【摘要】：在理論探討與裁判實(shí)務(wù)中,人們經(jīng)常會(huì)不自覺地將概念涵攝與規(guī)則適用在概念或邏輯上等同起來。這既不利于清晰地闡明司法推理的不同環(huán)節(jié)及其邏輯順序,也會(huì)給本就質(zhì)疑司法推理客觀性的人們留下口實(shí)。概念涵攝與規(guī)則適用在概念上是有區(qū)別的,在邏輯上是不等值的。它們之間存在規(guī)范性的聯(lián)系,即概念涵攝的成立給規(guī)則適用提供了推定的理由,這種理由在性質(zhì)上既不同于初顯的理由,也不同于終局的理由。對(duì)概念涵攝與規(guī)則適用之間區(qū)別與聯(lián)系的澄清,有助于我們思考相關(guān)的法理學(xué)問題,特別是,它能夠使我們?cè)谧銐蚯逦母拍罨A(chǔ)上談?wù)摲呻y題與司法推理的客觀性。
[Abstract]:In the theoretical discussion and the practice of judgment, people often unconsciously equate the concept of inclusion and the application of rules in concept or logic. This is not only unfavorable to clarify the different links and logical sequence of judicial reasoning, but also to the people who question the objectivity of judicial reasoning. Conceptual inclusion and rule application are different in concept and not equivalent in logic. There is a normative connection between them, that is, the establishment of the concept of inclusion provides a presumptive reason for the application of the rules, which is different in nature from both the prima facie reason and the final reason. The clarification of the difference and relation between the concept inclusion and the application of the rules is helpful for us to think about the relevant jurisprudence problems, especially, it enables us to talk about the legal problems and the objectivity of the judicial reasoning on the basis of sufficient clear concepts.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【基金】：2015年度國家社科基金青年項(xiàng)目“基于可駁斥性邏輯的法律推理研究”(15CFX005)的階段性成果
【分類號(hào)】：D923.5

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