家族企業(yè)HY公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化研究
[Abstract]:Family business is the main force of wealth creation and economic growth in the private enterprises of contemporary society in our country. It is also a common enterprise form in the world today. In the decades of reform and opening up, Family business plays an important role in social and economic development. According to the National report on the Development of Family Enterprises in China in December 2011, 85.4% of private enterprises in China belong to family businesses in a broad sense, and 55.5% of private enterprises belong to family businesses in a narrow sense. Domestic listed companies accounted for 36.9% of the family business. Due to the growing influence of family business on the global economy, the topic of family business has aroused widespread concern and heated discussion. There are many common problems in family business in China, such as small scale and short life. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, a large number of family enterprises in our country have closed down or are facing closure. This paper chooses the optimization of the internal governance structure of the family business as the writing direction, through the literature research method, the case analysis method carries on the research to the HY company. This paper holds that the family business can be divided into different development stages according to its development situation. In different development stages, the internal governance structure model of the family business should also be different, so it can not be applied to one kind of mode. Based on the principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory, incentive theory and other relevant theories, and the influence of equity structure on internal governance, this paper analyzes the development of internal governance structure of HY Company. It is found that there are many problems in the internal governance structure of HY Company, which affect the healthy development of the company. Therefore, this paper puts forward the corresponding optimization countermeasures and suggestions for HY Company in the aspects of ownership structure, incentive and restraint mechanism, supervision system, etc. It is hoped that the countermeasures proposed in this paper will contribute to the optimization of the internal governance structure of HY Company and enable it to grow healthily and healthily.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:廣東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F276.5;F426.88;F271
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