【摘要】：員工激勵(lì)的方法很多樣,比如物質(zhì)激勵(lì)法和非物質(zhì)激勵(lì)法,股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為員工激勵(lì)中比較新穎的一種方式,主要是為了達(dá)到提高企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)和吸引及留用人才,因此也叫做金手銬激勵(lì)法。近幾年來(lái),我國(guó)越來(lái)越多的上市企業(yè)及擬上市企業(yè)開(kāi)始利用股權(quán)激勵(lì)的方式來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略,目前的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式有很多種,股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)也各不相同,不同的企業(yè)性質(zhì)也常常反映出不同的激勵(lì)特點(diǎn)。由于我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)起步較晚,很多理論經(jīng)驗(yàn)都是在實(shí)踐中不斷總結(jié)的,因此很多企業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案仍然存在問(wèn)題。本文選取了創(chuàng)業(yè)板的W公司作為研究對(duì)象,以此來(lái)研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施方案中存在的問(wèn)題。之所以選擇創(chuàng)業(yè)板為研究對(duì)象有以下幾點(diǎn)原因:第一,創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)集中于創(chuàng)新型和高速發(fā)展型的高新企業(yè),對(duì)人才的需求十分的迫切,所以越來(lái)越多的創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)開(kāi)始通過(guò)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的方式促發(fā)展,未來(lái)創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的數(shù)量還會(huì)持續(xù)增加;第二,創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)在實(shí)施的過(guò)程中,出現(xiàn)很多問(wèn)題,比如由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板收到過(guò)度追捧,極易產(chǎn)生泡沫現(xiàn)象,市場(chǎng)有效性較差,這使得很多時(shí)候企業(yè)設(shè)定的行權(quán)價(jià)格變得極不合理,甚至成為了變相的“福利”。本文從股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論入手,簡(jiǎn)要闡述股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)模式和其他基礎(chǔ)知識(shí);對(duì)W公司的生命周期現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,方便后期股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的選擇和有效意見(jiàn)的提出;針對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)兩個(gè)目標(biāo)——業(yè)績(jī)、人才,文章將通過(guò)財(cái)務(wù)性指標(biāo)分析業(yè)績(jī)變化、非財(cái)務(wù)性指標(biāo)分析人才變化相結(jié)合的方式來(lái)研究W公司在實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)后的效果是否明顯;最后通過(guò)對(duì)其方案中存在的不足,提出了更好的優(yōu)化方案及可行性意見(jiàn)。案例研究表明,我國(guó)在股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施過(guò)程中還存在一些問(wèn)題,這使得一些企業(yè)激勵(lì)效果并不明顯,甚至還有一些企業(yè)利用股權(quán)激勵(lì)變相為高管發(fā)放“福利”。所以企業(yè)在今后制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的時(shí)候,不僅要結(jié)合自身發(fā)展情況來(lái)設(shè)計(jì)科學(xué)的方案,還要考慮到行業(yè)發(fā)展前景以及市場(chǎng)變化規(guī)律,這樣在制定相應(yīng)數(shù)據(jù)指標(biāo)的時(shí)候,也能夠更加合理,進(jìn)一步的擴(kuò)大股權(quán)激勵(lì)的激勵(lì)效果。研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),企業(yè)內(nèi)部公司治理環(huán)境及外部環(huán)境都對(duì)企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的實(shí)施有著一定的影響,所以為保證股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效實(shí)施,今后也應(yīng)該注重構(gòu)建合理的公司內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)和良好的外部資本市場(chǎng)。
[Abstract]:The methods of employee motivation are very diverse, such as material incentive method and non-material incentive method. As a relatively new way of employee incentive, equity incentive is mainly aimed at improving enterprise performance and attracting and retaining talents. Therefore, it is also called golden cuff stimulation method. In recent years, more and more listed enterprises and enterprises to be listed in our country begin to use the way of equity incentive to realize the long-term development strategy of enterprises. At present, there are many kinds of equity incentive modes, and the design of equity incentive schemes is also different. Different nature of the enterprise also often reflects different characteristics of incentives. Due to the late start of equity incentive in China, many theoretical experiences are summed up in practice, so many enterprises still have problems in equity incentive schemes. This paper selects W Company of the gem as the research object to study the problems existing in the implementation scheme of the gem equity incentive. The reasons for choosing the gem as the research object are as follows: first, the gem enterprises focus on innovative and high speed developing high-tech enterprises, and the demand for talents is very urgent. Therefore, more and more gem enterprises begin to promote development through equity incentive, and the number of gem enterprises implementing equity incentive will continue to increase in the future. Second, there are many problems in the process of implementation of gem enterprises. For example, because of the excessive pursuit of gem, it is easy to produce bubble phenomenon, and the market effectiveness is poor, which makes the prices set by enterprises become extremely unreasonable and even become "welfare" in disguise. Starting with the relevant theory of equity incentive, this paper briefly expounds the relevant mode and other basic knowledge of equity incentive, analyzes the current situation of life cycle of W company, and facilitates the choice of equity incentive mode in the later stage and the putting forward of effective opinions. In view of the two objectives of equity incentive-performance, talent, the article will analyze the performance changes through financial indicators, non-financial indicators to analyze the combination of talent changes to study whether the effect of W company after the implementation of equity incentive is obvious; Finally, through the shortcomings of the scheme, better optimization scheme and feasible suggestions are put forward. The case study shows that there are still some problems in the implementation of equity incentive in China, which makes the incentive effect of some enterprises not obvious, and even some enterprises use equity incentive to issue "welfare" to executives in disguise. Therefore, when enterprises formulate equity incentive schemes in the future, they should not only design scientific plans in the light of their own development situation, but also take into account the industry development prospects and market changes, so that when formulating corresponding data indicators, Can also be more reasonable, further expand the incentive effect of equity incentives. It is also found that both the internal corporate governance environment and the external environment have a certain impact on the implementation of the corporate equity incentive scheme, so as to ensure the effective implementation of equity incentive. In the future, we should also pay attention to the construction of a reasonable internal structure and a good external capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.6

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本文編號(hào)：2201328