本文選題：煤炭供需企業(yè) + 匹配交易　； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)新煤炭交易機(jī)制為處理好政府與煤炭市場(chǎng)的關(guān)系、解決煤炭市場(chǎng)穩(wěn)定問題提供新思路。傳統(tǒng)的交易機(jī)制如掛牌交易、競(jìng)價(jià)交易、招標(biāo)交易都具有單向選擇性、信息不對(duì)稱、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不充分和交易關(guān)系不穩(wěn)定等缺點(diǎn)。雙邊匹配理論為解決煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配問題提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。本文的煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配交易模型是對(duì)雙邊匹配模型的進(jìn)一步拓展。利用帶交易量的延遲接受算法,可以求得煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配結(jié)果。該算法具有可操作性,即煤炭供需雙方可以通過調(diào)整偏好和供需量,達(dá)成預(yù)先約定的匹配交易。算法下得到的匹配結(jié)果為煤炭需求企業(yè)最優(yōu)的成對(duì)穩(wěn)定匹配結(jié)果,更好地保護(hù)了消費(fèi)一側(cè)的利益。算法具有較為廣泛的適用性,是對(duì)婚姻匹配模型、大學(xué)生入學(xué)模型、企業(yè)員工匹配模型下延遲接受算法的一般化,可以求取其中任意一種模型的成對(duì)穩(wěn)定匹配結(jié)果。煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配交易機(jī)制也是對(duì)競(jìng)價(jià)交易和招標(biāo)交易的融合、一般化,可以通過參數(shù)設(shè)定轉(zhuǎn)化為競(jìng)價(jià)交易和招標(biāo)交易機(jī)制。在煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配交易機(jī)制下,匹配交易成對(duì)穩(wěn)定具有一定的交易量彈性范圍,單個(gè)供應(yīng)方供應(yīng)量的小幅度增加或者單個(gè)需求方需求量的小幅度減少不會(huì)改變算法的匹配結(jié)果。更重要的是,如果供應(yīng)方能夠準(zhǔn)確響應(yīng)需求方的需求變化,穩(wěn)定的匹配關(guān)系也不會(huì)因?yàn)楣┬枇孔兓淖�。帶交易量的延遲接受算法具有較高的算法效率,能在較短的時(shí)間內(nèi)得出結(jié)果,能夠適應(yīng)大量用戶的匹配交易運(yùn)算。掛牌交易的匹配結(jié)果可能存在多個(gè)阻礙匹配對(duì),造成交易關(guān)系的不穩(wěn)定。與掛牌交易不同的是,煤炭供需企業(yè)穩(wěn)定匹配交易機(jī)制能夠避免阻礙匹配雙對(duì)的出現(xiàn),使得供需企業(yè)之間形成相對(duì)穩(wěn)固的交易關(guān)系,從而也能便于煤炭企業(yè)更加準(zhǔn)確的響應(yīng)市場(chǎng)的需求,應(yīng)對(duì)市場(chǎng)的變化。
[Abstract]:The innovation of coal trading mechanism provides a new way to deal with the relationship between government and coal market and to solve the problem of coal market stability. The traditional trading mechanism, such as listing, bidding and bidding, has the disadvantages of one-way selectivity, asymmetric information, inadequate competition and unstable trading relationship. Bilateral matching theory provides a theoretical basis for solving the problem of stable matching between coal supply and demand enterprises. The stable matching transaction model of coal supply and demand enterprises in this paper is a further expansion of bilateral matching model. The stable matching results of coal supply and demand enterprises can be obtained by using the delay acceptance algorithm with trading volume. The algorithm is operable, that is, both sides of coal supply and demand can reach a pre-agreed matching transaction by adjusting their preferences and quantity of supply and demand. The matching result under the algorithm is the optimal pairwise and stable matching result of the coal demand enterprise, which better protects the interests of the consumption side. The algorithm has more extensive applicability, which is the generalization of delay acceptance algorithm under marriage matching model, college entrance model and enterprise employee matching model, which can obtain the pairwise and stable matching results of any one of the models. The stable matching transaction mechanism of coal supply and demand enterprises is also the integration of bidding and bidding transactions, which can be transformed into bidding and bidding by setting parameters. Under the stable matching trading mechanism of coal supply and demand enterprises, matching transactions have a certain range of trading volume elasticity. A small increase in the supply of a single supplier or a small reduction in the demand for a single demand-side will not change the matching result of the algorithm. More importantly, if the supply side can accurately respond to the demand changes on the demand side, the stable matching relationship will not change with the change of the supply and demand quantity. The delay acceptance algorithm with transaction volume has high efficiency and can get results in a short time. It can adapt to the matching transaction operation of a large number of users. The matching result of the listed transaction may have several blocking matching pairs, resulting in the instability of the trading relationship. Different from listed trading, the stable matching transaction mechanism of coal supply and demand enterprises can avoid obstructing the occurrence of matching double pairs, and make a relatively stable transaction relationship between supply and demand enterprises. Thus, it is convenient for coal enterprises to respond more accurately to market demand and market changes.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.21

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