本文選題：政府監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：醫(yī)療器械　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國醫(yī)療器械在政策的支持下,發(fā)展步伐不斷加快,醫(yī)療器械供應(yīng)鏈成為重要研究對(duì)象。醫(yī)療器械行業(yè)是具有一定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行業(yè),由于醫(yī)療器械故障造成相關(guān)人員傷害,患者治療中斷、錯(cuò)誤治療或患者健康惡化,將會(huì)對(duì)患者產(chǎn)生不可逆的損失,合理制定監(jiān)管機(jī)制至關(guān)重要。同時(shí),議價(jià)直接影響到產(chǎn)品的需求狀況和企業(yè)的競爭優(yōu)勢,是供應(yīng)鏈中任何企業(yè)都會(huì)面臨的重要難題,研究醫(yī)療器械供應(yīng)鏈議價(jià)是降低企業(yè)成本和提高企業(yè)收益的關(guān)鍵。本文通過參閱國內(nèi)外相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的研究成果,分析現(xiàn)階段對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈議價(jià)研究所存在的不足,結(jié)合博弈論、議價(jià)理論和最優(yōu)化理論,參照國內(nèi)外研究經(jīng)驗(yàn)和研究方法,并結(jié)合醫(yī)療器械供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)實(shí)際議價(jià)的情況,展開了政府監(jiān)管下的供應(yīng)鏈議價(jià)策略研究。為了系統(tǒng)的討論醫(yī)療器械供應(yīng)鏈中制造商和供應(yīng)商的議價(jià)情形,引入需求函數(shù)和政府獎(jiǎng)懲函數(shù),考慮議價(jià)能力的影響,分別構(gòu)建“單一供應(yīng)商”、“多供應(yīng)商”兩種模式下無政府監(jiān)管和政府監(jiān)管的制造商和供應(yīng)商決策模型,運(yùn)用最優(yōu)化理論和議價(jià)理論分別求出兩種模式下的最優(yōu)解。對(duì)各個(gè)模式下不同決策模型的最優(yōu)值進(jìn)行對(duì)比,并通過靈敏度分析,討論不同模式下政府監(jiān)管和議價(jià)能力對(duì)制造商和供應(yīng)商議價(jià)決策值的影響,得出以下結(jié)論:(1)政府監(jiān)管對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈的議價(jià)約束主要通過政府的單位獎(jiǎng)懲因子和醫(yī)療器械事故概率影響的,與醫(yī)療器械的銷售數(shù)量無關(guān);(2)政府監(jiān)管情形下,政府的激勵(lì)力度能有效促進(jìn)醫(yī)療器械銷售量、制造商利潤和供應(yīng)商利潤的增加;(3)政府監(jiān)管下,單一供應(yīng)商模式中,交易數(shù)量和制造商的利潤受供應(yīng)商議價(jià)能力的影響,表現(xiàn)為供應(yīng)商的議價(jià)能力越高,交易量就越低,制造商的利潤越小;交易價(jià)格和銷售價(jià)格與供應(yīng)商的議價(jià)能力呈負(fù)相關(guān);多供應(yīng)商模式中,交易量和制造商的利潤隨供應(yīng)商議價(jià)能力的提高先增加后降低,存在最優(yōu)值;交易價(jià)格、銷售價(jià)格和供應(yīng)商的利潤總是和議價(jià)能力呈正相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:With the support of the policy, the development of medical devices in China has been accelerated, and the supply chain of medical devices has become an important research object. The medical device industry is an industry with certain risks, and the related personnel are injured because of the failure of medical devices. Interruption of patient treatment, wrong treatment or deterioration of patient's health will cause irreversible losses to patients. It is essential to establish a reasonable regulatory mechanism. At the same time, bargaining directly affects the demand of products and the competitive advantage of enterprises. It is an important problem that any enterprise will face in the supply chain. It is the key to reduce the cost and increase the profit of the enterprise to study the price negotiation of the medical device supply chain. This paper analyzes the shortcomings of the research on supply chain bargaining at the present stage, combining with game theory, bargaining theory and optimization theory, referring to the domestic and foreign research experience and research methods, and combining with the actual bargaining situation of the enterprise in the medical device supply chain. In order to systematically discuss the bargaining situation of manufacturers and suppliers in the medical device supply chain, the demand function and the government reward and punishment function are introduced to consider the influence of bargaining power. The decision models of manufacturers and suppliers under the two models of "single supplier", "multi-supplier" and "government supervision" are constructed respectively. Using the optimization theory and the bargaining theory, the optimal solutions of the two models are obtained, and the optimal values of different decision models in each model are compared, and the sensitivity analysis is carried out. This paper discusses the influence of government regulation and bargaining power on the bargaining decision value of manufacturers and suppliers under different models. The following conclusions are drawn: 1) the bargaining constraints of government supervision on the supply chain are mainly affected by the unit rewards and punishment factors of the government and the probability of medical device accidents, and are not related to the quantity of medical device sales. Government incentives can effectively promote sales of medical devices, increase of manufacturer's profit and supplier's profit) under the supervision of government, the quantity of transaction and the profit of manufacturer are influenced by the bargaining power of supplier under the single supplier model, under the supervision of the government, the quantity of trade and the profit of the manufacturer are influenced by the bargaining power of the supplier. The higher the bargaining power of the supplier, the lower the transaction volume and the smaller the profit of the manufacturer; the negative correlation between the transaction price and the selling price and the bargaining power of the supplier; in the multi-supplier model, The trading volume and the manufacturer's profit increase first and then decrease with the increase of the supplier's bargaining power, and there is an optimum value, and the transaction price, the sales price and the profit of the supplier are always positively correlated with the bargaining power.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.4;R197.1

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