本文選題：大前提構(gòu)建 + 新進(jìn)路��； 參考：《西南政法大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 法律推理的大前提構(gòu)建問(wèn)題是法律邏輯學(xué)一個(gè)重要的研究領(lǐng)域。大前提構(gòu)建問(wèn)題,本質(zhì)上是司法審判中由于法官不得拒絕裁判的規(guī)則存在,法官在面對(duì)法律規(guī)范不明、沖突、缺失等情形下,而必須對(duì)所裁案件依據(jù)的法律規(guī)范予以選擇的問(wèn)題。這種選擇是基于法官的自由裁量權(quán),但并不意味著其是一種任意選擇或解釋的結(jié)果,而必須是基于一種合理的,為當(dāng)事人所能接受和理解的論證方法。大前提構(gòu)建問(wèn)題就是為了構(gòu)建這樣一些理論,為法官的最終選擇提供有力的依據(jù)。但在目前已有的大前提構(gòu)建理論中,并不能完全合理的解決上述問(wèn)題,反而遭遇了類似“明希豪森困境”等的難題,本文在批判相關(guān)大前提構(gòu)建理論的基礎(chǔ)上,旨在從一個(gè)全新的角度,探尋更加合理,更具實(shí)踐意義的理論進(jìn)路,以期滿足法官在現(xiàn)實(shí)審判中的需求。本文選題的實(shí)踐意義在于:(1)滿足裁判者裁判的實(shí)際需求。即在遭遇疑難案件,尤其是法律規(guī)范缺失、沖突,法律語(yǔ)言模糊、不明等情況下,為困境解決提供一條可行之路;(2)為司法裁判改革,尤其是為司法文書內(nèi)容具體化、推理邏輯化的改革要求提供思路,以真正實(shí)現(xiàn)透明的司法正義。其理論意義在于超越邏輯系統(tǒng)本身,解決法律邏輯大前提論證中的“明希豪森困境”,構(gòu)建合理的司法三段論體系,實(shí)現(xiàn)法律推理的正當(dāng)性。 本文第一部分,旨在探討法律推理大前提構(gòu)建問(wèn)題的由來(lái)。首先,從法律邏輯學(xué)的基本研究對(duì)象入手,闡述了邏輯學(xué)的研究對(duì)象與現(xiàn)實(shí)發(fā)展?fàn)顩r,并進(jìn)而對(duì)現(xiàn)階段爭(zhēng)議頗多的法律邏輯學(xué)的研究對(duì)象予以探討,肯定了大前提構(gòu)建問(wèn)題在當(dāng)前法律邏輯學(xué)范疇內(nèi)的研究?jī)r(jià)值。其次,針對(duì)上述結(jié)論,一是從大前提構(gòu)建的必要性方面,二是從大前提構(gòu)建的可能性方面予以論證。大前提構(gòu)建的必要性,是當(dāng)下關(guān)于大前提構(gòu)建的相關(guān)論證理論的局限性,以及迫切的司法實(shí)踐需求兩大原因促成;而大前提構(gòu)建之所以具有可能性,則是由于現(xiàn)實(shí)層面我國(guó)法官本身具有一定的案件自由裁量權(quán)與理論層面中不斷興起的相關(guān)論證理論予以支持。 本文的第二部分,旨在闡述并分析法律邏輯學(xué)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)相關(guān)大前提構(gòu)建的論證理論,同時(shí)就此提出一條更為合理的大前提構(gòu)建的理論進(jìn)路,本部分對(duì)目前學(xué)術(shù)界具有較大影響并代表不同研究方向的三個(gè)大前提構(gòu)建論證理論予以評(píng)介�？枴だ瓊惔牡拇笄疤針�(gòu)建理論詳細(xì)分析了大前提構(gòu)建中存在的各類情形,針對(duì)不同情形提出了與之相適應(yīng)的簡(jiǎn)明的構(gòu)建方法與標(biāo)準(zhǔn),同時(shí)在存在多種構(gòu)建方法時(shí)清晰的排列了應(yīng)遵循的位階,從而可以有效的解決大前提構(gòu)建的理論困境,但在司法實(shí)踐中缺乏更加具體的規(guī)則,阻礙了這一方法論的適用效果;羅伯特·阿列克西的大前提構(gòu)建理論中,程序性法律論證理論是其理論基點(diǎn),現(xiàn)代邏輯的演算系統(tǒng)在其論證理論中的充分運(yùn)用,展現(xiàn)了該理論進(jìn)路嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性的特色,但是由于過(guò)分的唯理性,使得其在以內(nèi)容為核心的法律大前提構(gòu)建中遭遇困境;法律解釋學(xué)以哲學(xué)解釋學(xué)為理論背景,提出了司法者本身之于法律解釋的主體性,強(qiáng)調(diào)了法官自身理解(本體)對(duì)于法律解釋的重要性,但該理論自身的體系矛盾與艱深,造成了其在司法審判實(shí)踐中的適用困難。 針對(duì)上述各種理論自身存在的缺陷,本文引介了實(shí)用主義理論的相關(guān)要素,提出了大前提構(gòu)建的一條新的理論進(jìn)路。該理論進(jìn)路具備以多元性與開(kāi)放性為標(biāo)識(shí),以相對(duì)合理性為論證標(biāo)準(zhǔn),以實(shí)踐性為目的,以審判結(jié)果實(shí)效性為訴求的特征。