本文選題：股權激勵　切入點：股票期權　出處：《石河子大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：在知識經(jīng)濟飛速發(fā)展的時代,科技對于經(jīng)濟增長的促進作用正在與日俱增,創(chuàng)新能力作為影響競爭力的重要因素被眾多國家視為關鍵發(fā)展目標。我國公布的《國家中長期科學和技術發(fā)展規(guī)劃綱要(2006-2020年)》指出我國存在自主創(chuàng)新能力較弱,企業(yè)核心競爭力不強的現(xiàn)象。2016年9月的G20峰會也將“科技創(chuàng)新”作為會議重要論題。企業(yè)是國家專利數(shù)量的主要貢獻者,如何促進其更好地開展研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動就成為亟需解決地問題。企業(yè)普遍存在代理問題,管理者不愿從事高風險、高投入特點的研發(fā)活動。而股權激勵由于具有緩解代理沖突的特點,被越來越多的企業(yè)所重視。多數(shù)學者已運用實證模型得出股權激勵能夠促進企業(yè)研發(fā)投入額的增加,然而實證得出對研發(fā)活動激勵性最強的激勵方式,并不是我國實施股權激勵計劃企業(yè)所選的主流方式。近年來,以“研發(fā)創(chuàng)新”為生存之根本的制造行業(yè)中,實施股權激勵方案的企業(yè)數(shù)量逐年增多,但選用限制性股票激勵方式的企業(yè)占比極高,歌爾股份為少數(shù)選用股票期權激勵方案的企業(yè),因此,本文以歌爾股份為研究對象。于理論梳理后,對研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動進行階段性劃分,然后對歌爾股份實施股票期權激勵前后的研發(fā)投入、成果產(chǎn)出、研發(fā)創(chuàng)收進行趨勢分析。再選取同行企業(yè)進行對比,以分析股票期權激勵和限制性股票激勵對于企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動的影響強弱。繼而結(jié)合委托代理理論、前景理論、人力資本論和內(nèi)容激勵論搭建分析框架,對兩種激勵方式作用于企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動的影響過程進行分析,最后根據(jù)分析結(jié)果對歌爾股份的股權激勵方案提出改進建議。數(shù)據(jù)分析結(jié)果表明,股票期權激勵和限制性股票激勵均能對企業(yè)的研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動產(chǎn)生正面效應,股權激勵實施后企業(yè)的研發(fā)創(chuàng)新指標較激勵實施前有明顯增長。實施股票期權激勵的歌爾股份較實施限制性股票激勵的對比企業(yè),在研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動方面數(shù)據(jù)表現(xiàn)更佳。結(jié)合委托代理理論、前景理論、人力資本論和內(nèi)容激勵論對股權激勵作用機理進行分析,產(chǎn)生此種現(xiàn)象的原因是:股權激勵使高管和所有者的目標函數(shù)趨于一致,股票期權的股價波動率敏感性強于限制性股票,其風險規(guī)避性弱于限制性股票。具有風險厭惡感的管理者會在股票期權的激勵作用下加強企業(yè)的研發(fā)投資力度。由于股票期權激勵滿足了員工對于收入增長的經(jīng)濟需求,兼具權利義務的非對稱性,因而能夠調(diào)動人才的主觀能動性,對企業(yè)研發(fā)成果產(chǎn)出以及研發(fā)創(chuàng)收增加產(chǎn)生積極影響。
[Abstract]:In the era of the rapid development of knowledge economy, the role of science and technology in promoting economic growth is increasing day by day. Innovation ability, as an important factor affecting competitiveness, is regarded as a key development objective by many countries. The outline of the National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020) published by China points out that there is a weak independent innovation capability in China. The G20 summit in September 2016 also made "science and technology innovation" an important topic. Enterprises are the main contributors to the number of national patents. How to promote its R & D innovation activities has become a problem that needs to be solved urgently. There is a common agency problem in enterprises, and managers are unwilling to engage in high risk. The equity incentive has been paid more and more attention to by more and more enterprises because of its characteristics of mitigating agency conflict. Most scholars have used empirical model to conclude that equity incentive can promote the increase of enterprise R & D investment. However, the empirical results show that the strongest incentive to R & D activities is not the mainstream way chosen by Chinese enterprises to implement the equity incentive plan. In recent years, in the manufacturing industry, "R & D innovation" is the basic survival of the manufacturing industry. The number of enterprises implementing equity incentive scheme is increasing year by year, but the proportion of enterprises that choose restrictive stock incentive method is very high. This article regards the Goer stock as the research object. After combing the theory, the research and development innovation activities are divided into stages, and then the R & D input before and after the stock option incentive is put into practice. In order to analyze the influence of stock option incentive and restrictive stock incentive on R & D innovation activities, and then combine the principal-agent theory and prospect theory, this paper analyzes the trend of R & D income generation. The human capital theory and the content incentive theory set up the analysis frame, and analyzed the influence process of the two kinds of incentive ways acting on the enterprise R & D innovation activity. Finally, according to the results of the analysis, some suggestions are put forward to improve the equity incentive scheme of Goer shares. The results of data analysis show that both stock option incentive and restrictive stock incentive can produce positive effects on R & D innovation activities of enterprises. After the implementation of equity incentive, the R & D innovation index of enterprises has significantly increased compared with that before the implementation of incentive. Data performance in R & D innovation activities is better. Combined with principal-agent theory, prospect theory, human capital theory and content incentive theory, the mechanism of equity incentive is analyzed. The reason for this phenomenon is that equity incentive converges the objective functions of executives and owners, and stock options are more sensitive to stock price volatility than restricted stocks. Risk aversion is weaker than restricted stock. Managers with a sense of risk aversion will strengthen their R & D investment under the incentive of stock option. Because of the asymmetry of rights and obligations, it can mobilize the subjective initiative of talents and have a positive impact on the output of R & D and the increase of R & D income.
【學位授予單位】：石河子大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.6;F272.92;F273.1

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