【摘要】：國際仲裁，，作為一種私人的糾紛解決方式，學(xué)界一般認為其基礎(chǔ)是當(dāng)事人的意思自治，國家能夠干預(yù)的范圍甚小。但是私人的糾紛解決方式何以能創(chuàng)立具有司法性質(zhì)的糾紛解決程序，甚至在國家法律秩序之外創(chuàng)設(shè)規(guī)則？或者說仲裁員的權(quán)力以及仲裁程序和仲裁裁決的法律性質(zhì)來自何處？這仍然是一個有爭議的問題，且到目前為止我們對國際仲裁和法學(xué)理論的交叉研究仍然非常有限。 本文以蓋拉德教授關(guān)于國際仲裁基礎(chǔ)的三種“存在形式”的歸納為出發(fā)點（第一部分），從國家與個人之間的關(guān)系（第二部分）、國家與國家之間的關(guān)系（第三部分）兩個層面對國際仲裁的存在基礎(chǔ)進行了分析。在國家與個人之間的關(guān)系中，自法理基礎(chǔ)看，個人權(quán)利具有無可爭議的優(yōu)先地位，國家產(chǎn)生和存在的目的即為保護個人權(quán)利。但是這卻往往無法解釋現(xiàn)實中個人權(quán)利為國家主權(quán)讓步的情形。比如，何以有非可仲裁事項？對選擇仲裁的自由進行限制的理由是什么？而一旦到了國家與國家之間（單一國家與國際社會之間）的關(guān)系的層面，個人則幾乎沒有發(fā)聲的空間。國家是國際法的主體，卻在宏觀的層面上決定了個人的權(quán)利。因此本文認為傳統(tǒng)的國際仲裁的基礎(chǔ)為個人自治的理論并不能完全解釋國際仲裁中的一些現(xiàn)象。 在傳統(tǒng)的個人權(quán)利與國家權(quán)力的對立性關(guān)系中，本文用集體的或者說集合的個人權(quán)利的觀念代替了個體的個人權(quán)利的觀念，即在國家產(chǎn)生的過程中，個人權(quán)利是以個人權(quán)利的集合的形式出現(xiàn)的。而如果在后續(xù)的討論中，認為個體的個人權(quán)利能取得集合的個人權(quán)利的地位，在與國家權(quán)力的對立性關(guān)系中也取得一樣的絕對的優(yōu)勢地位，則是錯誤的。 基于這樣一種區(qū)分，本文將個體的個人權(quán)利與國家權(quán)力的關(guān)系表述為“個人意志優(yōu)先，兼顧國家主權(quán)”，即在國際仲裁制度中個人意志是最基礎(chǔ)的，但在權(quán)利讓渡之后，實際的權(quán)力是由國家行使來行使的；在國際仲裁活動中，某一國家具有決定本國仲裁制度的權(quán)力，可以決定本國公民仲裁權(quán)利的范圍；但是國家主權(quán)對個人權(quán)利作出限制的地方，必須有正當(dāng)?shù)睦碛伞?br/>[Abstract]:International arbitration, as a private dispute settlement method, is generally considered to be based on the autonomy of the parties, and the scope of state intervention is very small. But how can private dispute resolution methods create dispute resolution procedures of a judicial nature, or even create rules outside the national legal order? Or where do the arbitrators' powers and the legal nature of the arbitral proceedings and arbitral awards come from? This is still a controversial issue, and so far our cross-study of international arbitration and legal theory is still very limited. This paper starts from Professor Gillard's induction of three "forms of existence" on the basis of international arbitration (part I), from the relationship between the state and the individual (the second part). The relationship between state and state (part three) analyzes the existence basis of international arbitration. In the relationship between the state and the individual, from the legal basis, the individual rights have an indisputable priority, and the purpose of the state is to protect the individual rights. But this often can not explain the reality of individual rights for national sovereignty concessions. For example, why is there a non-arbitrable matter? What are the reasons for restricting the freedom to choose arbitration? When it comes to state-to-state relations (between a single state and the international community), individuals have little room to speak. The state is the subject of international law, but it determines the individual's rights at the macro level. Therefore, this paper argues that the traditional theory of individual autonomy can not fully explain some phenomena in international arbitration. In the traditional antithesis between individual right and state power, this paper uses the concept of collective or collective individual right to replace the idea of individual right, that is, in the process of the emergence of the state, Individual rights appear in the form of a collection of individual rights. However, it is wrong to think that the individual rights can obtain the status of collective individual rights and the same absolute superiority status in the antagonistic relationship with the state power in the subsequent discussion. Based on such a distinction, the relationship between individual rights and state power is expressed in this paper as "individual will takes precedence over national sovereignty", that is, in the international arbitration system, individual will is the most basic, but after the transfer of rights, The actual power is exercised by the state; In international arbitration activities, a country has the power to determine its own arbitration system and may determine the scope of its citizens' arbitration rights; however, where national sovereignty limits individual rights, there must be justification.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中共中央黨校
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D994;D997.4

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