本文關(guān)鍵詞：中興通訊股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效影響研究　出處：《廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一項(xiàng)完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、激勵(lì)公司高管員工的重要舉措,于上世紀(jì)五十年代在美國(guó)興起,經(jīng)歷萌芽和起步階段后,迅速在西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家得到推廣。在上世紀(jì)九十年代后期,我國(guó)一些民營(yíng)企業(yè)自發(fā)開(kāi)始了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)踐。在2005年12月31日,為了進(jìn)一步完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),促進(jìn)上市公司規(guī)范運(yùn)作與持續(xù)發(fā)展,中國(guó)證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)公布了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》(試行),自2006年1月1日起施行。此辦法一出,標(biāo)志著我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度建設(shè)的開(kāi)端正式建立。此辦法施行同年,我國(guó)有大量上市公司開(kāi)始推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。2016年7月13日,證監(jiān)會(huì)公布了中國(guó)證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)令第126號(hào)《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》,2016年8月13日起施行。這意味著隨著上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的發(fā)展,相關(guān)條文也在不斷完善。截至2015年底,我國(guó)推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司共有808家,涉及股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃達(dá)1110個(gè),其中有229家公司推出兩個(gè)或兩個(gè)以上的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,中興通訊就是這其中之一。2007年2月5日,中興通訊發(fā)布了200709號(hào)公告,宣布第一期股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃修訂稿,一次性向激勵(lì)對(duì)象授予4798萬(wàn)股標(biāo)的股票額度,授予數(shù)量約占中興通訊股本總額的5%。2013年8月27日,中興通訊公布了第二期股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃草案,公司擬向激勵(lì)對(duì)象授予總量不超過(guò)10,320萬(wàn)份的股票期權(quán),對(duì)應(yīng)的股票約占授予時(shí)公司股本總額的3%。本文正是在這樣一個(gè)背景下對(duì)中興通訊的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行研究,探討其方案的實(shí)施是如何影響公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的,期望能為該公司和其他實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的企業(yè)提供一些有價(jià)值的信息。本文首先介紹了基本股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論、股權(quán)激勵(lì)與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的聯(lián)系以及本文將采用的績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)方法,接著通過(guò)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)綜述的總結(jié),介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)在國(guó)內(nèi)外的發(fā)展情況和國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究現(xiàn)狀。在此基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)中興通訊的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的內(nèi)容和實(shí)施結(jié)果進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單分析。通過(guò)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)法、杜邦分析法、對(duì)比分析法從縱向、橫向兩個(gè)角度對(duì)中興通訊股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案實(shí)施前后的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。經(jīng)過(guò)分析,從與自身縱向?qū)Ρ冉Y(jié)果來(lái)看和從與行業(yè)內(nèi)可比公司橫向?qū)Ρ冉Y(jié)果來(lái)看,相比于所選取的未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的可比公司而言,在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)中興通訊凈資產(chǎn)收益率有較大的增加,兩次實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃是有效的,有助于提升該公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效。最后,對(duì)案例研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行總結(jié)。本文認(rèn)為股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度是有助于提升財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的,往往短期效益大于長(zhǎng)期,因此,針對(duì)中興通訊股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案存在的主要問(wèn)題,提出對(duì)策和建議:在企業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案時(shí),應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮長(zhǎng)期性;在設(shè)置考核指標(biāo)時(shí),也需要考慮到指標(biāo)多樣性,才能更好地達(dá)到提升績(jī)效的目的。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive, as an important measure to improve corporate governance structure and motivate senior employees, rose in -50s in the United States, and experienced the embryonic and initial stage. In -10s, some private enterprises in China spontaneously started the practice of equity incentive. In December 31st 2005. In order to further improve the governance structure of listed companies and promote the standardized operation and sustainable development of listed companies, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has promulgated the measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies (for trial implementation). Since January 1st 2006, this measure has been put into effect, which marks the beginning of the construction of equity incentive system in China. A large number of listed companies in China began to implement equity incentive plans. In July 13th 2016, the Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the China Securities Regulatory Commission order No. 126, "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies". Effective from August 13th 2016. This means that with the development of the stock incentive system of listed companies, the relevant provisions are also continuously improved. Until end of 2015. There are 808 listed companies offering equity incentive plans in China, involving 1110 equity incentive plans, among which 229 companies introduce two or more equity incentive plans. ZTE is one of them. On February 5th 2007, ZTE announced a revised version of the first phase of the equity incentive plan, in a public announcement of 2007 09. A one-time quota of 47.98 million shares was awarded to the incentive target, which accounted for about 5. 5% of ZTE's total equity capital in August 27th. ZTE has released a second draft of the equity incentive plan, which it intends to grant to its incentive partners for a total of no more than 10, 3.2 million stock options. The corresponding shares account for about 3% of the total share capital of the company at the time of the grant. This paper studies the equity incentive scheme of ZTE under such a background and discusses how the implementation of the scheme affects the financial performance of the company. It is expected to provide some valuable information for the company and other enterprises implementing equity incentive. Firstly, this paper introduces the basic equity incentive theory. The relationship between equity incentive and financial performance and the performance evaluation method to be adopted in this paper, and then through the summary of domestic and foreign literature on equity incentive. This paper introduces the development of equity incentive at home and abroad and the current research situation of scholars at home and abroad. On this basis, the content and implementation results of ZTE's equity incentive scheme are simply analyzed, and the financial index method is adopted. DuPont analysis, comparative analysis from the vertical and horizontal perspectives of ZTE equity incentive scheme before and after the implementation of financial performance evaluation. From the vertical comparison with their own results and from the horizontal comparison with comparable companies in the industry, compared with the selection of the non-implementation of the equity incentive scheme of comparable companies. In a period of time ZTE net assets return has a large increase, twice implemented equity incentive plan is effective, help to improve the company's operating performance and financial performance. Finally. This paper concludes the results of the case study. This paper holds that equity incentive system is helpful to improve financial performance, and the short-term benefits are often greater than long-term. Therefore, the main problems of ZTE's equity incentive scheme are pointed out. Put forward the countermeasure and suggestion: when the enterprise designs the stock right incentive plan, should consider the long-term nature; In order to achieve the purpose of improving performance, we should also take into account the diversity of indicators when setting evaluation indicators.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.6;F272.92;F406.7;F832.51

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