【摘要】：保護國家根本安全利益的權利作為條約承諾的例外,已經(jīng)在條約實踐中建立起來。經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,簡稱經(jīng)合組織OECD)投資協(xié)議、北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(North American Free Trade Agreement,簡稱NAFTA)投資協(xié)議、一些雙邊投資條約和國際協(xié)定中都列入了明確的例外或排除性條款,以確保國家為了根本安全利益而采取行動。盡管國家加入了某一條約,但條約中的承諾不能阻止國家為了根本安全利益而采取措施。在國際投資立法中,關于根本安全利益例外的條款有多常見?他們的范圍是什么?是如何來處理根本安全利益例外條款的?國家是否有權自行適用這些根本安全利益例外條款,即國家是否可以自行判定?在根本安全利益例外條款問題上是否有相應的習慣國際法?國際仲裁庭是如何解讀根本安全利益例外條款的?中國對根本安全利益例外條款該如何把握?等等所有這些使得本文有了對國際投資法中根本安全利益例外條款進行研究的必要。 根本安全利益例外條款是二戰(zhàn)后開始的美國友好、通商和航海條約的固定元素。在20世紀50年代后期,根本安全利益例外條款從早期的友好、通商和航海條約中移植到德國的雙邊條約中。第一個包括根本安全利益例外條款的投資條約是德國的第一個雙邊投資條約,即1959年的德國—巴基斯坦雙邊條約。根本安全利益例外條款幾乎可以在這之后的每一個德國雙邊投資條約中找到。同樣美國訂立的第一個雙邊投資條約,即1982年美國—巴拿馬雙邊投資條約也包含了根本安全利益例外條款。并且這之后美國的每一個雙邊投資條約都包含這個條款。 雖然雙邊投資條約成為學術界研究的熱點,但雙邊投資條約中經(jīng)常可見的根本安全利益例外條款并沒有得到非常多的關注。然而,根本安全利益例外條款在國際投資法中是相對比較廣泛傳播的。這類條款在諸如德國、印度、比利時—盧森堡聯(lián)盟、加拿大和美國的雙邊投資條約中頻繁出現(xiàn),在國際金融體系中起著重要的作用。這類條款在許多其他國家的特定的雙邊投資關系條約中也會偶爾出現(xiàn)。在目前發(fā)生效力的2000個左右的雙邊投資條約中,根本安全利益例外條款至少出現(xiàn)在其中的200個條約中。1 從更普遍的意義上來說,雙邊投資條約中根本安全利益例外條款的流行對國際投資法制度具有非常重要的影響。雙邊投資條約長久以來被認為是非常強有力的投資者保護的法律工具,它為跨界投資提供了深遠的保護。例如,美國參議院對外關系委員會就斷言,雙邊投資條約的首要目的就是鼓勵和保護美國在發(fā)展中國家的投資。然而,根本安全利益例外條款的存在表明,那些保護不適用于處于極端風險中的國際投資例外或危機情況。 對雙邊投資條約的傳統(tǒng)理解是,東道國承諾通過此條約不傷害外國投資者,或至少要承擔費用,如果東道國如此做的話。根本安全利益例外條款起著風險分配的作用。它將例外情形下?lián)p害投資者的費用從東道國轉(zhuǎn)移給投資者。在包括根本安全利益例外的雙邊投資條約下,東道國必須對平常環(huán)境下違反條約對投資者的損害進行賠償。但在特殊的例外情形,如阿根廷金融危機情形下,根本安全利益例外條款將風險轉(zhuǎn)移給了投資者,國家就有可能無須為違反雙邊投資條約所采取的措施負責。在一個比以往更全球化的世界中,各種例外情形都有可能包括進根本安全利益例外條款中,如金融危機、恐怖威脅、公共健康緊急情況等,都非常普遍,根本安全利益例外條款根本上限制著對外國投資者的保護制度。根本安全利益例外條款的解釋和適用,對確定國家應對例外情形下的自由和根據(jù)雙邊投資條約賦予投資保護的范圍有著非常關鍵性的作用。 本文將集中探討阿根廷應對2000年至2002年經(jīng)濟危機所涉及的提交給ICSID仲裁庭的第一波仲裁裁決浪潮中的四個案例。阿根廷的系列案件對于投資者與國家之間的未來仲裁的重要性很難再被夸大了。阿根廷為應對經(jīng)濟危機所采取的保護公共秩序和安全,保護國家根本安全利益的措施是否是根據(jù)美國—阿根廷之間的雙邊條約第11條中規(guī)定的必需的不可阻止的措施?四個案件的仲裁庭對這個問題給予了直接回答。其中二個仲裁庭接受了阿根廷援引根本安全利益例外條款措施的必需性的抗辯,而另外二個仲裁庭卻拒絕了阿根廷援引根本安全利益例外條款措施的必需性的抗辯。在基本相同的事實面前,其中的二個仲裁庭認定根本安全利益例外條款不能適用,并且判定阿根廷要為違反雙邊投資條約給投資者造成的損失負責。但另外二個仲裁庭卻認定阿根廷援引根本安全利益例外條款是合理的,從而判定阿根廷無須為在經(jīng)濟危機情況下所必需的時期內(nèi)對投資者造成的損害負責。這些仲裁庭不同的判決對根本安全利益例外條款的解釋和適用提出了一個很重要的問題。根本安全利益例外條款究竟給予國家在危機情形下采取措施而不違反雙邊投資條約多少自由?雙邊投資條約的確像被人們認為的那樣是一種保護投資者的強有力形勢嗎?在什么樣的情形下,根本安全利益例外條款是可以被援引的?援引根本安全利益例外條款后,國家與投資者的責任與賠償?shù)暮蠊鞘裁?最終,是國家還是投資者來承擔國家應對例外情形下采取措施的風險與損失?這一系列的仲裁裁決值得關注。由于一系列的關于根本安全利益例外條款案件的出現(xiàn),根本安全利益例外條款并不是純粹的理論,而是具有重要的司法實踐意義。 而BIT等國際投資協(xié)議中有關根本安全利益例外條款的規(guī)定,無論是對吸收海外投資的東道國,還是對投資者母國而言,它都是保護本國投資利益的重要內(nèi)容,如何妥善規(guī)定該條款內(nèi)容,是值得權衡的策略性選擇。在這方面,阿根廷的教訓也給我國雙邊投資條約等國際投資立法的完善提供了有益的借鑒。 本文從結(jié)構上來說,全文除了導言和結(jié)束語外,正文共分六章。 第一章國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款概述。該章分四節(jié),其中,第一節(jié)論述了國際投資立法的新發(fā)展,第二節(jié)論述了根本安全利益例外條款的概念,第三節(jié)論述了根本安全利益例外條款的法理基礎,第四節(jié)論述了國際投資法中援引根本安全利益例外條款的條件,第五節(jié)論述了根本安全利益例外條款的解釋與應用的系統(tǒng)性影響。 第二章美國國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款。該章分三節(jié)。其中,第一節(jié)美國國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款概述,第二節(jié)美國國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款內(nèi)容,第三節(jié)對美國國際投資法中根本安全利益例外條款的評價。 第三章NAFTA關于根本安全利益條款的理論與實踐。該章分三節(jié)。其中,第一節(jié)NAFTA關于根本安全利益例外條款的規(guī)定,第二節(jié)NAFTA關于根本安全利益例外條款的司法實踐,第三節(jié)對NAFTA根本安全利益例外條款的評價。 第四章歐盟國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款。該章分三節(jié)。其中,第一節(jié)歐盟國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款概述,第二節(jié)歐盟法院關于根本安全利益例外條款的司法實踐,第三節(jié)對歐盟根本安全利益例外條款的評析。 第五章ICSID中根本安全利益例外條款的司法實踐。該章分三節(jié)。其中,第一節(jié)ICSID關于根本安全利益例外條款案件類案不同判,第二節(jié)ICSID對四起案件類案不同判的理由,第三節(jié)ICSID根本安全利益例外條款案裁決的思考。 第六章中國國際投資法中的根本安全利益例外條款分析及中國對策建議。該章分三節(jié)。其中,第一節(jié)中國有關根本安全利益例外條款的締約實踐及價值,第二節(jié)中美雙邊投資協(xié)定(BIT)的談判,第三節(jié)中國完善根本安全利益例外條款的對策建議。
