本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 盈余管理�。� 參考：《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究導(dǎo)刊》2017年08期

【摘要】：伴隨現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的發(fā)展及高新技術(shù)企業(yè)對(duì)人才的渴求,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度逐漸在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中普及開來。股權(quán)激勵(lì)在企業(yè)管理中發(fā)揮的積極作用不言而喻,然而近年來爆發(fā)的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞引起了學(xué)者們對(duì)這一激勵(lì)制度負(fù)面影響的深入探究。尤其目前我國的資本市場(chǎng)尚不完善,相關(guān)法律法規(guī)不健全,都為管理層進(jìn)行盈余管理行為提供了可能。大量研究認(rèn)為,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在給管理層帶來有效激勵(lì)的同時(shí),也會(huì)使管理層為了一己私利而采取盈余管理行為。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern enterprise system and the desire of high-tech enterprises for talents, equity incentive system is gradually popularized in modern enterprises. It is self-evident that equity incentive plays a positive role in enterprise management. However, the financial scandal that broke out in recent years has caused scholars to probe into the negative impact of this incentive system. Especially at present, the capital market of our country is not perfect, the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect, all of them provide the possibility for the management to carry on the earnings management behavior. A large number of studies suggest that equity incentive not only brings effective incentive to management, but also makes management adopt earnings management behavior for their own benefit.
【作者單位】： 黑龍江科技大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F406.7;F425

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