多元性與開(kāi)放性的特征,表現(xiàn)為面對(duì)當(dāng)下法律邏輯大前提構(gòu)建,各類論證理論眾說(shuō)紛紜的局面,該新進(jìn)路以一種開(kāi)放性的胸懷,容納各種不同論證理論的爭(zhēng)議,平息各種不同氣質(zhì)的哲學(xué)思想的沖突,它并不排斥其他思維進(jìn)路,而是認(rèn)為各種理論可以通過(guò)一定的方式而共存;在大前提構(gòu)建中堅(jiān)持一種相對(duì)合理性的論證標(biāo)準(zhǔn),是為了克服“明希豪森困境”帶來(lái)的知識(shí)之根的難題,強(qiáng)調(diào)只要獲得的司法裁判能有效的解決糾紛,便無(wú)需過(guò)分追究大前提證成的真理性;以實(shí)踐性為目的,則表現(xiàn)為針對(duì)當(dāng)下的理論存在著過(guò)于艱深,實(shí)踐性不強(qiáng)的問(wèn)題,期望以一種更注重實(shí)踐的“平民式”哲學(xué)精神來(lái)解決大前提構(gòu)建的困境,其偏重方法在司法審判實(shí)踐中的適用性與可推廣性,始終堅(jiān)持以實(shí)踐為理論研究的基礎(chǔ);以審判結(jié)果實(shí)效性,表現(xiàn)為我們當(dāng)以存在沖突的各方理論、原則所最終可能導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果進(jìn)行比照,凡是能解決案件實(shí)際爭(zhēng)議,有效實(shí)現(xiàn)案件公正審判后,就應(yīng)予以選擇,從而作為前提構(gòu)建的論證標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 本文的第三部分是關(guān)于大前提構(gòu)建的新進(jìn)路在司法實(shí)踐中的具體應(yīng)用。分別選取了具有代表性的民法案例、刑法案例及婚姻法案例,比較其他大前提構(gòu)建的論證理論在案例中的適用,將該理論進(jìn)路具體應(yīng)用方式予以展現(xiàn),論證其在司法實(shí)踐中的可行性。 大前提構(gòu)建的新進(jìn)路以法的實(shí)際效果為根本衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),法官考慮依據(jù)不同的法律規(guī)范所可能產(chǎn)生的不同法律效果,來(lái)判斷究竟適用何種規(guī)范。其優(yōu)勢(shì)在于:(1)衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的明晰,不存在繁瑣深邃的理論,易于為我國(guó)司法實(shí)踐者所掌握、適用;(2)能有效平息案件糾紛,尤其適用于調(diào)解結(jié)案的案件中,可以使當(dāng)事人雙方都獲得滿意的實(shí)際法律效果,從而有利于和諧社會(huì)、和諧司法的構(gòu)建;(3)可以使法院的審理程序得以簡(jiǎn)化,避免不必要的司法程序,節(jié)約司法資源。但是,大前提構(gòu)建這一新進(jìn)路并不具有完全取代其他大前提構(gòu)建理論的功能,也絕非一種具有普適性的理論進(jìn)路;它不為追求個(gè)案的結(jié)果而破壞整個(gè)司法系統(tǒng)的平衡;不會(huì)為達(dá)到案件的最佳近期效果而忽略了遠(yuǎn)期的后果——即對(duì)法治的追求。 本文的研究重點(diǎn)在于大前提構(gòu)建的理論進(jìn)路,以司法判例實(shí)證分析為重點(diǎn),解決理論適用實(shí)踐問(wèn)題。本文研究的思路是從法律推理大前提構(gòu)建的實(shí)踐必要性與理論可能性入手,提出重構(gòu)大前提的問(wèn)題。并在考察、批判國(guó)內(nèi)外各類法律推理大前提構(gòu)建的理論基礎(chǔ)上,提出大前提構(gòu)建存在的缺陷及改進(jìn)目標(biāo)。研究方法在于引入西方有益的相關(guān)思想作為理論進(jìn)路,以解決大前提構(gòu)建的理論缺陷和實(shí)現(xiàn)研究目的。并以司法判例的實(shí)證分析方法,論證該思想進(jìn)路在司法實(shí)踐適用中的可行性與有益性。其創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)一方面在于對(duì)實(shí)用主義的批判基礎(chǔ)上,借鑒其可行之點(diǎn)解決大前提構(gòu)建的困境,另一面在于加強(qiáng)對(duì)司法判例的實(shí)證研究,擺脫以外法律邏輯學(xué)重理論輕實(shí)證研究的窠臼。
[Abstract]:The big premise construction problem of legal reasoning is an important research field in legal logic. The construction of the big premise is essentially the existence of the rule that the judge may not refuse the referee in the judicial trial, and the judge must choose the legal norms of the basis of the case under the circumstances of the unidentified legal norms, the conflict and the absence of the law. The choice is based on the discretion of the judge, but it does