[Abstract]:The right to protect the fundamental interests of the State as an exception to the treaty commitments has been established in treaty practice. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) investment agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment agreement, a number of bilateral investment treaties and international agreements have included explicit exceptions or exclusionary clauses, In order to ensure that the State takes action for the fundamental security interests. Despite the fact that the State had acceded to a treaty, the commitments under the Treaty could not prevent States from taking measures for the sake of fundamental security interests. How often are the provisions on the exception of fundamental security interests in international investment legislation? What is their range? How do I deal with the basic safety benefit exception clause? Does the State have the right to apply these fundamental security exception clauses on its own, that is, whether the State can decide on its own? Is there a corresponding customary international law on the question of the fundamental safety benefit exception clause? How does the international arbitral tribunal interpret the exception clause of the fundamental security interest? How to hold that exception clause for fundamental security benefit in China? All of these make this article necessary to study the fundamental safety benefit exception clause in the international investment law. The fundamental security interest exception clause is the fixing of American friendship, trade and navigation treaties that began after World War II Elemental. In the late 1950s, the fundamental security exception clause was transplanted from the early friendly, trade and navigation treaties to Germany's bilateral The first investment treaty, including the fundamental security exception clause, is the first bilateral investment treaty in Germany, which is the first bilateral investment treaty in Germany in 1959 The fundamental security interest exception clause can be applied to almost every German bilateral investment treaty after that The first bilateral investment treaty in the United States, the United States and Panama's bilateral investment treaty in 1982, also included an exception to the fundamental security interests The terms. And then every bilateral investment treaty in the United States includes this. Article. Although bilateral investment treaties have become a hot spot in academic research, the fundamental safety benefit exception clause that is often visible in bilateral investment treaties is not available There are many concerns. However, the fundamental security exception clause is relatively comparable in the international investment law Such provisions are widely disseminated in bilateral investment treaties, such as Germany, India, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada and the United States, and play a role in the international financial system The important role of these provisions is also in the specific bilateral investment relationship treaties of many other countries It will occasionally appear. In the current 2000 bilateral investment treaties, the underlying security benefit exception clause is at least 200 in a treaty.1 from more In general, the prevalence of the fundamental security interests exception clause in the bilateral investment treaties is for the international investment law system There is a very important impact. Bilateral investment treaties have long been regarded as a very strong legal instrument for investor protection, which is a cross-border investment far-reaching protection is provided. For example, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Commission has asserted that the primary purpose of BITs is to encourage and protect the United States Investment in developing countries. However, the existence of the fundamental security exception clause indicates that those protections do not apply to international investment in extreme risk An exception or a crisis situation. The traditional understanding of BITs is that the host country is committed to not hurting foreign investors through this treaty, or at least at the expense of the host country If the host