發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-12-13 02:03

【摘要】：專利叢林引發(fā)的反公地悲劇是指眾多分散的專利無法有效整合，一方面導(dǎo)致原有專利無法充分利用，另一方面阻礙新專利產(chǎn)生的困境。該困境的產(chǎn)生以專利叢林為背景，專利叢林的產(chǎn)生又以專利聚集為前提，由于專利本身互補(bǔ)問題和技術(shù)金字塔原理的客觀存在，伴隨著專利制度利益平衡點(diǎn)的轉(zhuǎn)移而愈演愈烈。在此叢林中，各專利權(quán)人基于自身利益最大化的考慮動(dòng)態(tài)地進(jìn)行博弈，從而引發(fā)了反公地悲劇。 運(yùn)用博弈論中的囚徒困境模型，分析其產(chǎn)生原因可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，專利叢林引發(fā)的反公地悲劇既與專利自身特性有關(guān)，，也與專利制度的特征有關(guān)，但最主要的是專利權(quán)人基于利益考量而在博弈中采取排他策略，從而導(dǎo)致了囚徒困境式的雙輸結(jié)果。此種雙輸結(jié)果導(dǎo)致在先專利權(quán)人的專利一直處于無法充分利用的閑置狀態(tài)，又導(dǎo)致新專利研發(fā)人的成本高企，新專利難以孵化，還妨礙了正當(dāng)?shù)母偁�，阻礙了技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新、社會(huì)的進(jìn)步。 國外應(yīng)對(duì)此困境產(chǎn)生的危害，按照降低新專利研發(fā)人成本，為新專利的產(chǎn)生騰挪空間的思路，分別以專利權(quán)窮竭原則、專利強(qiáng)制許可制度和反壟斷為手段對(duì)其進(jìn)行法律規(guī)制。對(duì)此，我國在應(yīng)對(duì)此困境危害時(shí)，除了借鑒國外先進(jìn)的應(yīng)對(duì)之道外，必須立足國情，提出符合本國利益的法律規(guī)制。我們既要看到我國知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)仍需不斷完善，也要避免類似悲劇的發(fā)生。具體而言，可從提高專利創(chuàng)造性、增加新專利的孵化成功率等角度切入，除了運(yùn)用上述三種主要規(guī)制手段外，可在規(guī)制的時(shí)間點(diǎn)上往前和往后再推一步。往前一步要求必須完善專利審查，保證專利審查部門的中立性，提高專利“三性”審查的嚴(yán)格性。往后一步則是要降低問題專利、垃圾專利和不應(yīng)成為專利的某些技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等的救濟(jì)水平，為審查的紕漏做好善后工作。 在規(guī)制過程中，必須明確權(quán)利有境必有禁的原則，無論是針對(duì)專利叢林引發(fā)的反公地悲劇還是專利領(lǐng)域的其他不平衡狀態(tài)，發(fā)揮激勵(lì)作用的同時(shí)做好利益平衡是最根本的思想基礎(chǔ)。同時(shí)，深諳平衡之謀更要發(fā)揮平衡之術(shù)，因勢利導(dǎo)、因地制宜和適度原則是變通之法。
[Abstract]:The tragedy of anti-Commons caused by the patent jungle means that many scattered patents can not be effectively integrated, which leads to the failure to make full use of the original patents and hinders the emergence of new patents on the other hand. The emergence of this dilemma takes the patent jungle as the background and the patent accumulation as the premise. Because of the complementary problem of the patent itself and the objective existence of the principle of technological pyramid, it is becoming more and more serious along with the transfer of the balance of the interests of the patent system. In this jungle, the patentee plays the game dynamically based on the consideration of maximization of his own interests, which leads to the tragedy of anti-Commons. By using the prisoner's dilemma model in game theory, it can be found that the anti-Commons tragedy caused by the patent jungle is related to the characteristics of the patent system as well as to the characteristics of the patent system. But the most important thing is that the patentee adopts the exclusive strategy in the game, which leads to the prisoner's dilemma. As a result, the patent of the prior patentee has been left unused and the cost of the new patent R & D is high, the new patent is difficult to incubate, and the legitimate competition is hindered and the innovation of technology is hindered. Social progress According to the idea of reducing the cost of new patent R & D personnel and freeing up space for the generation of new patent, foreign countries should take the principle of patent exhaustion, patent compulsory licensing system and antitrust as the means to regulate the new patent. In response to this problem, our country, in addition to drawing lessons from foreign advanced ways, must base itself on the national conditions and put forward legal regulations that are in line with the interests of our country. We should not only see that our intellectual property protection still needs to be improved, but also to avoid the occurrence of similar tragedies. In particular, from the point of view of improving patent creativity and increasing the hatching success rate of new patents, in addition to the use of the above three main regulatory means, we can push forward and back one step further in the time point of regulation. The first step is to perfect the patent examination, ensure the neutrality of the patent examination department, and improve the strictness of the patent "three nature" examination. The next step is to reduce the level of relief for problem patents, garbage patents, and certain technical standards that should not be patented, so as to do a good job of remedying flaws in the review. In the process of regulation, it is necessary to make clear the principle that rights must be prohibited, not only in the case of anti-Commons tragedy caused by the patent jungle, but also in other unbalanced states in the field of patent. It is the most fundamental ideological foundation to play the role of encouragement and to balance the interests well at the same time. At the same time, to understand the balance of the art of balance, according to the situation, according to local conditions and the principle of moderation is the alternative method.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D923.42

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