本文選題：并購(gòu) + 效率抗辯　； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：并購(gòu)可以在短期內(nèi)迅速擴(kuò)大企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)規(guī)模、提升企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,企業(yè)并購(gòu)是企業(yè)的一種擴(kuò)展形式,不僅對(duì)企業(yè)的收益以及生存有舉足輕重的作用,而且對(duì)整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)乃至整個(gè)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)都有非常重要的影響。企業(yè)并購(gòu)具有兩面性,一方面,它可能限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng),另一方面,它可以提高企業(yè)效率,促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,帶來(lái)社會(huì)福利,因此在反壟斷法中,并購(gòu)控制是其核心內(nèi)容。本文主要研究橫向與縱向并購(gòu)對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與福利的影響。橫向并購(gòu)可以產(chǎn)生規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì),節(jié)約成本,另一方面又會(huì)產(chǎn)生或增強(qiáng)其市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力以及減少市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者數(shù)量等反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng);在縱向并購(gòu)中,一方面可以產(chǎn)生成本節(jié)約、消除雙重加價(jià)以及提高資源配置整合等效率,另一方面又可能使并購(gòu)企業(yè)引起市場(chǎng)封鎖從而排擠競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手等。因此,關(guān)于并購(gòu)的積極與消極效應(yīng)的分析,在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界與反壟斷司法中都存在較大的爭(zhēng)議。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái),反壟斷政策的觀點(diǎn)也發(fā)生了變化。在二十世紀(jì)70年代前,以美國(guó)哈佛學(xué)派的SCP結(jié)構(gòu)為主要理論;在70年代中期,逐漸出現(xiàn)對(duì)哈佛學(xué)派的批判,產(chǎn)生了芝加哥學(xué)派以效率為核心的理論觀點(diǎn),該觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為,如果一項(xiàng)并購(gòu)可以獲得較大的效率提高,甚至可以抵消潛在的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng),那么該項(xiàng)并購(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)因考慮效率因素而通過(guò)審查并獲得批準(zhǔn)。文章的研究對(duì)象是橫向與縱向并購(gòu)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)與并購(gòu)規(guī)制,這是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問(wèn)題也是法學(xué)問(wèn)題,文章采取學(xué)科交叉的研究方法,從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度分析,采用了實(shí)證研究與比較分析,運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,系統(tǒng)梳理歐盟與美國(guó)對(duì)效率抗辯研究的理論成果與主要觀點(diǎn),對(duì)橫向并購(gòu)與縱向并購(gòu)的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)與福利效應(yīng)進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)研究與探討,結(jié)合我國(guó)的反壟斷政策提出相應(yīng)建議。文章的研究針對(duì)效率抗辯中的關(guān)鍵點(diǎn),即橫向與縱向并購(gòu)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)損害機(jī)理與產(chǎn)生的福利結(jié)果問(wèn)題。具體來(lái)說(shuō),可以歸納為以下幾個(gè)問(wèn)題。首先,對(duì)于橫向與縱向并購(gòu)損害競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的機(jī)理是什么?橫向與縱向并購(gòu)的福利結(jié)果是什么?第二,效率抗辯中運(yùn)用福利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的問(wèn)題,以及從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型分析橫向與縱向并購(gòu)的福利結(jié)果是否可以傳遞給消費(fèi)者?第三,比較歐盟與美國(guó)并購(gòu)指南中對(duì)效率抗辯的態(tài)度與實(shí)施標(biāo)準(zhǔn),我國(guó)應(yīng)采取怎樣的并購(gòu)控制?圍繞這些問(wèn)題,結(jié)合其他學(xué)者的研究,文章從以下幾個(gè)部分進(jìn)行了探討。第一,文章對(duì)橫向與縱向并購(gòu)的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)與效率改進(jìn)進(jìn)行梳理與探討研究。反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)與效率改進(jìn)是反壟斷審查中的重要指標(biāo),因?yàn)楦＠慕Y(jié)果取決于這兩者的比較。這也是效率抗辯的核心內(nèi)容。第二,效率抗辯的另一重要部分是福利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的選擇,不同福利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的嚴(yán)格程度不同,從而影響評(píng)估審查的結(jié)果。分析福利標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的選擇,利用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型分析效率傳遞在不同市場(chǎng)中對(duì)價(jià)格的影響,探討效率對(duì)消費(fèi)者的傳遞程度。第三,對(duì)于并購(gòu)效率的前后是否存在變化,文章引入了包絡(luò)模型的數(shù)據(jù)分析,測(cè)算了橫向與縱向并購(gòu)前后的投入效率值的變化,對(duì)效率分析提供了一定的依據(jù)。最后,在政策規(guī)制方面,對(duì)歐盟與美國(guó)并購(gòu)控制政策進(jìn)行了比較分析,根據(jù)我國(guó)反壟斷法的立法宗旨,提出了關(guān)于我國(guó)反壟斷政策的建議。認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)重視并購(gòu)效率,吸納芝加哥及后芝加哥學(xué)派的精華,借鑒歐美并購(gòu)指南的做法,對(duì)不同的并購(gòu)類(lèi)型循序漸進(jìn)地建立初步的分析框架。
