【摘要】：管理層激勵(lì)一直是學(xué)術(shù)界研究的熱點(diǎn),它是解決當(dāng)今公司制下企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離的主要方法。其中薪酬契約是管理層激勵(lì)的核心內(nèi)容,也是影響管理層管理行為的重要因素。所以如何有效地設(shè)計(jì)薪酬契約是公司治理的一個(gè)難點(diǎn)。學(xué)術(shù)界普遍認(rèn)為提高薪酬可以解決所有者的委托代理問(wèn)題,然而卻不知在什么情況下需要提高管理層薪酬,以及提高到什么程度合適。這就需要一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),也就衍生出了管理層薪酬的公平性問(wèn)題。自從2005年,我國(guó)強(qiáng)制上市公司披露公司管理層薪酬,這就使得高管將自己的薪酬與其他公司高管的薪酬進(jìn)行比較成為了可能,對(duì)自身薪酬有了公平與否的新認(rèn)知,從而來(lái)調(diào)整自己的行為。而管理層的行為直接影響公司的業(yè)績(jī)。因此,管理層薪酬外部公平產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果是改進(jìn)我國(guó)公司薪酬制度必須考慮的因素。研究管理層薪酬外部公平性與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系一般會(huì)運(yùn)用的以下相關(guān)理論:公平理論、錦標(biāo)賽理論、委托代理論、前景理論以及薪酬扭曲理論,本文在這五大理論的基礎(chǔ)上分析了管理層投資行為是如何成為管理層薪酬外部公平性與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)之間的“橋梁”。首先,提出了管理層薪酬外部公平性的研究背景,目前我國(guó)社會(huì)存在嚴(yán)重的分配不均的問(wèn)題,這使得管理層薪酬成為社會(huì)關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)之一。同時(shí)我國(guó)還存在制造業(yè)投資過(guò)熱的問(wèn)題,這使得管理層投資行為也被重點(diǎn)關(guān)注。在這樣的研究背景下,研究管理層投資行為將有助于這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題的解決;其次,論述了關(guān)于管理層薪酬外部公平性、管理層投資行為以及企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的文獻(xiàn)綜述、相關(guān)的理論分析。最后,采用2007-2015年滬深A(yù)股制造業(yè)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),利用實(shí)證研究以及中介效應(yīng)驗(yàn)證方法來(lái)進(jìn)行回歸分析,研究表明管理層投資行為是管理層薪酬外部公平性與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的中介變量。利用建立的四大模型進(jìn)行回歸分析,得出管理層薪酬外部正向或負(fù)向公平性,不利于減少管理層的非效率投資行為,進(jìn)而也不利于提高企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)。說(shuō)明了企業(yè)管理層薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)并不具有高度敏感性,給予管理層過(guò)高的薪酬并不能達(dá)到應(yīng)有的激勵(lì)效果。在公司治理的結(jié)構(gòu)中,管理層的地位不言而喻,其行為對(duì)于促進(jìn)公司的長(zhǎng)久發(fā)展是至關(guān)重要的。本文通過(guò)理論與實(shí)證分析,提出改善管理層薪酬的一些建議。通過(guò)平衡管理層現(xiàn)金薪酬與股權(quán)薪酬,達(dá)到對(duì)管理層激勵(lì)效果的最大化;通過(guò)企業(yè)內(nèi)部較高的股權(quán)集中度來(lái)抑制管理層非效率投資行為;通過(guò)完善管理層薪酬的披露機(jī)制,加強(qiáng)外界對(duì)管理層薪酬的關(guān)注以及監(jiān)督。研究管理層薪酬外部公平性、管理層投資行為與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義,探究管理層薪酬外部公平性對(duì)管理層投資行為的影響,才能更有效地減少企業(yè)的非效率投資行為,促進(jìn)企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的增長(zhǎng),實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值的提升。并且對(duì)于企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)人力資本在企業(yè)中的地位屬于重中之重,制定有效、具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的薪酬契約是企業(yè)吸引、留住人才的重要措施。
[Abstract]:Management motivation has always been a hot topic in academic research. It is the main method to solve the separation of enterprise ownership and management right under the current company system. The compensation contract is the core content of management incentive and also an important factor affecting management behavior. So how to effectively design compensation contract is a difficult point of corporate governance. The academic community generally believes that increasing pay can solve the owner's principal-agent problem, but I do not know what to improve management pay and to what extent it is appropriate. This requires a standard, which also derives the fairness of management pay. Since 2005, China's mandatory listed companies disclosed the company. Management pay, which makes it possible for executives to compare their remuneration with the salary of other executives, to have a new cognition of their own compensation, and to adjust their behavior. And the behavior of management directly affects the performance of the company. Therefore, the economic consequences of the external equity of the management pay are changed. The factors that must be considered in our company's salary system must be considered. The following related theories are generally used to study the relationship between the external fairness of management salary and the relationship of enterprise performance: equity theory, tournament theory, principal-generation theory, prospect theory and compensation distortion theory. Based on these five theories, the management investment behavior is analyzed. What is the "bridge" between the external fairness of management salary and the performance of the enterprise. First, it puts forward the research background of the external equity of management salary. At present, there is a serious problem of uneven distribution in our society, which makes the salary of management become one of the hot spots of social concern. At the same time, there is still a question of overheating investment in manufacturing industry in China. In this kind of research background, the study of management investment behavior will help to solve the two problems. Secondly, it discusses the external fairness of management salary, management investment behavior and enterprise performance, related theoretical analysis. Finally, adopt 2007-2015. The data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen are analyzed by the empirical research and the medium effect verification method. The study shows that the management investment behavior is the intermediary variable of the management salary external equity and the enterprise performance. Using the four models established to carry out regression analysis, the external positive or negative direction of management salary is obtained. Fairness is not conducive to reducing the inefficient investment behavior of management, and in turn is not conducive to improving the performance of the enterprise. It shows that the salary of the management layer is not highly sensitive to the performance of the enterprise, and the salary of the management layer is too high to achieve the due incentive effect. In the structure of the corporate governance, the management level is self-evident. Behavior is very important to promote the long-term development of the company. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the management salary. By balancing the management level of cash pay and equity compensation, the incentive effect is maximized. The management level is suppressed by the higher concentration of equity in the enterprise. By perfecting the disclosure mechanism of management salary, we should strengthen the attention and supervision of the external management salary, study the external equity of the management salary, the investment behavior of management and the performance of the enterprise, and explore the influence of the external equity of management salary to the management investment behavior, so as to reduce the enterprise more effectively. The inefficiency investment behavior promotes the growth of enterprise performance and improves the enterprise value. And for the enterprise, the position of human capital in the enterprise is the most important. Making effective and competitive compensation contract is the important measure to attract and retain talents.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F425;F406.7