not mean that it is a result of arbitrary choice or interpretation, but it must be based on a reasonable method of proof for the parties to be accepted and understood. The construction of the big premise is to build such theories and provide a powerful basis for the final choice of the judge. However, in the existing theory of big premise construction, it can not solve the above problems completely and reasonably. Instead, it is confronted with a difficult problem like "mushausen Plight". On the basis of critical premise construction theory, this paper aims to explore a more reasonable and practical theoretical approach from a new angle to expire. The practical significance of this topic is: (1) to meet the actual needs of referees, that is, in the case of difficult cases, especially the lack of legal norms, conflicts, vague legal language, unknown and so on, to provide a feasible way for the settlement of the predicament; (2) the reform of the judiciary, especially for judicial documents. The reform of the logic of reasoning requires ideas to truly realize the transparent judicial justice. Its theoretical significance lies in transcending the logical system itself, solving the "the plight of the hausen" in the legal logic, constructing a reasonable judicial syllogism system and realizing the legitimacy of legal reasoning.
The first part of this article is to discuss the origin of the construction of the big premise of legal reasoning. First, starting with the basic research object of the legal logic, this paper expounds the object of the study of logic and the development of the reality, and then discusses the research of the legal logic which has many disputes at the present stage, and affirms the problem of the construction of the big premise. Secondly, according to the above conclusion, first, from the necessity of the construction of the big premise, the two is to demonstrate the possibility of the construction of the big premise. The necessity of the construction of the big premise is the limitation of the relevant argumentation theory on the construction of the big premise at the moment, and the urgent needs of the judicial practice two. The reason for the reason is that the possibility of the big premise is that the judges in our country have a certain right of discretion in the case and the theory of relevant arguments that are rising in the theoretical level.
