基于外生性視角的研究。在研究中對(duì)研究變量的選擇也不盡相同。對(duì)于高管薪酬的指標(biāo)有些研究使用所有高管人員的報(bào)酬總額,有的學(xué)者則選用前三名最高薪酬的均值或總額,還有的學(xué)者在研究中使用高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部的薪酬差距。對(duì)于企業(yè)績(jī)效的指標(biāo)的選擇主要是財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo),還有部分學(xué)者選用EVA評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)、平衡計(jì)分卡等。因此基于委托代理理論和高管薪酬激勵(lì)理論進(jìn)一步對(duì)銀行高管激勵(lì)作用進(jìn)行研究,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)高管薪酬制度對(duì)銀行業(yè)績(jī)的激勵(lì)作用,驗(yàn)證國(guó)內(nèi)上市銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)的效果具有一定的理論意義。 本文具體研究的是我國(guó)上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬對(duì)銀行績(jī)效的激勵(lì)效應(yīng),主要從六個(gè)部分對(duì)研究情況進(jìn)行了介紹。第1章介紹了本文的研究背景、目的和意義、研究的方法和內(nèi)容,這一部分在文章總體中占據(jù)著總覽全文的作用,詳細(xì)介紹了寫作之前的思路框架,對(duì)后文的寫作起著基本的指導(dǎo)作用。第2章介紹了高管薪酬激勵(lì)的基本概念和理論。由于不同學(xué)者在研究高管薪酬激勵(lì)問(wèn)題時(shí)往往對(duì)于研究中所涉及到的相關(guān)概念的定義不同,研究的結(jié)論也會(huì)有所差異,因此本文在研究前首先對(duì)相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行明確的定義,也便于后文中相關(guān)理論和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的進(jìn)行。本章還對(duì)高管薪酬涉及的相關(guān)理論,如委托代理理論、公司治理理論、高管薪酬激勵(lì)等相關(guān)理論做了具傣的介紹,對(duì)相關(guān)理論知識(shí)進(jìn)行回顧與梳理,在理順基礎(chǔ)知識(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上才能更好的進(jìn)行下一步的研究與分析。第3章是國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)的回顧與評(píng)述。這一章從國(guó)外研究狀況和國(guó)內(nèi)研究狀況兩個(gè)大的方面進(jìn)行了祥簡(jiǎn)結(jié)合的文獻(xiàn)介紹,在其中又根據(jù)研究角度的不同分為外生性視角的研究和內(nèi)生性視角的研究。本章最后從研究視角、研究結(jié)論、國(guó)內(nèi)外研究的對(duì)比方面對(duì)前面的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行總體的評(píng)述,并認(rèn)為高管薪酬激勵(lì)的研究仍然有很長(zhǎng)的路要走。第4章主要分析了國(guó)內(nèi)上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀。銀行作為國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的重要行業(yè),其經(jīng)營(yíng)管理有其特殊性,比如其經(jīng)營(yíng)目標(biāo)的多重性、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的重要性等。接下來(lái)詳細(xì)介紹了國(guó)內(nèi)高管薪酬的政策與規(guī)范制度,在此基礎(chǔ)上具體介紹了國(guó)內(nèi)銀行高管的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),并對(duì)16家上市銀行高管薪酬前三名均值的非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)做了簡(jiǎn)單地描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)。這些數(shù)據(jù)主要來(lái)源于各上市商業(yè)銀行披露的年報(bào)和補(bǔ)充報(bào)告。第5章詳細(xì)介紹了EVA指標(biāo)。高管薪酬的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)在前一章中已經(jīng)做了具體的介紹,銀行業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)在整個(gè)研究中起著重要的作用。這一章主要介紹了EVA指標(biāo)的相關(guān)理論知識(shí)、選擇原因、模型、調(diào)整后的EVA指標(biāo)計(jì)算等。在這一章中計(jì)算占了很大一部分,EVA指標(biāo)是基于企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)凈利潤(rùn)調(diào)整后的數(shù)值,在計(jì)算過(guò)程中涉及到的中間值較多,數(shù)據(jù)收集工作較重,主要來(lái)源是各銀行年報(bào)、和訊財(cái)經(jīng)網(wǎng)站、通達(dá)信股票分析軟件等。第6章我們的研究進(jìn)入了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)階段,得出結(jié)論,并提出合理的建議�；谇叭说难芯亢捅疚闹星懊娴慕榻B,該章通過(guò)搜集數(shù)據(jù)、選擇變量和模型,在EViews軟件的幫助下實(shí)現(xiàn)了高管薪酬與銀行績(jī)效之間的回歸,并得出高管薪酬對(duì)當(dāng)期、下一期業(yè)績(jī)存在負(fù)激勵(lì)。國(guó)有銀行高管薪酬與銀行績(jī)效存在負(fù)相關(guān),但不顯著,非國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬對(duì)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)存在顯著地負(fù)激勵(lì)。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本章最后提出了自己對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)上市銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)問(wèn)題的三方面的建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, when the listed company's annual report released, was surprised to "price" of executive compensation in listed banks is always concerned by the community. Especially during the financial crisis, the operating performance of the entire banking industry downturn, domestic commercial banks listed on executive pay is still high, and in the industry ranking of executive compensation is also in the forefront. In this regard, academia, media and other sectors have questioned whether bank executives should take how much salary? Whether executive pay and bank performance? Whether executive pay is the management of the bank to a proper incentive? In this context, the research of bank executive compensation incentive operating results have a practical significance.
Executive compensation incentive is based on principal-agent relationship under the background mentioned above. In order to adapt to the development of social production, the development of the enterprise system has experienced three main modes of system namely ownership, partnerships and corporations. The separation of corporate ownership in the production management process and management rights, the principal-agent relationship exists between in the internal relationship between shareholders and managers. In the principal-agent relationship, the management of enterprise management as an agent of shareholders, the shareholders as the owner of the enterprise ownership and the right to participate in major decision-making enterprises. So in daily business management personnel, especially senior management personnel is easier to grasp the whole enterprise the operating conditions, easier to obtain first-hand information, and information about shareholders in the enterprise master behind executives, even Can only see the information of the company. The black box real business management process for shareholders. As translucent the serious information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, this information asymmetry will lead to moral hazard of executives, which control the business power of the executives may for their own interests at the expense of the long-term interests of enterprises. This is the so-called principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem will have a negative impact on the long-term development of enterprises, shareholders' wealth, business circles and academic circles in the quest to solve the principal-agent problem in the process of the method proposed. The executive compensation incentive system of executive compensation incentive system as one of the methods to solve the principal-agent problem, its purpose is to the interests of the operators is consistent with the interests of the company, through the incentive pay for executives in the business to make a favorable In shareholder wealth management. On the third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee of the modern enterprise system characteristics are summed up in the fourth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee, stressed the need to establish and improve the modern enterprise system, with the modern enterprise system in the domestic enterprises gradually built up accordingly. In order to solve the principal-agent problem in the modern enterprise system, domestic enterprises are also introduced. In the executive compensation incentive system executive compensation in China is mainly composed of basic salary and performance pay incentive in addition to long-term equity incentive and performance salary, but the equity incentive in the present situation in our country's corporate governance is not universal. The executive compensation incentive in monetary incentive is mainly reflected in the performance of wages, enterprises in the implementation of performance pay system will be linked to executive pay and corporate performance, in order to encourage managers in the management work to increase shareholder wealth Rich as the goal, to improve the working enthusiasm and efficiency, create more wealth for shareholders. Monetary incentive is mainly short-term means belonging to executives incentives, in order