國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理法律問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-12 16:34
【摘要】：近年來,隨著國有商業(yè)銀行全部完成了兩地上市,國有商業(yè)銀行的治理結構得到了進一步的完善。但是,眾所周知,股權結構改革只是國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理整個系統(tǒng)工程的一部分,不能解決國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的一切問題。本文從公司治理的理論基礎談起,分析了公司的內(nèi)部治理和外部治理,在此基礎上分析了國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理與公司治理的共同點以及國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的特殊性,比較了現(xiàn)代商業(yè)銀行公司治理結構的國際模式,從而提出了我國國有商業(yè)銀行公司內(nèi)部治理的措施。全文共分四個部分:第一部分,對國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理進行法律界定,闡述國有商業(yè)銀行的整個發(fā)展歷程;分析了因國有商業(yè)銀行具有的特殊性質(zhì)其治理具有的特殊性,分析了國有商業(yè)銀行完善公司治理所必須遵循的一般原則,分析了國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的理論目標。第二部分,介紹了我國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理的現(xiàn)狀,在此基礎上,筆者分析了我國當前我國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理所存在的問題,并著重分析了國有股東一股獨大、內(nèi)部人控制、內(nèi)部治理機構設置不完善、信息披露透明度低、缺乏有效的約束激勵機制等五個問題。第三部分,運用比較分析法,分別介紹了英美、德日四國商業(yè)銀行公司治理方面的先進經(jīng)驗,以期借鑒。最終目的是為我國國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理不足尋找完善的途徑。第四部分,針對我國國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理存在的問題,有針對性的提出完善我國針對我國國有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理的思路,并提出相應的建議:建立明晰的產(chǎn)權結構、促進股權主體多元化、完善公司內(nèi)部治理結構、強化信息披露、建立科學的約束和激勵機制。總之,國有商業(yè)銀行的公司治理是一項系統(tǒng)的復雜工程,需要長期的不斷努力去建設和完善此項工程。需要內(nèi)部治理與外部治理互動、相互作用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the completion of the dual listing of state-owned commercial banks, the governance structure of state-owned commercial banks has been further improved. However, it is well known that the reform of ownership structure is only a part of the whole system project of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks, and it cannot solve all the problems of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper starts with the theoretical basis of corporate governance, analyzes the internal and external governance of the company, and on this basis, analyzes the common ground between corporate governance and corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks and the particularity of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper compares the international model of the corporate governance structure of modern commercial banks and puts forward the internal governance measures of the state-owned commercial banks in China. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part defines the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks, expounds the whole development process of the state-owned commercial banks, analyzes the particularity of its governance because of the special nature of the state-owned commercial banks. This paper analyzes the general principles which must be followed by the state-owned commercial banks to perfect the corporate governance, and analyzes the theoretical objectives of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks. The second part introduces the current situation of internal governance of commercial banks in China. On this basis, the author analyzes the problems existing in the internal governance of commercial banks in our country, and focuses on the analysis of the state-owned shareholders' dominance and insider control. There are five problems, such as imperfect setting of internal governance organization, low transparency of information disclosure and lack of effective constraint incentive mechanism. The third part, using comparative analysis, introduces the advanced experiences of commercial banks in Anglo-American, Germany and Japan, in order to learn from them. The ultimate aim is to find a perfect way to improve the internal governance of state-owned commercial banks. The fourth part, aiming at the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, puts forward the idea of perfecting the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, and puts forward the corresponding suggestions: to establish a clear structure of property rights. To promote the diversification of the main body of equity, to perfect the internal governance structure of the company, to strengthen the information disclosure, and to establish a scientific restraint and incentive mechanism. In a word, the corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks is a systematic and complex project, which needs to be built and perfected continuously for a long time. Need internal governance and external governance interaction and interaction.
【學位授予單位】：云南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.281
本文編號：2179631
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the completion of the dual listing of state-owned commercial banks, the governance structure of state-owned commercial banks has been further improved. However, it is well known that the reform of ownership structure is only a part of the whole system project of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks, and it cannot solve all the problems of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper starts with the theoretical basis of corporate governance, analyzes the internal and external governance of the company, and on this basis, analyzes the common ground between corporate governance and corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks and the particularity of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper compares the international model of the corporate governance structure of modern commercial banks and puts forward the internal governance measures of the state-owned commercial banks in China. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part defines the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks, expounds the whole development process of the state-owned commercial banks, analyzes the particularity of its governance because of the special nature of the state-owned commercial banks. This paper analyzes the general principles which must be followed by the state-owned commercial banks to perfect the corporate governance, and analyzes the theoretical objectives of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks. The second part introduces the current situation of internal governance of commercial banks in China. On this basis, the author analyzes the problems existing in the internal governance of commercial banks in our country, and focuses on the analysis of the state-owned shareholders' dominance and insider control. There are five problems, such as imperfect setting of internal governance organization, low transparency of information disclosure and lack of effective constraint incentive mechanism. The third part, using comparative analysis, introduces the advanced experiences of commercial banks in Anglo-American, Germany and Japan, in order to learn from them. The ultimate aim is to find a perfect way to improve the internal governance of state-owned commercial banks. The fourth part, aiming at the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, puts forward the idea of perfecting the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, and puts forward the corresponding suggestions: to establish a clear structure of property rights. To promote the diversification of the main body of equity, to perfect the internal governance structure of the company, to strengthen the information disclosure, and to establish a scientific restraint and incentive mechanism. In a word, the corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks is a systematic and complex project, which needs to be built and perfected continuously for a long time. Need internal governance and external governance interaction and interaction.
【學位授予單位】：云南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.281
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