country does so, the fundamental security interest exception The terms play a role in the distribution of risks. It will, in exceptional circumstances, damage the cost of the investor Transfer from the host country to the investor. Under the bilateral investment treaties, including the fundamental security interests, the host country must be in breach of the treaty in the ordinary circumstances Compensation for damage to investors, but in exceptional exceptional circumstances, such as the Argentine financial crisis, the underlying security interest exception clause transfers the risk to the investor, and the State may not need to be in violation of bilateral investment The measures taken by the treaty are responsible. In a world that is more globalized than in the past, all exceptions may be included in the fundamental security exception clause, such as the financial crisis, the terrorist threat, the public health, The emergency and so on are very common, and the fundamental safety benefit exception clause is fundamentally limited The system of protection for foreign investors. The interpretation and application of the fundamental security interests exception clause is the case for determining the freedom of the State to deal with exceptional circumstances and the protection of investment in accordance with BITs. This paper will focus on the role of Argentina in the submission of the 2000-2002 economic crisis to the ICSID arbitral tribunal The four cases in the wave of a wave of arbitral awards. Argentina's series of cases are between the investor and the country The importance of the arbitration is very difficult to be overstated. Argentina's measures to protect public order and security for the economic crisis and to protect the fundamental interests of the State are based on article 11 of the bilateral treaties between the United States and Argentina The necessary and non-stoppable measures specified in the following: the secondary of the four cases The tribunal gave a direct answer to the question, in which the two arbitral tribunals had accepted the defence of the necessity of invoking the fundamental security interest exception clause in Argentina, while the other two arbitral tribunals had rejected Argentina's invocation of the fundamental safety interest A plea of the necessity of an exception clause. In the same facts, the two arbitral tribunals found that the fundamental security exception clause could not be applied and that Argentina would be in violation of bilateral investment The loss of a treaty to an investor is the responsibility of the investor, but the other two arbitral tribunals have found that Argentina's invocation of the fundamental security exception clause is reasonable in order to determine that Argentina need not be required to be in the context of the economic crisis In the period of time, the damage to the investors is the responsibility of the investors. The different decisions of these arbitral tribunals have an explanation of the exception of the fundamental security interests and the application of the basic safety benefit exception clause gives the State the measures to take measures in the context of the crisis And how much freedom is it not a violation of a bilateral investment treaty? The bilateral investment treaties do, as people think, Is it a strong situation to protect investors? Under what circumstances, it's essential A full-benefit exception clause can be invoked? After invoking the fundamental security benefit exception clause, the State and the vote What is the consequence of the liability and the compensation of the financier? In the end, it is the State or the investor to bear the national response Risk and loss of measures in the event of an out-of-case basis ? This series of arbitral awards is of great concern. The fundamental safety benefit exception clause is not a pure theory due to a series of occurrences of an exception