本文選題：冷凍胚胎 + 夫妻��； 參考：《國(guó)家檢察官學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)》2015年01期

【摘要】：冷凍胚胎不同于人,因?yàn)檫�沒(méi)有生命;也不同于物,因?yàn)橛邪l(fā)育成為人的可能。這種特殊性決定了應(yīng)獲得適當(dāng)尊重。冷凍胚胎的處理依據(jù)主要是夫妻在知情同意權(quán)中達(dá)成的合意,但也應(yīng)區(qū)別對(duì)待。法律賦予不行使生育權(quán)利一方的利益應(yīng)優(yōu)于行使生育權(quán)一方,且應(yīng)允許不行使生育權(quán)利一方改變已經(jīng)達(dá)成的合意;其他情況下,當(dāng)事人的合意具有最終性。處理冷凍胚胎的任意性法律規(guī)范的設(shè)計(jì)同樣應(yīng)優(yōu)先考慮不行使生育權(quán)方的利益,且以冷凍胚胎的銷毀為任意性處理方式。
[Abstract]:Frozen embryos are different from humans because they are inanimate, and unlike objects because they have the potential to develop into human beings. This particularity dictates due respect. The treatment of frozen embryos is mainly based on the agreement of the couple in informed consent, but should also be treated differently. The law endows the party that does not exercise the reproductive right with the benefit which should be superior to the party exercising the reproductive right, and should allow the party not to exercise the reproductive right to change the agreement that has been reached; in other cases, the consent of the party concerned is final. The design of the legal norm of dealing with the arbitrariness of frozen embryos should also give priority to the interests of the parties that do not exercise their reproductive rights and take the destruction of frozen embryos as a way of arbitrary treatment.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【基金】：法治建設(shè)與法學(xué)理論研究部級(jí)科研項(xiàng)目“大規(guī)模交易私法理論研究”(14SFB2029)的研究成果
【分類號(hào)】：D923

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本文編號(hào)：1801653