發(fā)布時間：2018-04-12 22:29

  本文選題：信息不對稱 + 單方錯誤��； 參考：《西南政法大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：在合同法領域，似乎存在著這樣一個矛盾現象，在一些案件中——一般歸于“單方錯誤”規(guī)則下——認為當承諾人關于某些重要事實存在誤解且他的錯誤為另一方所知悉（或應當知悉）時，他就免除了履約或者支付賠償金的義務。另一方面，，也存在一些案件，主張在某些情形下，合同一方有權保有他明知而另一方缺乏的信息。這兩類看似矛盾的案件所反映的本質問題是相同的，即如果合同一方知道或有理由知道另一方關于特定事實的錯誤，擁有信息的一方有義務說出來嗎？還是他可以保持沉默并利用另一方的錯誤獲利？或者說這兩類案件所要解決的都是關于錯誤的風險分配問題。 產生錯誤的根本原因在于信息的不完全性與信息的非對稱性，正是由于交易中的一方掌握了他方所不知悉的信息，才產生了上述的矛盾案件。信息可有效消除錯誤，但產生信息的成本可能是高昂的。信息與資源控制權的結合總是需要一定的交易成本，合理的法律應當在效率原則的要求下通過對錯誤風險的合理分配來降低交易成本。然而具體案件中對哪些信息的不披露能夠作為撤銷合同的理由而哪些信息又允許不予披露是一個十分復雜的問題�；诤贤试瓌t的要求，應當將錯誤的風險分配給能夠以最低成本防止錯誤發(fā)生的一方當事人，也就是能以最低成本搜集信息的一方當事人。 為設立一個一般性的參考標準，本文基于不同的標準對信息做了分類，主要包括實質性信息和非實質性信息、努力搜尋的信息與偶然獲取的信息、生產性信息與再分配性信息以及買方信息與賣方信息。通過將各種信息與我們所設立的將錯誤風險分配給能以最低成本搜集信息的一方的規(guī)則相對比，最終得出結論：首先無論是作為撤銷合同理由的被誤解的信息還是享有不予披露權利的信息都應當是涉及合同基本假設的實質性信息。對買方而言，如果其所掌握的信息是生產性信息或者既是生產性信息又是再分配性信息，并且他在獲取此信息的過程中進行了一定的投入，那么就應當允許其訂立并執(zhí)行其信息表明是可以獲利的合同而不必向另一方披露信息，甚至在賣方問及是否知悉與合同相關的有價值信息時可以拒絕回答或者說謊。而賣方卻必須披露其所知道的與合同相關的有價值信息，不論此種信息是生產性的還是再分配性的，是努力搜尋的結果還是偶然獲取的。
[Abstract]:In the field of contract law, there seems to be such a contradiction.In some cases-generally attributable to the "unilateral error" rule-it is assumed that when the promise is misunderstood about certain material facts and his error is known to (or should be known to) the other party,He was relieved of the obligation to perform or pay damages.On the other hand, there are cases in which one party to the contract is entitled under certain circumstances to keep information which he knows but the other party lacks.The two seemingly contradictory types of cases reflect the same underlying problem, that is, if one party to the contract knows or has reason to know the other party's error in relation to a particular fact, does the party in possession of the information have an obligation to say so?Or can he remain silent and take advantage of the other's mistakes?In other words, the two types of cases are concerned with the problem of misallocation of risk.The fundamental reason for the error lies in the incompleteness of information and the asymmetry of information. It is precisely because one party in the transaction has grasped the information which the other party does not know that the contradiction cases mentioned above have arisen.Information can effectively eliminate errors, but the cost of generating information can be high.The combination of information and resource control always requires a certain transaction cost, and reasonable law should reduce transaction cost through the rational allocation of wrong risk under the requirement of efficiency principle.However, it is a very complicated problem that what information is not disclosed in specific cases and which information can be used as grounds for rescission of the contract and which information is allowed not to be disclosed.Based on the principle of contract efficiency, the risk of error should be assigned to the party who can prevent the error at the lowest cost, that is, the party who can collect information at the lowest cost.In order to establish a general reference standard, this paper classifies information based on different criteria, mainly including substantive and non-substantive information, information sought and information obtained by chance.Productive and redistributive information and buyer's and seller's information.By comparing all kinds of information with the rules that we have set up to assign error risks to those who can collect information at the lowest cost,Finally, the conclusion is drawn that, first of all, the misinterpreted information as the reason for rescission of the contract or the information with the right not to disclose should be the substantive information concerning the basic assumptions of the contract.For the buyer, if the information in his possession is productive information or is both productive and redistributed information, and he has made a certain investment in the process of obtaining this information,It should then be allowed to enter into and enforce a contract in which its information indicates that it is profitable without having to disclose information to the other party, or even refuse to answer or lie when the seller asks if he knows of valuable information relating to the contract.On the other hand, the seller must disclose valuable information which he knows is relevant to the contract, whether it is productive or redistributive, the result of hard search or accidental acquisition.
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D913

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前3條

1 周彬彬;;論合同錯誤規(guī)則的設置——以經濟分析為視角[J];工會論壇(山東省工會管理干部學院學報);2009年04期

2 孔玉飛;龔鵬程;;論英國合同法中的錯誤及對我國民事立法的借鑒[J];南京社會科學;2007年05期

3 張淳;論能夠成為民事行為瑕疵的錯誤——兩大法系有關規(guī)定比較以及我國民法相應規(guī)定評析[J];浙江社會科學;2004年04期

本文編號：1741726