本文關(guān)鍵詞：民法價值判斷問題的實體性論證規(guī)則——以中國民法學(xué)的學(xué)術(shù)實踐為背景，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

摘要：

王軼先生在《民法價值判斷問題的實體性論證規(guī)則——以中國民法學(xué)的學(xué)術(shù)實踐為背景》一文中提出了兩項實體性論證規(guī)則：沒有足夠充分且正當理由的情況下，應(yīng)當堅持強式意義上的平等對待；在沒有足夠充分且正當理由的情況下，不得主張限制民事主體的自由。筆者就這兩項實體性論證規(guī)則進行了分析和評判，并順用這兩項規(guī)則對善意取得制度和物權(quán)行為制度進行了實體性論證分析，從另一方面得出了不同于王軼先生的民法價值判斷：物權(quán)抽象性原則優(yōu)于善意取得制度。

Abstract： 

In the article“Substantive Proof Rules of the Problem of Civil Law Value Judgments-in the Background of Academic Practice of Chinese Civil Law”, Mr. Wang Yi puts forward two substantive proof rules: without enough and proper reason we should adhere to strong-sense equal treatment; without enough and proper reason we should not be in favor of limiting the freedom of civil subject.The writer analyses and judges these two substantive proof rules, and carries out substantive proof analysis on bona fide acquisition and juristic act of real right. The civil law value judgment drawn in this paper, which is different from Mr.Wang’s, is that juristic act of real right is superior to bona fide acquisition.

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：民法價值判斷問題的實體性論證規(guī)則——以中國民法學(xué)的學(xué)術(shù)實踐為背景，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。