本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬對綜合績效影響的實證研究　出處：《云南財經(jīng)大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市股份制銀行 高管薪酬激勵 綜合績效 長期股權(quán)激勵 延期支付計劃

【摘要】：目前，銀行高管的天價薪酬受到社會各界的普遍關(guān)注，較高的薪酬能否帶來較好的銀行績效受到廣泛質(zhì)疑，國內(nèi)外學者研究結(jié)果也不一致，指標選取不完備。因此，本論文選取充分的相關(guān)變量指標，利用主成分分析法得出綜合績效得分，以期更加準確的研究高管薪酬與綜合績效的相關(guān)關(guān)系。本論文選取上市的八家股份制商業(yè)銀行：招商銀行、中信銀行、浦發(fā)銀行、民生銀行、光大銀行、興業(yè)銀行、華夏銀行和深圳發(fā)展銀行為主要研究對象，目的是為我國股份制商業(yè)銀行薪酬委員會制定高管薪酬提供政策建議。 本文首先對高管薪酬與綜合績效關(guān)系進行了定性分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬差距較大，高管薪酬各部分比例不合理，高管薪酬與實際綜合績效關(guān)系不大等問題。然后進行多元回歸定量分析，得出了高管薪酬與銀行綜合績效顯著正相關(guān)的結(jié)論。與定性分析結(jié)果不一致，，我們以定量分析為準，認為銀行高管高薪并不是沒有績效這一依據(jù)。高管薪酬內(nèi)部作用機制使得高管努力工作，帶來了高績效，伴隨著高薪作為獎勵，以強化其繼續(xù)努力工作。此外，本文還單獨對延期支付、股權(quán)激勵與銀行績效進行了回歸分析，考察其對銀行綜合績效的影響，為其他銀行是否實施延期支付和股權(quán)激勵計劃提供實證依據(jù)，其中延期支付的研究彌補了前人研究的缺陷。通過實證研究，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬延期支付能很好的解釋銀行綜合績效，并且延期支付對核心資本充足率顯著正影響，對不良貸款率顯著負影響；高管股權(quán)激勵不是影響銀行綜合績效的因素，不僅如此，對各項績效指標均沒有解釋意義。 最后，本文提出優(yōu)化銀行高管薪酬的三大建議：基本薪酬的設(shè)置應(yīng)該既考慮內(nèi)部公平，進行職位評價，又考慮外部公平，進行市場薪酬調(diào)查；績效薪酬的設(shè)置應(yīng)該既考慮盈利性績效指標又考慮非盈利性績效指標，也就是要構(gòu)造綜合績效指標體系；并且要將短期薪酬激勵與長期薪酬激勵相結(jié)合，更加注重長期激勵的作用，加大長期薪酬激勵所占的比重。
[Abstract]:At present, bank executives pay price attracted widespread attention from all sectors of society, high salary can bring better performance of banks has been widely questioned, the research results of domestic and foreign scholars are inconsistent, the index selection is complete. Therefore, this thesis chooses relevant variables full index analysis method, comprehensive performance scores using principal component correlation the relationship between the more accurate and comprehensive performance of executive compensation in order. This paper selects eight listed joint-stock commercial bank, China Merchants Bank, CITIC Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Minsheng Bank, China Everbright Bank, industrial bank, Huaxia Bank and Shenzhen Development Bank as the main research object, purpose is for China's Joint-stock Commercial Commission bank executive pay compensation policies to provide policy recommendations.
This paper makes a qualitative analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and comprehensive performance, that the executive compensation gap between executive compensation, the proportion is not reasonable, the relationship between executive compensation and the actual performance is not the problem. Then multiple regression analysis, the significant positive correlation of executive pay and bank performance results are inconsistent with the conclusions. The qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis, we shall prevail, that bank executives and high performance is the basis. The executive compensation mechanism of internal executives makes hard work, bring high performance, with a high salary as a reward, in order to strengthen its work. In addition, this paper also separately on the deferred payment of equity incentive and bank performance by regression analysis, to examine its effect on the performance of the bank, other banks for deferred payment and whether the implementation of equity incentive plan to provide empirical in According to the study, including deferred payments to make up for deficiencies in the previous studies. Through empirical research, we found that executive pay deferred payment can explain the bank comprehensive performance is very good, and pay a significant positive impact on the core capital adequacy ratio, the rate of significant negative impact on non-performing loans; executive equity incentive factors, not affect the comprehensive performance of banks not only that, no explanation of the performance indicators.
Finally, three suggestions are put forward to optimize the bank executive compensation: basic salary setting should not only consider the internal fairness, job evaluation, and consider the external equity, market salary survey; performance salary setting should not only consider profit performance index considering the profitability performance index, which is to construct the index system and comprehensive performance; to be a short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination, pay more attention to the long-term incentive effect, increase the proportion of long-term incentive compensation.

【學位授予單位】：云南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.33

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