本文關(guān)鍵詞： 優(yōu)先股 普通股 利益失衡 公司治理 利益平衡　出處：《西南政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：優(yōu)先股的引入對于資本市場和公司治理具有重要的意義。然而,從公司治理角度而言,其發(fā)行意味著公司將產(chǎn)生新的利益主體,如何平衡優(yōu)先股股東與其它利益主體之間的利益將成為公司治理面臨的新問題。有鑒于此,本文選取其中最為顯著的問題,即優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東之間的利益平衡,作為文章研究的方向。全文將結(jié)合國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有優(yōu)先股實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn),在理論和實(shí)踐兩個(gè)層面探討中國公司法語境下的優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東平衡機(jī)制,以期對我國關(guān)于優(yōu)先股制度的構(gòu)建和完善提出一些有益的建議。本文除導(dǎo)論和結(jié)束語外,分為五部分:第一部分——優(yōu)先股的基本理論。優(yōu)先股主要是指一種“優(yōu)先于普通股股東分配公司利潤和剩余財(cái)產(chǎn),但參與公司決策管理等權(quán)利受到限制”的類別股份;性質(zhì)上是一種融合了債之優(yōu)點(diǎn)的公司股權(quán)資本;本質(zhì)上是商事自治理念下股份權(quán)利自治性配置的結(jié)果�；谇笆龇治�,優(yōu)先股將具備在資本市場和公司治理兩方面的獨(dú)特商事價(jià)值。第二部分——優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東利益失衡的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我國長期圍繞單一股份形式進(jìn)行公司治理機(jī)制構(gòu)建,優(yōu)先股這種類別股權(quán)將對我國公司法傳統(tǒng)理念和制度內(nèi)容造成沖擊。如果缺少利益平衡的制度設(shè)計(jì),優(yōu)先股的債權(quán)性約定和普通股的表決權(quán)優(yōu)勢將可能造成兩類股東的利益失衡。從國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有實(shí)踐分析,利益失衡可能出現(xiàn)在股利分配、股份回購、公司合并等情形下。第三部分——優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東利益失衡的成因。通過股權(quán)對比分析,以下兩個(gè)理論視角有助于理解兩類股東利益失衡的基本邏輯:其一,“異質(zhì)化”理論。股權(quán)的差異化設(shè)計(jì)使得優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東之間呈現(xiàn)“異質(zhì)化”特征,具體體現(xiàn)在利益取向、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好以及股權(quán)權(quán)能三方面。其二,股東維度代理理論。優(yōu)先股的參與性權(quán)利與經(jīng)濟(jì)性權(quán)利是非比例性配置的,這使得優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東間產(chǎn)生了實(shí)質(zhì)代理問題。缺少制衡的控制權(quán)將使得兩類股東間代理成本的提升,最終表現(xiàn)為股東間失衡。第四部分——優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東的利益平衡之道。利益失衡的形成源于股份權(quán)利義務(wù)的非合理配置。故在平衡優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東的利益過程中,須遵循以下基本路徑:其一,優(yōu)先股與普通股的法權(quán)制衡,包括合理配置優(yōu)先股股權(quán)和制衡普通股權(quán)力兩方面;其二,公司法信義義務(wù)的分層演進(jìn),包括董事信義義務(wù)和股東信義義務(wù)。第五部分——我國優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東的利益平衡。本部分將回歸現(xiàn)實(shí),首先將梳理中國優(yōu)先股的發(fā)展歷程和制度規(guī)范,進(jìn)而從比較和制度功能的視角對相關(guān)平衡制度進(jìn)行分析,同時(shí)相應(yīng)地提出我國相關(guān)制度的完善之策。具體包括發(fā)行制度、表決權(quán)復(fù)活制度、分類表決制度、退出制度、信息披露制度、救濟(jì)制度。
[Abstract]:The introduction of preferred stock is of great significance to the capital market and corporate governance. However, from the point of view of corporate governance, the issuance of preferred stock means that the company will produce new stakeholders. How to balance the interests between preferred shareholders and other stakeholders will become a new problem in corporate governance. That is, the balance of interests between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders, as the direction of the article. The full text will be combined with the existing domestic and foreign preferred stock practice experience. This paper probes into the balance mechanism between preferred shareholders and common shareholders in the context of Chinese company law from the theoretical and practical aspects. In order to put forward some useful suggestions on the construction and perfection of preferred stock system in China. It is divided into five parts: the first part is the basic theory of preferred stock. Preferred stock mainly refers to a kind of "preferential distribution of company profits and surplus property over common shareholders." But participation in the company's decision-making management and other rights are restricted "the category of shares;" The nature of the company is a combination of the advantages of debt equity capital; In essence, it is the result of the allocation of stock right autonomy under the concept of commercial autonomy. Preferred stock will have unique commercial value in capital market and corporate governance. The second part is the risk of imbalance of interests between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders. Our country has carried out corporate governance in the form of single shares for a long time. Mechanism construction. This kind of preferred shares will impact the traditional concept and system content of our company law, if there is a lack of institutional design of interest balance. The creditor's rights agreement of preferred stock and the voting advantage of common stock may cause the interest imbalance of two kinds of shareholders. From the analysis of the existing practice at home and abroad, the imbalance of interest may appear in dividend distribution and share repurchase. The third part is the cause of interest imbalance between preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The following two theoretical perspectives are helpful to understand the basic logic of the two types of shareholder interest imbalance: first. The theory of "heterogeneity". The difference design of stock right makes preferred shareholders and common shareholders present "heterogeneity", which is embodied in three aspects: interest orientation, risk preference and equity power. Shareholders' dimensional agency theory. The participation right and economic right of preferred stock are allocated non-proportionally. This makes the real agency problem between preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The lack of checks and balances of control will increase the cost of agency between the two types of shareholders. The ultimate manifestation is the imbalance between shareholders. 4th-the way to balance the interests of preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The formation of interest imbalance stems from the unreasonable allocation of rights and obligations of shares. Therefore, the balance between preferred shareholders and ordinary shareholders. The interests of shareholders in the process. We must follow the following basic paths: first, the balance of legal rights between preferred stock and common stock, including the rational allocation of preferred shares and checks and balances of common stock power; Second, the hierarchical evolution of company law fiduciary obligations, including directors' fiduciary obligations and shareholders' fiduciary obligations. Part 5th-the balance of interests between preferred shareholders and common shareholders in China. This part will return to reality. First of all, it will comb the development of Chinese preferred stock and institutional norms, and then from the perspective of comparative and institutional functions to analyze the relevant balance system. At the same time, the author puts forward the corresponding measures to improve the relevant systems of our country, including the issuing system, the resurrection of voting rights system, the classified voting system, the withdrawal system, the information disclosure system and the relief system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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