The second part of this article is to expound and analyze the theory of argumentation in the field of legal logic, and to put forward a more reasonable theoretical approach to the construction of a big premise. This part is a review of the three major prerequisites, which have great influence on the current academic circles and represent different research directions. M Larenz's theory of big premise construction is a detailed analysis of the various situations in the construction of the big premise and the concise construction methods and standards adapted to different situations. At the same time, the position order should be followed clearly in the existence of various construction methods, so that the theoretical predicament of the construction of the big premise can be effectively solved. But the lack of more specific rules in judicial practice hinders the application of this methodology; in the theory of Robert Alexy's big premise construction, procedural legal argumentation theory is its theoretical basis, and the system of modern logic is fully applied in its argumentation theory, showing the characteristics of the rigorous approach to the theory. It is due to excessive rationalism that makes it difficult in the construction of a legal premise with content as the core; legal hermeneutics, with philosophical hermeneutics as the theoretical background, puts forward the subjectivity of the judiciary itself in the interpretation of the law, emphasizing the importance of the judge's own understanding (noumenon) to the legal interpretation, but the system of the theory itself spears. Shield and hardship make it difficult to apply in judicial practice.
In view of the shortcomings of these theories, this paper introduces the relevant elements of pragmatism theory, and puts forward a new theoretical approach to the construction of the big premise. The theoretical approach has the characteristics of diversity and openness, the relative rationality as the proof standard, the practicality as the purpose, and the appeal of the trial result. The characteristics of pluralism and openness are characterized by the construction of the legal logic in the face of the present great precondition of legal logic, and the different opinions of various argumentation theories. The new road has an open mind, accommodates various disputes of different theories of argument, and quits the conflict of philosophical thoughts of various different temperaments. It does not exclude other ways of thinking, but thinks that it is not a way of thinking. All kinds of theories can coexist in a certain way; to adhere to a relatively reasonable standard of argument in the construction of a big premise is to overcome the problem of the root of knowledge brought by the "the plight of Ming Xi hausen", and to emphasize that the truth of the large premise is not needed to be investigated too much if the judicial referee can effectively solve the dispute. The purpose of it is to show that there is a problem that is too hard and practical in view of the present theory, and it is expected to solve the predicament of the construction of the big premise with a more practical "civilian" philosophy spirit, and the applicability and scalability of the method in judicial practice, and always adhere to the basis of the theory of practice. The results of the trial results show that we should compare the results that may lead to the theory of the conflicting parties and the results that the principle may eventually lead to.
The third part of this article is the specific application of the new road in the judicial practice of the construction of the big premise. It selects representative civil cases, criminal cases and marriage law cases, compares the application of the argument theory constructed by other big premises, and demonstrates the theory into the concrete application way, demonstrating its judicature. The feasibility of practice.
The actual effect of the new road with the great premise is the basic measure of the actual effect of the law. The judge considers the different legal effects which may produce according to the different legal norms to judge exactly what norms to apply. The advantages lie in: (1) the clarity of the criteria is clear, there is no complicated and profound theory, and it is easy for our judicial practitioners to master and apply. (2) it is possible to effectively quell case disputes, especially in cases of mediation and settlement, which can make both parties obtain satisfactory actual legal effects, thus conducive to the construction of harmonious society and harmonious judicature; (3) it can simplify the trial procedure of the court, avoid unnecessary judicial procedures and save judicial resources. The new approach does not have the function of completely replacing other big premise construction theories, nor is it a universal theoretical approach; it does not destroy the balance of the whole judicial system for the result of the case, and does not neglect the long term consequences of the best recent effect of the case, namely, the pursuit of the rule of law.
The focus of this study lies in the theoretical approach of the construction of the big premise, focusing on the empirical analysis of judicial precedents and solving the practical problems of theory application. This study is based on the practical necessity and theoretical possibility of the construction of legal reasoning, and puts forward the problem of reconstructing the big premise. On the basis of the theory of the construction of the big premise, we put forward the defects and the improvement goals of the big premise construction. The research method is to introduce the useful related ideas of the West as the theoretical approach to solve the theoretical defects of the construction of the big premise and to realize the purpose of the study. On the one hand, on the basis of the criticism of pragmatism, the innovation point is to solve the predicament of the construction of the big premise on the basis of its practical point, and the other is to strengthen the empirical study of the judicial precedent and get rid of the stereotype of the light empirical research on the theory of legal logic.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：D90-051

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