【摘要】：《巴黎協(xié)定》既不能消除碳泄漏,也不能解決碳泄漏問題。發(fā)達(dá)國家與發(fā)展中國家在碳泄漏問題上的博弈將長期存在。博弈表現(xiàn)為雙方觀點(diǎn)的對立。發(fā)達(dá)國家博弈的目的是陽謀與陰謀并舉,名利雙收;發(fā)展中國家則是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)氣候正義,維護(hù)自由貿(mào)易。發(fā)達(dá)國家博弈的基礎(chǔ)相對雄厚,既有道德基礎(chǔ),也有理論支撐,還有實(shí)踐保證。發(fā)展中國家博弈的基礎(chǔ)相對薄弱,有法倫理學(xué)基礎(chǔ)、國際法支持和理論支撐。共同責(zé)任將是解決碳泄漏作為環(huán)境問題的路徑,威脅實(shí)施碳關(guān)稅仍可能是解決碳泄漏作為國際政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)問題的路徑。以中國為首的發(fā)展中國家應(yīng)當(dāng)采取措施積極應(yīng)對碳泄漏問題。
[Abstract]:The Paris Agreement can neither eliminate carbon leaks nor solve carbon leaks. There will be a long-term game between developed and developing countries on carbon leakage. The game is expressed as the opposition between the two sides. The purpose of the game in the developed countries is to achieve both conspiracy and conspiracy, while the developing countries are to achieve climate justice and safeguard free trade. The foundation of game in developed countries is relatively strong, both moral basis, theoretical support, and practical guarantee. The foundation of developing country game is relatively weak, with legal ethics foundation, international law support and theoretical support. The common responsibility will be to solve the problem of carbon leakage as an environmental problem, and the threat to implement carbon tariff may still be the way to solve the problem of carbon leakage as an international political and economic problem. Developing countries, led by China, should take steps to deal with carbon spills.
【作者單位】： 廣東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“碳泄漏問題及其法律規(guī)制研究”(13YJA820036)的階段性研究成果
【分類號】：D996.9
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本文編號：2421568