【摘要】：現(xiàn)行的發(fā)電商上網(wǎng)電量基本上是按發(fā)電容量等比例確定,而上網(wǎng)電價則實行統(tǒng)一的"標桿電價"�；谔寂欧偶s束下總上網(wǎng)電量發(fā)電成本最小原則,設(shè)計寡頭發(fā)電商的上網(wǎng)電量分配機制與上網(wǎng)電價機制,并與現(xiàn)行的電量上網(wǎng)機制進行數(shù)值分析比較,分析結(jié)果表明:(1)新機制可誘導發(fā)電商真實地報告自己的成本類型、以保證碳排放約束下總發(fā)電成本最小目標的實施;(2)相對于現(xiàn)行的等比例電量上網(wǎng)機制,新機制有利于減排CO2,且在相同排放水平下可節(jié)省總的發(fā)電成本;(3)新機制下低排放發(fā)電商電量優(yōu)先上網(wǎng),且可促使高排放機組逐步退出市場。
[Abstract]:The current electricity quantity of generators is basically determined according to the proportion of generating capacity, while the price of electricity connected to the net is unified "benchmark electricity price". Based on the principle of minimum cost of total electricity generation under carbon emission constraints, this paper designs the electricity distribution mechanism and price mechanism of oligopoly, and makes a numerical analysis and comparison with the current electricity generation mechanism. The results show that: (1) the new mechanism can induce generators to report their own cost types in order to ensure the implementation of the minimum target of total generation cost under carbon emission constraints; (2) compared with the current equivalent power generation mechanism, The new mechanism can reduce CO2 emission and save the total power generation cost under the same emission level. (3) under the new mechanism, the low emission generators can give priority to Internet access and can promote the high emission units to withdraw from the market gradually.
【作者單位】： 國家電網(wǎng)公司華中分部;長沙理工大學經(jīng)濟管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71271033) 國家社科基金重大項目(12&ZD051)~~
【分類號】：X32;F426.61

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