to make the interests of executives and shareholders interests tend to take a better favorable long-term incentive means such as equity incentive plan, the executive compensation incentive should be the short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination can better incentive effect of executives continued, the maximum interests of executives and business interests together in a better solution to the principal-agent relationship. With the reform of China's commercial bank governance, executive compensation incentive of listed banks is also introduced the governance of listed commercial banks. Executives' salary includes basic salary, performance pay and long-term incentive. As China's commercial banks gradually listed and the Commission on executive pay For disclosure requirements of listed banks in China will disclose the relevant senior management personnel in its annual report, remuneration of board of directors and board of supervisors. This provides reference data for the correlation of domestic scholars research on executive pay and bank performance. Discussion on executive compensation and enterprise performance relationship between the scholars in particular the 08 years since the outbreak of the financial crisis is particularly intense. From the current situation of the overall domestic scholars study is concerned with such a high executive compensation on the performance of the business can play an effective incentive role or executive compensation setting depends on whether the performance of the enterprise. The domestic scholars on the executive compensation incentive research for about 20 years, the discussion is mainly the executive compensation incentive problem from the angle of theory on the basis of foreign experience, including the performance salary and stock option plan. With the research etc. Domestic corporate governance improvement and the improvement of information disclosure system, the research focus of domestic scholars gradually shifted from theoretical research to empirical research, analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and performance to test domestic enterprises on the basis of empirical data, and obtained a series of achievements. Although there are many scholars also. Achieved results, but these results did not form a unified conclusion. In the study of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the main conclusions of the study are negative correlation, no correlation and positive correlation. From the research perspective is mainly based on the endogeneity and exogeneity. Based on the research perspective in research a study on the choice of variables are not the same. For executive compensation index in some of the total compensation using all executives, some scholars selected the top three most High salary mean or total, some scholars use pay gap within the executive team in the study. The enterprise performance index selection is the main financial indicators, as well as some scholars use EVA evaluation index, balanced scorecard. Therefore the research on the principal-agent theory and the high tube salary incentive theory further to bank executives incentive effect based on the empirical test of executive compensation incentive system of bank performance, has a certain theoretical significance to verify the domestic listed bank executive compensation incentive effect.
This paper is the study of the incentive effect of executives of listed commercial banks pay on bank performance, mainly from the six parts of the research are introduced. The first chapter introduces the research background, purpose and significance, research method and content, this part of the total body plays a role in this. And introduces the framework before writing, the writing of this article plays a fundamental and guiding role. The second chapter introduces the basic concepts and theories of executive compensation incentive. Because of different scholars incentive problems in the study of executive compensation is often related to concepts involved in the research of different definitions, the conclusion of the study will be the differences, this paper first defines the related concepts, is easy to the relevant theoretical and empirical test. This chapter also relates to the relevant theories of executive compensation The theory, such as principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory, incentive theory with Dai introduction of relevant theoretical knowledge on the basis of reviewing and combing, straighten out the basic knowledge on to the next step of research and analysis. The third chapter is the review of relevant research literature at home and abroad this chapter. The research situation and research status of domestic and abroad from two aspects combined with the literature about Jane Cheung, and in which according to the different research angle for the external perspective and the endogeneity of research. At the end of this chapter, from the perspective of research, the conclusion of the study, comparative research at home and abroad on the front of the literature of the general comment on, and that the study of executive compensation incentive is still a long way to go. The fourth chapter mainly analyzes the domestic commercial banks listed on executive compensation incentive status as national bank. Important sectors of the economy, its management has its particularity, such as multiple business goals, the importance of risk control. Then introduces the domestic policies and regulations of executive compensation system, on the basis of detailed introduces the domestic bank executive compensation structure, and unbalanced panel data on executive compensation 16 the top three listed banks mean to do a simple descriptive statistics. The main sources of data disclosure in the listed commercial banks annual report and supplementary report. The fifth chapter introduces the EVA index. The relevant data of executive compensation has done a detailed introduction in the previous chapter, bank performance index plays an important role in the whole study. This chapter mainly introduces the related theory of EVA, the choice of indicators, model, adjusted EVA index calculation. In this chapter the calculation account for a large part, EVA The subject is the enterprise net profit after adjustment of business value based on the intermediate in the process of calculation involves the value of more data collection work is heavy, is the main source of the annual report of the bank, and the financial website, access to the letter stock analysis software. In the sixth chapter, we research into the test phase, draw the conclusion, and put forward the reasonable the front of the previous studies and suggestions. This paper based on the introduction, this chapter through the data collection, variable selection and model, with the help of the EViews software to realize the regression between executive compensation and bank performance, and the impact the current executive pay, a negative incentive. The performance is negatively related to the performance of state-owned bank executives payment of the bank, but not significant, non state-owned commercial bank executives pay significantly negative incentive for banks operating performance. On this basis, this chapter puts forward to the domestic city bank executives pay Three suggestions on the issue of remuneration incentive.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.3