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 韋志林;芮明杰;;薪酬心理折扣、薪酬公平感和工作績(jī)效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究;2016年04期

2 宿玉海;劉璐;;基于行業(yè)公平性的上市公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)作用研究[J];山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2016年02期

3 任廣乾;;管理層權(quán)力、薪酬標(biāo)桿與高管薪酬制定[J];中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2016年02期

4 劉敏;馮麗娟;;高管內(nèi)部薪酬差距、投資行為與企業(yè)績(jī)效——以中國(guó)制造業(yè)A股上市企業(yè)為例[J];科學(xué)決策;2015年10期

5 王新;李彥霖;李方舒;;企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與經(jīng)理人薪酬激勵(lì)有效性研究——戰(zhàn)略性動(dòng)機(jī)還是卸責(zé)借口?[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2015年10期

6 張敦力;江新峰;;管理者能力與企業(yè)投資羊群行為:基于薪酬公平的調(diào)節(jié)作用[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2015年08期

7 覃予;靳毓;;經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)、薪酬外部公平性與公司業(yè)績(jī)[J];中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2015年03期

8 羅華偉;宋侃;干勝道;;高管薪酬外部公平性與企業(yè)績(jī)效關(guān)聯(lián)性研究——來(lái)自中國(guó)A股上市房地產(chǎn)公司的證據(jù)[J];軟科學(xué);2015年01期

9 朱學(xué)義;譚雪萍;;媒體監(jiān)督、非效率投資與企業(yè)價(jià)值——來(lái)自中國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司的證據(jù)[J];南京審計(jì)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2014年06期

10 張兆國(guó);劉亞偉;楊清香;;管理者任期、晉升激勵(lì)與研發(fā)投資研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2014年09期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王莉;高管薪酬公平對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響研究[D];山東大學(xué);2014年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 稅雪;高管薪酬外部差距對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響研究[D];西南大學(xué);2014年

2 胡金鳳;高管薪酬外部公平性與公司業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性研究[D];重慶理工大學(xué);2013年

3 徐建;高管薪酬差額與公司業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

4 白石楠;薪酬和股權(quán)激勵(lì)的外部公平性與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

，

本文編號(hào)：2136112