本文選題：關(guān)聯(lián)交易　切入點(diǎn)：控股股東　出處：《上海師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：關(guān)聯(lián)交易是企業(yè)運(yùn)行中常見(jiàn)的“利益沖突”交易,與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展過(guò)程中企業(yè)的快速運(yùn)行相伴而生。雖然其利弊皆有,但因近年來(lái)上市公司利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易損害中小股東和債權(quán)人利益的丑聞?lì)l頻爆發(fā),導(dǎo)致關(guān)聯(lián)交易給投資者留下了利大于弊的直觀印象。一方面,從經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的角度來(lái)看,關(guān)聯(lián)人能夠掌握非關(guān)聯(lián)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者缺少的公司信息等優(yōu)勢(shì)資源,節(jié)約交易費(fèi)用,加速企業(yè)運(yùn)行效率。另一方面,由于信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和權(quán)利不對(duì)等,交易的一方能夠利用自己對(duì)另一方的影響力和控制力,使雙方交易違背公平原則,進(jìn)而損害公司及其他“用腳投票”的中小股東和投資者的利益。此外,在交易中擁有控制權(quán)和影響力的一方還可以通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)交易為規(guī)避稅負(fù)、利益輸送、形成市場(chǎng)壟斷等非法目的披上合法的外衣。關(guān)聯(lián)交易在我國(guó)的上市公司、國(guó)有企業(yè)和有限責(zé)任公司的運(yùn)行中都普遍存在。然而,因?yàn)樯鲜泄驹谧C券市場(chǎng)上公開(kāi)募集資金,涉及到眾多中小股東的利益,因此上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的影響更為深遠(yuǎn),產(chǎn)生的法律問(wèn)題也更為突出。相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)表明,上市公司與其母公司進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易的比率高達(dá)百分之四十,涉及資金往來(lái)巨大,相對(duì)復(fù)雜。我國(guó)大部分上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)集中導(dǎo)致控股股東更容易獲得公司的控制權(quán)進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易。法律若不能對(duì)這類(lèi)非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行有效規(guī)則,證券市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展無(wú)疑會(huì)受到巨大的阻礙。但是目前,我國(guó)相關(guān)法律對(duì)控股股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)制過(guò)于粗糙,不夠細(xì)化,僅見(jiàn)于《公司法》的原則性規(guī)定和中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)以及上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所的有關(guān)規(guī)則和準(zhǔn)則�？梢�(jiàn)我國(guó)法律關(guān)于關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)范層級(jí)較低,缺乏總體規(guī)制思路;同時(shí),預(yù)防非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生的上市公司信息披露制度、股東表決權(quán)回避制度也存在不足之處;對(duì)上市公司控股股東進(jìn)行非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易的責(zé)任追究制度尚未建立。本文主要從上市公司控股股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的法律規(guī)制入手,梳理我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法對(duì)此規(guī)制的不足之處,借鑒美國(guó)、英國(guó)、香港等域外國(guó)家和地區(qū)的制度設(shè)計(jì),對(duì)完善我國(guó)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的法律制度提出建議。對(duì)非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易的事前預(yù)防,從控股股東的誠(chéng)信義務(wù)、信息披露制度、股東表決權(quán)回避制度等方面進(jìn)行闡述;對(duì)非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易的事后救濟(jì),從法院對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易公允性的審查、股東派生訴訟、法人人格否認(rèn)原則和“深石原則”等方面的完善提出建議。
[Abstract]:Related party transaction is a common "conflict of interest" transaction in the operation of the enterprise, which is accompanied by the rapid operation of the enterprise in the process of economic development. However, in recent years, the scandals of listed companies using related party transactions to harm the interests of minority shareholders and creditors have frequently broken out, leading to the intuitive impression that related party transactions leave investors with more advantages than disadvantages. On the one hand, from the point of view of economic benefits, The associated person can grasp the advantage resources such as the company information which the non-affiliated competitor lacks, saves the transaction cost, accelerates the enterprise operation efficiency, on the other hand, because of the information asymmetry and the power asymmetry, One party to the transaction can use its influence and control over the other party to make the transaction against the principle of fairness, thereby harming the interests of the company and other minority shareholders and investors who "vote with their feet." in addition, The party that has the control and influence in the transaction can also put on the legal cloak for the illegal purposes of avoiding tax burden, transferring benefits, forming market monopoly and so on through related party transaction. The related party transaction is listed company in our country. The operation of state-owned enterprises and limited liability companies is widespread. However, because the listed companies raise funds publicly in the stock market, it involves the interests of many minority shareholders. As a result, the related transactions of listed companies have a more profound impact on economic life and more serious legal problems. Relevant data show that the ratio of related transactions between listed companies and their parent companies is as high as 40%. The ownership structure of most listed companies in China makes it easier for the controlling shareholders to obtain the control of the company to conduct related transactions. If the law can not carry out effective rules for this kind of unfair related transactions, There is no doubt that the development of the securities market will be greatly hindered. However, at present, the relevant laws of our country are too rough to regulate the related transactions of controlling shareholders, and they are not detailed enough. It can only be seen in the principled provisions of Company Law and the relevant rules and standards of CSRC, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. At the same time, the system of information disclosure of listed companies and the system of avoiding voting rights of listed companies arising from unfair related party transactions also have some shortcomings. The system of accountability for unfair related party transactions of controlling shareholders of listed companies has not yet been established. This paper starts with the legal regulation of related transactions of controlling shareholders of listed companies, combs the deficiencies of the existing laws of our country, and draws lessons from the United States. The system design of foreign countries and regions, such as Britain and Hong Kong, makes suggestions for perfecting the legal system of related party transactions in our country. The prior prevention of unfair related party transactions, from the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders and the information disclosure system, The ex post relief of unfair related party transactions, from the court review of the fairness of related transactions, shareholder derivative litigation, The author puts forward some suggestions on the perfection of the principle of denial of legal personality and the principle of deep stone.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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