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 游虎;經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)離不開EVA[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2000年S1期

2 朱建武;基于EVA的中小銀行績(jī)效與治理結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2005年05期

3 邵平;劉林;孔愛(ài)國(guó);;高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)的敏感性因素分析——金融業(yè)的證據(jù)(2000～2005年)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2008年01期

4 陳旭東;谷靜;;上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2008年06期

5 柯可;邱凱;;上市公司高管薪酬影響因素分析——基于滬深股市的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2009年09期

6 胡銘;上市公司高層經(jīng)理與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的實(shí)證分析[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2003年04期

7 高莉,樊衛(wèi)東;中國(guó)銀行業(yè)創(chuàng)值能力分析——EVA體系對(duì)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的考察[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2003年11期

8 龍建成;經(jīng)營(yíng)者激勵(lì)、經(jīng)營(yíng)者控制與公司績(jī)效[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2005年03期

9 宋清華;曲良波;;高管薪酬、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)與銀行績(jī)效:中國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];國(guó)際金融研究;2011年12期

10 李燕萍;孫紅;張銀;;高管報(bào)酬激勵(lì)、戰(zhàn)略并購(gòu)重組與公司績(jī)效——來(lái)自中國(guó)A股上市公司的實(shí)證[J];管理世界;2008年12期

，

本文編號(hào)：1377439