本文選題：目標(biāo)公司 + 股東優(yōu)先��； 參考：《遼寧大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：明確敵意收購中目標(biāo)公司董事會(huì)權(quán)利范圍,是我國上市公司在面對敵意收購時(shí)的重要問題,同樣也是我國證券市場上的各上市公司在面對現(xiàn)今的公司收購浪潮中的迫切需要。但是,在如今我國的公司法與證券法中,這一問題卻并未得到應(yīng)得的重視,在立法上處于相對落后的狀態(tài)。同時(shí),由于缺乏相關(guān)法律的規(guī)制,實(shí)踐中的現(xiàn)狀也呈現(xiàn)出混亂的局面,一方面一些目標(biāo)公司的董事會(huì)過于強(qiáng)勢,在惡意收購時(shí)大權(quán)獨(dú)攬,大肆侵蝕、占有本應(yīng)屬于股東的權(quán)利;另一方面則有一部分公司在面對敵意收購時(shí)股董雙方為了爭奪權(quán)利而爭吵不休,矛盾不斷激化。這些現(xiàn)象都不是一個(gè)健康的資本市場所應(yīng)擁有的。本文提出:首先,在惡意收購過程中被收購公司董事會(huì)所擁有的權(quán)利應(yīng)被部分限制。這表現(xiàn)在平衡股東與董事會(huì)之間的關(guān)系上。公司所有者與管理者之間的利益平衡是公司內(nèi)部最為基本的問題,因此也是確定董事會(huì)權(quán)利范圍時(shí)的首要問題。其次,是在處理其他利益相關(guān)者時(shí)的權(quán)利擴(kuò)張�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)的發(fā)展離不開除了股東之外的其他利益群體,這不僅是現(xiàn)代公司生存的要求,也是現(xiàn)代公司社會(huì)責(zé)任的體現(xiàn)。在劃分目標(biāo)公司董事會(huì)權(quán)利范圍時(shí),將其他利益相關(guān)者納入公司內(nèi)部權(quán)利制衡的考量范圍符合現(xiàn)代公司發(fā)展的內(nèi)涵。最后,應(yīng)賦予目標(biāo)公司董事會(huì)保護(hù)公司內(nèi)部中小股東的責(zé)任,這是法律公平與正義的體現(xiàn),為此公司董事會(huì)應(yīng)作為中小股東的代理,獲得對抗公司內(nèi)大股東的權(quán)利。建議在未來的立法過程中,以司法解釋的方式在《公司法》中明確目標(biāo)公司董事會(huì)的權(quán)利范圍,同時(shí)可以通過單行條例的方式在法律之余為制度的具體實(shí)施提供必要的補(bǔ)充。具體而言,制度的設(shè)計(jì)應(yīng)當(dāng)在同董事會(huì)與股東會(huì)、其他利益相關(guān)者和中小股東的關(guān)系中明確其在面對敵意收購時(shí)的自身定位,并在同這三大利益群體的互動(dòng)交流之際把握住三項(xiàng)原則:和公司所有人的股東優(yōu)先原則、和其他利益相關(guān)者的多重代理原則以及和中小股東之間的平等對待原則。
[Abstract]:Making clear the scope of the board of directors of the target company in hostile takeover is an important problem for the listed companies in facing the hostile takeover, and it is also the urgent need of the listed companies in the face of the current wave of corporate takeover in the securities market of our country.However, in our country's company law and securities law, this problem has not been given due attention and is relatively backward in legislation.At the same time, due to the lack of relevant legal regulation, the current situation in practice also presents a chaotic situation, on the one hand, some target companies' board of directors is too strong, in the hostile takeover of the monopoly of power, wantonly erosion, possession of the rights that should belong to shareholders;On the other hand, some companies in the face of hostile takeover when the two sides to fight for rights, the conflict has intensified.None of this is what a healthy capital market should have.Firstly, the rights of the board of directors of the acquired company should be partially restricted.This is manifested in balancing the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors.The balance of interests between the owner and the manager is the most basic problem within the company, and therefore the most important issue in determining the scope of the board of directors' rights.Second, the expansion of rights in dealing with other stakeholders.The development of modern enterprises can not be separated from other interest groups except shareholders, which is not only the requirement of modern company survival, but also the embodiment of modern corporate social responsibility.When dividing the scope of the board of directors of the target company, it is in line with the connotation of modern company development that other stakeholders should be included in the scope of the balance of rights within the company.Finally, the board of directors of the target company should be given the responsibility to protect the minority shareholders in the company, which is the embodiment of legal fairness and justice. Therefore, the board of directors of the company should act as the agent of the minority shareholders and obtain the right to resist the large shareholders in the company.It is suggested that in the future legislative process, the scope of the rights of the board of directors of the target company should be defined in the form of judicial interpretation in the Company Law, and at the same time, the necessary supplement for the concrete implementation of the system should be provided by means of separate regulations.Specifically, the system should be designed in the relationship with the board of directors and shareholders, other stakeholders and minority shareholders in the face of hostile takeover in their own position,At the time of the interaction and communication with these three interest groups, we should grasp three principles: the shareholder priority principle of the owner of the company, the multi-agent principle of other stakeholders and the principle of equal treatment between the minority shareholders and the other stakeholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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