發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-07 12:11

【摘要】：隨著時(shí)代發(fā)展,公司治理中所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離產(chǎn)生了傳統(tǒng)的委托代理問題,股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃是解決這一突出問題的有力工具,它通過給予作為公司代理人的管理層和核心技術(shù)人員等一定的股東權(quán)利,使代理人與作為委托人的企業(yè)所有者利益趨于一致。文章通過對(duì)青島海爾陸續(xù)實(shí)施的2009年、2011年、2012年和2014年四期股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃進(jìn)行全面分析與評(píng)價(jià),介紹其激勵(lì)對(duì)象、激勵(lì)股票的數(shù)額、行權(quán)期和可行權(quán)股票數(shù)量、業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)等要素,闡述其股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃實(shí)施控制的過程,并對(duì)其股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的效果進(jìn)行分析和評(píng)價(jià),總結(jié)出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)并指出在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃中應(yīng)關(guān)注的事項(xiàng)。本文共分為六大部分:引言、股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的基本理論、青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的案例背景、方案設(shè)計(jì)及實(shí)施過程、效果及成功原因分析以及案例啟示。第一部引言,介紹了案例的研究背景和研究意義并對(duì)相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行整理和評(píng)述。第二部分為股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的基本理論介紹。第三部分介紹的是案例的背景,介紹了青島海爾的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃實(shí)施背景并分析了其實(shí)施的必要性。第四部分對(duì)青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃具體如何設(shè)置要素以及具體如何進(jìn)行實(shí)施控制進(jìn)行分析。第五部分主要介紹了青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的效果并分析了其成功的原因。第六部分介紹了由青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃案例得到的啟示,并指出了在這個(gè)案例中應(yīng)關(guān)注的事項(xiàng)。青島海爾實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃后,排除外部因素的影響,公司的股價(jià)基本呈上升趨勢(shì),公司的各項(xiàng)收益指標(biāo)也逐年增長,可見股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃對(duì)青島海爾公司價(jià)值的提升有正面影響,總體來說是成功的。我們可以從青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的成功實(shí)施中,總結(jié)出相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)供之后的公司參考,同時(shí),青島海爾股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃中存在的對(duì)象選擇以及業(yè)績指標(biāo)考核方面的問題也值得關(guān)注。
[Abstract]:With the development of the times, the separation of ownership and management in corporate governance has brought about the traditional principal-agent problem. The equity incentive plan is a powerful tool to solve this outstanding problem. By giving certain shareholder rights such as management and core technical personnel as the agent of the company, it makes the interests of the agent and the owner of the enterprise as the principal converge. Through the comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the four equity incentive plans implemented by Qingdao Haier in 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2014, the paper introduces the incentive object, the amount of the incentive stock, the exercise period and the number of exercisable stock. This paper expounds the process of implementing the control of the equity incentive plan, and analyzes and evaluates the effect of the equity incentive plan. This paper summarizes the relevant experience of equity incentive plan and points out the matters that should be paid attention to in equity incentive plan. This paper is divided into six parts: introduction, the basic theory of equity incentive plan, case background of Qingdao Haier equity incentive plan, scheme design and implementation process, effect and successful reason analysis and case inspiration. The first part introduces the background and significance of the case study and reviews the relevant literature. The second part is the basic theory of equity incentive plan. The third part introduces the background of the case, introduces the implementation background of Qingdao Haier's equity incentive plan and analyzes the necessity of its implementation. The fourth part analyzes how to set up elements and how to implement the control of Qingdao Haier equity incentive plan. The fifth part mainly introduces the effect of Qingdao Haier equity incentive plan and analyzes the reasons for its success. The sixth part introduces the inspiration from the case of Qingdao Haier equity incentive plan, and points out the matters that should be paid attention to in this case. After the implementation of the equity incentive plan in Qingdao Haier, excluding the influence of external factors, the stock price of the company basically showed an upward trend, and the company's various income indicators also increased year by year. It can be seen that the equity incentive plan has a positive impact on the value of Qingdao Haier Company, generally speaking, it is successful. From the successful implementation of Qingdao Haier's equity incentive plan, we can sum up the relevant experiences for the company's reference after that. At the same time, Qingdao Haier equity incentive plan in the selection of targets and performance indicators evaluation problems are also worthy of attention.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.6;F272.92

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