發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-16 09:28

【摘要】：現(xiàn)行的發(fā)電商上網(wǎng)電量基本上是按發(fā)電容量等比例確定,而上網(wǎng)電價(jià)則實(shí)行統(tǒng)一的"標(biāo)桿電價(jià)"�；谔寂欧偶s束下總上網(wǎng)電量發(fā)電成本最小原則,設(shè)計(jì)寡頭發(fā)電商的上網(wǎng)電量分配機(jī)制與上網(wǎng)電價(jià)機(jī)制,并與現(xiàn)行的電量上網(wǎng)機(jī)制進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析比較,分析結(jié)果表明:(1)新機(jī)制可誘導(dǎo)發(fā)電商真實(shí)地報(bào)告自己的成本類型、以保證碳排放約束下總發(fā)電成本最小目標(biāo)的實(shí)施;(2)相對(duì)于現(xiàn)行的等比例電量上網(wǎng)機(jī)制,新機(jī)制有利于減排CO2,且在相同排放水平下可節(jié)省總的發(fā)電成本;(3)新機(jī)制下低排放發(fā)電商電量?jī)?yōu)先上網(wǎng),且可促使高排放機(jī)組逐步退出市場(chǎng)。
[Abstract]:The current electricity quantity of generators is basically determined according to the proportion of generating capacity, while the price of electricity connected to the net is unified "benchmark electricity price". Based on the principle of minimum cost of total electricity generation under carbon emission constraints, this paper designs the electricity distribution mechanism and price mechanism of oligopoly, and makes a numerical analysis and comparison with the current electricity generation mechanism. The results show that: (1) the new mechanism can induce generators to report their own cost types in order to ensure the implementation of the minimum target of total generation cost under carbon emission constraints; (2) compared with the current equivalent power generation mechanism, The new mechanism can reduce CO2 emission and save the total power generation cost under the same emission level. (3) under the new mechanism, the low emission generators can give priority to Internet access and can promote the high emission units to withdraw from the market gradually.
【作者單位】： 國(guó)家電網(wǎng)公司華中分部;長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71271033) 國(guó)家社科基金重大項(xiàng)目(12&ZD051)~~
【分類號(hào)】：X32;F426.61

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