clause on fundamental security interests It is not only the host country to absorb the overseas investment, but also the home country of the investor, it is the protection of the national investment benefit. What is the important content and how to properly set the rules The content of this article is a strategic choice that is worthy of trade-off. In this regard, the lessons of Argentina are also given to our bilateral investment treaties, etc. The improvement of international investment legislation provides a useful reference. This paper is from the structure In addition to the introduction and the concluding remarks, the text is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the exception clause of the fundamental security interests in the international investment law. The chapter is divided into four sections, in which section I discusses the new development of the international investment legislation, and the second section discusses the basic safety benefit exception clause. In the third section, the legal basis of the exception clause of the fundamental safety benefit is discussed in the third section, and the conditions for invoking the basic safety benefit exception clause in the international investment law are discussed in the fourth section. The explanation and the systemic effect of the basic safety benefit exception clause the second The fundamental security interest exception clause in the United States international investment law. This chapter is divided into three sections, in which the first section provides an overview of the fundamental security interest exception clause in the U.S. international investment law, section II, the basic safety benefit exception clause in the U.S. international investment law III. Comments on the exception of the fundamental security interests in the United States international investment law Price. 3. The theory and practice of NAFTA on the fundamental safety benefit clauses. The chapter is divided into three sections, in which, the first part of NAFTA is related to the provisions of the basic safety benefit exception clause, and the second section NAFTA is about the basic safety benefit exception. The judicial practice of the section, Section III, the fundamental safety benefit of NAFTA Evaluation of the external terms Chapter IV The fundamental security interest exception clause in the European Union's international investment law. This chapter is divided into three sections, in which section I of the European Union International Investment Law provides an overview of the fundamental security interest exception clause, section II of the European Union Court of Justice on the fundamental safety The judicial practice of the all-interest exception clause, and the third section is the fundamental security interest of the EU Comments on the exception clause Analysis. Chapter 5 Judicial practice of the exception clause of the fundamental safety benefit in ICSID. This chapter is divided into three sections, in which, the first ICSID is different from the case class case of the fundamental safety benefit exception clause, and the second ICSID is four The reason for the different judgment of the case case, and the case of the exception clause of the fundamental safety benefit of the ICSID in Section III Think about it. Chapter VI The Analysis of the Basic Security Interests and the Suggestions on China's Countermeasures in China's International Investment Law. This chapter is divided into three sections. In this section, the first section is the first section of China's practice and value of the exception clause of the fundamental security interests, and the second section
【學位授予單位】：華東政法大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D996.4

【引證文獻】

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2 郝荻;;BITs中的基本安全利益例外與國際習慣法中的危急情況之比較[J];中國外資;2013年14期

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本文編號：2487838