[Abstract]:M & A can rapidly expand the business scale and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises in the short term. Merger and acquisition is an extended form of enterprise. It not only plays an important role in the income and survival of the enterprise, but also has a very important influence on the whole industrial economy and the whole national economy. It may restrict competition, on the other hand, it can improve enterprise efficiency, promote economic development and bring social welfare. Therefore, in the anti monopoly law, merger control is its core content. This paper mainly studies the impact of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions on competition and welfare. Horizontal mergers and acquisitions can produce economies of scale, cost saving, and on the other hand it will come into being. On the one hand, it can produce cost saving, eliminate double price increase and improve the integration of resource allocation in vertical merger and acquisition, on the other hand, it may cause the merger and acquisition enterprise to cause market blockade to exclude competitors. The analysis of the negative effects existed in both the economics and the antitrust judiciary. For a long time, the views of the antitrust policy have changed. Before 70s twentieth Century, the SCP structure of the Harvard School of America was the main theory; in the middle of 70s, the criticism of the Harvard School was gradually emerged, and the Chicago school was produced. Based on the theory of efficiency, this view holds that if a merger can gain greater efficiency and even counteract the potential anti competitive effects, the merger should be examined and approved for consideration of efficiency factors. The object of the study is to regulate the competition effect and merger and acquisition of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions. This is a problem of economics as well as a law problem. This article takes a cross study method, analyzes from the perspective of economics, uses empirical research and comparative analysis, and uses industrial organization theory to systematically comb the theoretical results and main views of the European Union and the United States on the study of efficiency defense, and the anti competitive effect of horizontal merger and vertical merger and acquisition. The welfare effect is systematically studied and discussed, and the corresponding suggestions are put forward in combination with the anti monopoly policy of China. The study of the article is aimed at the key point of the efficiency defense, that is, the competition damage mechanism of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions, and the problem of welfare results. What are the mechanism of the harm competition? What are the welfare results of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions? Second, the problem of the use of welfare standards in the efficiency defense, and the analysis of the welfare results of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions from the economic model to the consumers? Third, compare the attitude and implementation of the efficiency defense in the EU and the US M & a guide. Standard, what kind of M & a control should China take? Around these questions and other scholars' research, the article is discussed from the following parts. First, the article combs and studies the anti competitive effect and efficiency improvement of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions. The anti competitive efficiency and efficiency improvement are the important indexes in the antitrust review. The result of welfare depends on the comparison between the two. It is also the core content of the efficiency defense. Second, the other important part of the efficiency defense is the choice of the welfare standard, the difference of the strict degree of the different welfare standards, and the results of the evaluation review. The influence of the market on the price and the degree of efficiency to the consumer. Third, whether there is any change in the efficiency before and after the merger and acquisition, the paper introduces the data analysis of the envelope model, calculates the change of the input efficiency before and after the merger and acquisition, and provides a certain basis for the efficiency analysis. Finally, in the policy regulation aspect This paper makes a comparative analysis of the merger control policy between the EU and the United States. According to the legislative purpose of China's antitrust law, it puts forward some suggestions on China's anti monopoly policy. It is believed that the efficiency of merger and acquisition should be paid attention to, the essence of Chicago and the post Chicago school should be absorbed, and the practice of South and West merger and acquisition in Europe and the United States should be used for the gradual construction of different types of mergers and acquisitions. Establish a preliminary analytical framework.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.294

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